

1 EARTHJUSTICE
 JAN E. HASSELMAN, WSBA No. 29107
 2 NOELIA GRAVOTTA, WSBA No. 60089
 810 3rd Ave., Suite 610
 3 Seattle, WA 98104
 Telephone: (206) 343-7340
 4 jhasselman@earthjustice.org
 ngravotta@earthjustice.org
 5 *Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenors*
Climate Solutions, The Lands Council,
 6 *NW Energy Coalition, Sierra Club, and*
Washington Physicians for Social
 7 *Responsibility*

8
 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

10 JAMON RIVERA, an individual;
 INLAND NW AGC, a membership
 11 organization; SPOKANE HOME
 BUILDER’S ASSOCIATION, a,
 12 nonprofit corporation; WASHINGTON
 STATE ASSOCIATION OF UA
 13 PLUMBERS, PIPEFITTERS AND
 HVAC/R SERVICE TECHNICIANS, a
 14 labor organization; CONDRON HOMES
 LLC, a limited liability company;
 15 PARAS HOMES LLC, a limited liability
 company; GARCO CONSTRUCTION
 16 INC., a for-profit corporation,
 NATIONAL PROPANE
 17 GAS ASSOCIATION, a national trade
 association, CITIZEN ACTION
 18 DEFENSE FUND, a nonprofit
 corporation; AVISTA
 19 CORPORATION; CASCADE
 NATURAL GAS CORPORATION; and
 20

Case No. 1:23-cv-03070-SAB

DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

July 18, 2023
10:00 a.m.
With Oral Argument

1 NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS
COMPANY,

2
3 Plaintiffs,

4 v.

5 WASHINGTON STATE BUILDING
CODE COUNCIL,

6 Defendant,

7 and

8
9 CLIMATE SOLUTIONS; THE LANDS
COUNCIL; NW ENERGY COALITION;
10 SIERRA CLUB; and WASHINGTON
PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL
11 RESPONSIBILITY,

12 Defendant-Intervenors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

INTRODUCTION1

BACKGROUND1

ARGUMENT2

 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE
 MERITS3

 II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW LIKELY IRREPARABLE
 HARM4

 III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST
 DO NOT SUPPORT AN INJUNCTION.....8

CONCLUSION10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Federal Cases

Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954).....10

Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council,
683 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2012)3

Brewer v. Landrigan,
562 U.S. 996 (2010).....7

Cal. Rest. Assoc. v. Berkeley,
65 F.4th 1045 (9th Cir. 2023)3, 4

Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige,
844 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1988)5, 7

Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1997)9

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
2016 WL 9226390 (D. Or. 2016)9

Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton,
626 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 2010)9

Enyart v. Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs,
630 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2011)5

Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc.,
736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013)6

Lopez v. Brewer,
680 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2012)6

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
561 U.S. 139 (2010).....2

1 *Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.*
 2 *Comm’n*,
 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981)4

3 *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*,
 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)9

4 *W. Watersheds Project v. Schneider*,
 5 417 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (D. Idaho 2019)5

6 *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*,
 555 U.S. 7 (2008).....2, 3, 4

7 *Wyoming v. Dep’t of Interior*,
 2017 WL 161428 (D. Wyo. Jan. 16, 2017)6

8 **State Cases**

9 *Dep’t of Ecology v. State Fin. Comm.*,
 10 804 P.2d 1241 (Wash. 1991)10

11 **Federal Statutes**

12 Energy Policy Conservation Act;
 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.3, 4, 9

13 42 U.S.C. § 6297(c)3

14 42 U.S.C. § 6297(f)(3)3, 9

15 **State Statutes**

16 RCW 19.27A.....1

17 RCW 19.27A.020(2)(a)2, 10

18 RCW 43.325.005(1).....10

19 **Rules**

20 Fed. R. App. Proc. 354

1 **Regulations**

2 WAC 51-11C-403146

3 **Other Authorities**

4 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and*
5 *Procedure* § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2023)4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1 INTRODUCTION

