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11		TES DISTRICT COURT ICT OF ARIZONA
12	FOR THE DISTRI	ICI OF ARIZONA
13		
14	COALITION FOR SONORAN DESERT PROTECTION; CENTER FOR	
15	BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY; FRIENDS OF	Case No. 4:22-cv-193-JCH
16	IRONWOOD FOREST; and TUCSON AUDUBON SOCIETY,	
17	Plaintiffs,	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
18	Tuments,	PARTIAL DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF
19	v.	SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
20	FEDERAL HIGHWAY	(Oral Argument Requested)
21	ADMINISTRATION; and KARLA PETTY, acting in her official capacity as DIVISION	
22	ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL	
23	HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, ARIZONA,	
24	Defendants.	
25	Defendants.	
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MOTION TO DISMISS

The Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") and Karla Petty, named in her official capacity as defendant, hereby move for partial dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, ECF No. 1, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and request entry of judgment in their favor as to Plaintiffs' claims for relief under Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 23 C.F.R. § 774, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 663.

Plaintiffs allege that "FHWA's failure to adequately consider the [I-11 Corridor]

Project's impacts on Sonoran Desert National Monument, Ironwood Forest National Monument,
Saguaro National Park, Tucson Mountain Park, Tucson Mountain Historic District, and City of
Tucson and Pima County lands and alternatives to avoid the Tucson Mitigation Corridor
precluded informed consideration of feasible and prudent alternatives and 'all possible planning'
to avoid and minimize impacts on these properties," in violation of Section 4(f). Compl. ¶ 111.

Plaintiffs also allege that "FHWA's decision to carry forward the West Option to Tier 2,
including use of the Tucson Mitigation Corridor for the Project, violates the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act's directive that properties acquired under 16 U.S.C. section 663 for wildlife
conservation purposes 'shall be in accordance with general plans jointly approved' by the agency
administering the project, the Department of the Interior, and the state wildlife agency." *Id.* ¶

115.

Taking the allegations of fact as true, Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs fail to state cognizable Section 4(f) and Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claims because the Complaint does not and cannot identify final agency action, as the APA requires. FHWA's review of the proposed and currently unfunded Interstate-11 ("I-11") freeway in Arizona (the "Proposed Facility") and its potential impacts to Section 4(f)

1	resources is preliminary and thus not final. FHWA's preliminary review precedes a final review		
2	of Section 4(f) resources that the Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT") must perform		
3	in Tier 2 should the agency secure sufficient funding. Similarly, in their Fish and Wildlife		
5	Coordination Act claim Plaintiffs ask the Court to review a deferred rather than final agency		
6	action (i.e., selection of the West Option). FHWA's deferment of the decision as to whether to		
7	select the West or East Options through Pima County renders Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife		
8	Coordination Act claim unripe.		
9	For all of these reasons and those detailed in the attached Memorandum Defendants		
10	respectfully ask the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) and Fish and Wildlife		
11			
12	Coordination Act claims and their associated Requests for Relief in their entirety, with prejudice,		
13	and enter judgment in their favor. See id. ¶¶ 105-116.		
14	Respectfully submitted on August 5, 2022.		
15	TODD KIM		
16	Assistant Attorney General Environment & Natural Resources Division		
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18	<u>Christopher M. Chellis</u> CHRISTOPHER M. CHELLIS		
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August, 2022, a copy of the foregoing Motion for Partial Dismissal was filed via the Court's electronic case filing (ECF) system, which will send notice to all counsel of record.

Christopher M. Challis

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15	IRONWOOD FOREST; and TUCSON	Cuse 110. 4.22 ev 173 3C11	
16	AUDUBON SOCIETY,		
17	Plaintiffs,	MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF	
18	·	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR	
19	V.	PARTIAL DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION	
20	FEDERAL HIGHWAY	Sebble 1 MATTER VERISDICTION	
21	ADMINISTRATION; and KARLA PETTY, acting in her official capacity as DIVISION	(Oral Argument Requested)	
22	ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL		
23	HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION,		
24	ARIZONA,		
25	Defendants.		
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INTRODUCTION

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims brought under Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act because they are predicated on non-final agency action. This case concerns the proposed and currently unfunded Interstate-11 ("I-11") freeway in Arizona (the "Proposed Facility") that would run 280 miles north to south from Wickenburg to Nogales and the I-11 Corridor Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") identifying a general area in which the future freeway could be located (the "I-11 Corridor") pending additional, more detailed study and available funding. Plaintiffs challenge the Record of Decision ("ROD") and Final Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation of the first phase (*i.e.*, "Tier 1") of the Proposed Facility. The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") and local project sponsor Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT") issued the Tier 1 ROD and preliminary Section 4(f) evaluation on November 15, 2021.

Should funding become available, identification of a precise alignment, design, and additional environmental review of the Proposed Facility will occur in a second phase, Tier 2. ADOT is solely responsible for advancing any Tier 2 projects as it has assumed all NEPA responsibility under 23 U.S.C § 326. The ROD identifies the 2,000-foot wide Preferred Corridor Alternative analyzed in the I-11 Final Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation as the Selected Corridor Alternative. But the ROD defers to Tier 2 and ADOT the further study and selection through Pima County of either the West or East Options, No Build, or a different alignment altogether. Moreover, there is no specific timing for the Tier 2 process, and the State legislature only recently authorized \$25M in funding for further Tier 2 study in Maricopa County, which does not include funding for final design, right-of-way

acquisition, or construction. Def. Ex. 1, Declaration of Karla Petty ("Declaration") \P 7. And no funding, federal or otherwise, has been authorized for any other segment. *Id.* Even assuming ADOT completes its review of the Tier 2 project and secures funding for construction, it is up to the State Transportation Board ("STB") to determine its priority in the Five-Year Transportation Facilities Construction Program and ADOT may not unilaterally prioritize it over other competing projects. *Id.* \P 6.