2 Plaintiffs’ request for emergency relief fails on every front. This rushed
3 motion draws a bead on a moving target, barely addressing the fact that Defendant
4 State Building Code Council (“SBCC”) has already effectively given Plaintiffs the
5 relief they seek by suspending the challenged rules and initiating a process to
6 amend them. It leans heavily on a fractured and non-final decision of the Ninth
7 Circuit holding a municipal prohibition on gas piping preempted by federal law,
8 but fails to mention the pending rehearing petition that could vacate the decision.
9 And their attempted showing of irreparable harm—consisting primarily of
10 unsupported opinions, speculation, and hearsay—falls far short of the strict
11 standards imposed in this Circuit for preliminary relief. Intervenors Climate
12 Solutions *et al.*, join the SBCC’s opposing brief, and ask that the motion be denied.

13 BACKGROUND

14 Washington State has adopted multiple ambitious policies that seek to
15 drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and catalyze a transition to clean
16 energy. Hall Decl. ¶¶ 6-9. One of these policies, the state’s Energy Code,
17 RCW 19.27A, addresses greenhouse gas emissions from residential and
18 commercial buildings—one of the primary sources of greenhouse gases in
19 Washington State. *Id.* ¶ 9. Under this statute, the SBCC is charged with
20 implementing increasingly stringent building design standards to reach zero

1 emissions from fossil fuels by 2031. RCW 19.27A.020(2)(a). The SBCC has been
2 implementing this regime since around 1990 with statewide energy standards for
3 residential and commercial buildings that are updated every three years.

4 The SBCC adopted the most recent iteration of these rules in two phases in
5 2022 and early 2023, with an effective date of July 1, 2023. The rules were
6 adopted after an extensive public process including many technical meetings,
7 public hearings, and opportunities for comment. They comprise hundreds of pages
8 of detailed technical standards, most of which are not at issue here. Recently, the
9 SBCC filed an amended rule-making order (known as a CR-103P) pushing back
10 the effective date of the rules until October 29, 2023, and initiated a rulemaking
11 process to amend the rules before then. That process is now well underway.

12 ARGUMENT

13 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy” that is “never
14 awarded as of right.” *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
15 “It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask
16 whether there is a good reason why an injunction should *not* issue; rather, a court
17 must determine that an injunction *should* issue under the traditional four-factor
18 test.” *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms*, 561 U.S. 139, 158 (2010) (emphasis
19 in original). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is
20 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

1 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
2 an injunction is in the public interest.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20. Here, Plaintiffs
3 cannot prevail on *any* factor, let alone all of them.

4 I. PLAINTIFFS ARE UNLIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS

5 Plaintiffs raise a single claim: that portions of the SBCC building codes are
6 federally preempted by the Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”). In
7 *California Restaurant Association v. Berkeley* (“CRA”), a divided panel of the
8 Ninth Circuit held that EPCA preempted Berkeley’s prohibition on some fossil fuel
9 infrastructure in new buildings. 65 F.4th 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2023). EPCA sets
10 national standards for the efficiency of certain appliances like furnaces and stoves.
11 To prevent manufacturers contending with a patchwork of varying state standards,
12 Congress preempted state and local governments from setting their own appliance
13 efficiency standards. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 6297(c). Building codes that meet certain
14 criteria are exempt from EPCA’s preemption provision in cases where it would
15 otherwise apply. *Id.* § 6297(f)(3); *Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg.*
16 *Code Council*, 683 F.3d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding SBCC building
17 standards). In *CRA*, the panel found that Berkeley’s gas piping prohibition was
18 preempted by EPCA because it impacted the “energy use” of covered appliances.
19 65 F.4th at 1050-51. Plaintiffs’ case relies almost entirely on *CRA*.

1 The *CRA* litigation is far from over. Berkeley has filed a petition for
2 rehearing *en banc*, which is pending. Hasselman Decl., Ex. 1. The petition was
3 supported by the United States, which observed that “[r]ehearing is warranted to
4 correct the panel’s error regarding [] issues of exceptional importance,” along with
5 multiple other amici—including the State of Washington. *Id.*, Ex. 2, at 2. A
6 decision from the Ninth Circuit to grant rehearing would prevent this Court from
7 relying on the decision until the rehearing is resolved. Fed. R. App. Proc. 35.

8 Regardless, Plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits because the SBCC
9 has already initiated a process to amend the rules in light of *CRA*, making this case
10 unripe. Plaintiffs can challenge the revised rules once finalized if they feel that
11 they are preempted by EPCA. Until the process is complete, their challenge is
12 premature. *Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n*,
13 659 F.2d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting a “challenged statute or regulation is
14 generally not considered fit for adjudication until it has actually been applied”).

15 II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW LIKELY IRREPARABLE HARM

16 Irreparable harm is “[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the
17 issuance of a preliminary injunction.” 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
18 Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 2948.1 (3d ed. 2023). The irreparable
19 harm factor requires a party “seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that
20 irreparable injury is *likely* in the absence of an injunction.” *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 22

1 (emphasis in original). A “[m]ere possibility of harm” is insufficient to invoke a
2 court’s emergency powers. *Enyart v. Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs*, 630 F.3d 1153,
3 1165 (9th Cir. 2011). The alleged injury must also be imminent: “a plaintiff must
4 demonstrate immediate threatened injury” to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
5 *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

6 Plaintiffs’ motion does not come close to passing this demanding standard.
7 Most obviously, irreparable injury is not “likely,” because the SBCC has initiated a
8 process to amend the rules, and delayed implementation until that process is
9 complete. That fact alone dooms this motion. Where a defendant initiates a process
10 to amend a challenged action, the appropriate posture is to stay the proceeding
11 until the amendment is complete—not issue an injunction. *See, e.g., W. Watersheds*
12 *Project v. Schneider*, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1324 (D. Idaho 2019) (litigation “put
13 on hold” while the administration amended challenged plans). Plaintiffs may argue
14 that the SBCC could abandon the rulemaking, leaving the current rules in place,
15 but this implausible outcome is hardly “likely” enough to warrant an injunction
16 now. For the same reasons, the claimed harm is not “imminent.” *Baldrige*, 844
17 F.2d at 674. And as the SBCC explains in its brief, Plaintiffs’ belief that the agency
18 cannot delay the effective date, or timely amend its rules, is flat wrong.

19 Plaintiffs claim that harm is occurring already from rules that were never
20 implemented. Motion at 12-14. They fail to offer even a single case applying this

1 novel theory of harm, nor can one be found. Moreover, plaintiffs bear the burden
2 of proof through competent evidence. *Lopez v. Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th
3 Cir. 2012) (plaintiff must make “a clear showing”). Measured by this standard,
4 Plaintiffs’ showing of imminent irreparable injury collapses.

5 Plaintiffs’ witnesses complain that the rules—which were only recently
6 enacted, were never implemented, and have been stayed—have already caused
7 them hardship, but make no effort to explain how or why. For example, one
8 declarant complains that people in the propane business are already experiencing a
9 “dramatic and substantial decline in business.” Kaminski Decl. ¶ 4. But Mr.
10 Kaminski offers no insights into how never-implemented regulations could have
11 caused this alleged decline. *See also* WAC 51-11C-40314 (allowing use of propane
12 in some instances). Another offers only a bare conclusion that the rules are having
13 a “direct negative impact” on union members, but no discussion as to how or why.
14 Hartman Decl. ¶ 5. These are precisely the sort of “unsupported and conclusory
15 statements regarding harm” that a plaintiff “might suffer” that must be rejected.
16 *Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc.*, 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir.
17 2013); *Wyoming v. Dep’t of Interior*, 2017 WL 161428, at *11 (D. Wyo. Jan. 16,

1 2017) (allegations of harm from rules that would not be effective for a year was
2 “simply too uncertain and speculative” to warrant injunctive relief).¹

3 Similarly, witnesses from the gas utilities predict declining customer counts
4 caused by the rules. Frankel Decl. ¶ 7; Forsyth Decl. ¶ 5; Robertson Decl. ¶ 6.
5 Plaintiffs make no effort to qualify these witnesses as experts, reveal the data that
6 they rely on, or explain the methodology that they use. These predictions are not
7 facts—they are opinions. Unsupported, vague, and conclusory opinions cannot
8 substitute for qualified affiants and competent evidence. *Brewer v. Landrigan*, 562
9 U.S. 996, 996 (2010) (“speculation cannot substitute for evidence” of irreparable
10 harm); *Baldrige*, 844 F.2d at 674 (“Speculative injury does not constitute
11 irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.”).

12 Not a single witness makes any effort to differentiate the impacts of the
13 SBCC’s rules from the countless other forces that are impacting the fossil fuel
14 business. Washington State is and has been deeply committed to an energy
15 transition away from fossil fuels. This is playing out in countless forums: city
16 ordinances that incentivize building electrification; utility commissions

17
18 ¹ Plaintiffs’ declarations are also riddled with inadmissible hearsay. *See, e.g.*,
19 Koschalk Decl. ¶ 6 (“We have already heard from people who don’t understand
20 how” the rules work); Stewart Decl. ¶ 7 (“Some of our members tell us . . .”).

1 investigating the decarbonization of the gas system; and changing consumer
2 choices in light of emerging evidence that burning fossil gas in buildings carries
3 serious health risks. Hall Decl. ¶ 12-16. All are playing a role in a shift away from
4 fossil gas. Gas purveyors may be feeling an impact from this transition, but that
5 does not mean such impacts are caused by the challenged rules.

6 To be sure, Intervenors care deeply that SBCC's building energy rules work
7 for unions, builders, and homeowners. Hall Decl. ¶ 22. They understand that
8 adverse economic impacts could weaken support for the rules, and have
9 consistently advocated that such concerns be addressed in crafting them. Indeed,
10 the economic impacts of shifting away from fossil fuels like gas were a particular
11 focus of the rule process and received careful attention from the SBCC. *Id.* ¶ 23.
12 The data in that process demonstrated that the rules would be both an
13 environmental and economic win for the state. *Id.* Plaintiffs can raise their
14 perspective about economic impacts anew during the rulemaking process for the
15 revised rules, just as they did during previous processes.

16 In sum, Plaintiffs have fallen far short of satisfying their burden of showing
17 imminent irreparable harm.

18 III. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST DO NOT
19 SUPPORT AN INJUNCTION.

20 Given the deficiencies in Plaintiffs' showing of irreparable harm, there is no
21 need for this Court to reach the other injunction factors. Even so, these factors also

1 tip sharply against the requested relief. “[D]istrict courts must give serious
2 consideration to the balance of equities.” *Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton*, 626 F.3d
3 462, 475 (9th Cir. 2010). A state “suffers irreparable injury whenever an enactment
4 of its people or their representatives is enjoined.” *Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson*,
5 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997). Where an injunction would reach beyond the
6 parties and impact the public, a Court must also carefully weigh the public interest.
7 *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (overturning
8 injunction against Washington state regulations as contrary to public interest).

9 An injunction against the rules would cause harm to Intervenors. Enjoining
10 rules that already are in the process of amendment would sow “public confusion”
11 and have a chilling effect on other jurisdictions considering clean energy policies.
12 Hall Decl. ¶ 20-21. It could empower those who seek to use disinformation to fight
13 against clean energy policies. *Id.* It could also undermine the ongoing good-faith
14 effort of SBCC to address EPCA concerns via rulemaking amendment. Indeed,
15 because EPCA specifically exempts building codes that meet certain criteria from
16 preemption, 42 U.S.C. § 6297(f)(3), modest amendments to just one of the
17 compliance pathways might resolve Plaintiffs’ EPCA concerns, while leaving the
18 vast majority of the rules intact. Courts have rejected injunction requests in
19 comparable situations. *See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of*

1 *Reclamation*, 2016 WL 9226390, at *5 (D. Or. 2016) (injunction “would disrupt
2 the ongoing, collaborative efforts” to resolve problem).

3 As to the public interest, it is most clearly represented by Washington’s
4 unchallenged commitment to addressing the climate crisis by eliminating
5 greenhouse gas emissions and transitioning to clean energy. “[W]hen the
6 legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
7 conclusive.” *Berman v. Parker*, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); *see also Dep’t of Ecology*
8 *v. State Fin. Comm.*, 804 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Wash. 1991) (“[L]egislative declaration
9 is presumed to express the will of the people.”). As the legislature has found,
10 “excessive dependence on fossil fuels jeopardizes Washington’s economic
11 security, environmental integrity, and public health.” RCW 43.325.005(1). That’s
12 why it enacted a statutory goal to phase out greenhouse gas emissions from fossil
13 fuel use in commercial and residential buildings by 2031. RCW 19.27A.020(2)(a).
14 Plaintiffs invite this Court to implement an end-run around policies which
15 represent the public interest. Intervenors ask this Court to reject the invitation.

16 CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, the motion for preliminary injunction should be denied.

18 //

19 //

20 //

1 DATED: June 22, 2023.

2 Respectfully submitted,

3 /s/Jan E. Hasselman

4 JAN E. HASSELMAN, WSBA No. 29107
5 NOELIA GRAVOTTA, WSBA No. 60089

6 Earthjustice

7 810 Third Avenue, Suite 610

8 Seattle, WA 98104-1711

9 (206) 343-7340 | Phone

10 (206) 343-1526 | Fax

11 *jhasselman@earthjustice.org*

12 *ngravotta@earthjustice.org*

13 *Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenors*
14 *Climate Solutions, The Lands Council, NW*
15 *Energy Coalition, Sierra Club, and*
16 *Washington Physicians for Social*
17 *Responsibility*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby declare that on this day, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Callie A. Castillo, WSBA No. 38214
Devon J. McCurdy, WSBA No. 52663
Angela Foster, WSBA No. 52269
Daniel Miller, WSBA No. 56810
LANE POWELL PC
1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4200
P.O. Box 91302
Seattle, Washington 98111-9402
Telephone: 206.223.7000
Facsimile: 206.223.7107
castilloc@lanepowell.com
mccurdyd@lanepowell.com
fostera@lanepowell.com
millerd@lanepowell.com
*Counsel for the Homeowners, Builders,
and Suppliers*

Megan H. Berge (DC Bar No. 983714)
Thomas Jackson (DC Bar No. 384708)
Scott Novak (DC Bar No. 1736274)
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
700 K Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
202-639-1308
megan.berge@bakerbotts.com
thomas.jackson@bakerbotts.com
scott.novak@bakerbotts.com

Francesca Eick (WA Bar No. 52432)
401 S 1st, Suite 1300
Austin, TX 78704
512-322-2672
francesca.eick@bakerbotts.com
Counsel for the Utilities

Emma Grunberg
Attorney General of Washington
Government Compliance and
Enforcement Division
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
360-753-6200
Emma.Grunberg@atg.wa.gov

1 R. July Simpson
William D McGinty
2 Washington State Office of the
Attorney General
3 7141 Cleanwater Drive SW
PO Box 40111
4 Olympia, WA 98504-0111
360-586-3151
5 july.simpson@atg.wa.gov
william.mcginty@atg.wa.gov
6 *Attorneys for Defendant Washington
State Building Code Council*

7 DATED: June 22, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

8 *s/ Diana Brechtel*

9 Diana Brechtel, Litigation Paralegal

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22