Plaintiffs now challenge, among other things, a largely unfunded freeway construction project and preliminary Section 4(f) analysis that represents one initial step among many more steps in the agencies' review of the Proposed Facility's potential impacts. ADOT cannot even begin the design phase or resume NEPA and Section 4(f) review of segments of the Proposed Facility until it has secured funding for that purpose, which has not occurred for the West or East Option segments in Pima County. Yet Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim assumes that the agencies' have already selected the West Option.

The Court should dismiss both Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) claim and their Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither claim is justiciable. FHWA's high-level evaluation of the Proposed Facility's impact to Section 4(f) resources is preliminary. Challenges under the APA require final agency action. FHWA's preliminary review, however, precedes the complete and final review of Section 4(f) resources that ADOT must perform in Tier 2 should it secure funding before it can select a build alternative for the Proposed Facility. Similarly, the West Option for the corridor in Pima County that Plaintiffs claim violates the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act is, as the name suggests, a route that the agencies have not yet chosen. Yet Plaintiffs' claim assumes that FHWA and ADOT have selected the West Option. The ROD itself, however, acknowledges that it carries

the West and East Options forward to allow ADOT to make a more informed decision to choose one of them, take no action (No Build), or develop a new alternative, after completing detailed environmental and engineering studies in Tier 2.

Thus, as explained in greater detail below, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) and Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. ADOT and NDOT Issue the I-11 and Intermountain West Corridor Study

In 2014, ADOT and the Nevada Department of Transportation issued the I-11 and Intermountain West Corridor Study identifying the I-11 Corridor as a critical transportation corridor that would diversify, support, and connect the economies of Arizona and Nevada. Compl. ¶ 67, ECF No. 1; Def. Ex. 2, Final Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation ("Final EIS") at ES-1.

In May 2016, FHWA and ADOT issued a Notice of Intent to Prepare a Tier 1
Environmental Impact Statement for Interstate 11 Corridor Between Nogales and Wickenburg,
Arizona. Compl. ¶ 68. The notice initiated a forty-five day scoping period during which FHWA
and ADOT received public input and held six public meetings on the scope of the EIS, the
Project's purpose and need, potential alternatives to be considered, and impacts to be evaluated.

Id. Materials presented at these meetings depicted the study area, detailed the purpose and need,
and defined the overall Tier 1 EIS study process. Id.

After the scoping period, FHWA and ADOT considered numerous corridors composed of twenty-seven segments that would be consistent with the Proposed Facility's purpose and need through the Alternative Selection Report (ASR) process, which included six additional public

information meetings and various other outreach efforts, and narrowed them to three end-to-end alternatives for analysis in the Draft EIS. *Id.* ¶¶ 70-71.

B. FHWA and ADOT Issue the Draft Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation for the Project

On April 5, 2019, FHWA and ADOT issued a Draft Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation for the Project. *Id.* ¶ 71. During a ninety-four-day comment period, the agencies held six public hearings attended by more than 1,300 people. *Id.* The agencies received over 12,400 public comment submissions on the Draft EIS. *Id.* ¶ 81.

The Draft EIS noted that in a final Tier 1 EIS the agencies would select either a Build Corridor Alternative or a No Build Alternative. Compl. ¶ 72. If the agencies selected the Build Corridor Alternative, the process would require Tier 2 environmental studies to determine the specific alignment of the freeway within the selected I-11 Corridor. *Id*.

The Draft EIS considered three Build Corridor Alternatives (Purple, Green, and Orange) and a hybrid of the alternatives. *Id.* ¶¶ 75-76. The document identified the hybrid alternative as the Recommended Alternative that FHWA determined would best meet the Proposed Facility's purpose and need. *Id.* ¶ 76.

The Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation determined that: (1) neither the Ironwood Forest
National Monument nor Sonoran Desert National Monument qualified for Section 4(f)
protections because they do not function and are not designated within the BLM Resource
Management Plan as a significant park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge; (2) the
Tucson Mitigation Corridor qualified for Section 4(f) protection because it is a significant
wildlife refuge and the Proposed Facility would result in a direct use of the property; and (3) the

recreation resource but there would be no direct or constructive use because the Proposed Facility's impacts would not incorporate land from the properties nor substantially impair the activities, features, or attributes that qualify each park for Section 4(f) protection. *Id.* ¶ 86.

Saguaro National Park and Tucson Mountain Park are protected by Section 4(f) as a park and

The Draft Section 4(f) Evaluation also determined that it did not need to consider the Proposed Facility's ecological intrusion as a constructive use of Saguaro National Park and Tucson Mountain Park because the two parks are managed for conservation, preservation, and public recreation as opposed to use as a wildlife or waterfowl refuge where ecological intrusion is a relevant a factor. *Id.* ¶¶ 87, 88.

C. FHWA and ADOT Issue the Final Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation for the Project

On July 16, 2021, FHWA and ADOT issued the Final Tier 1 EIS and Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation for the I-11 Corridor. Compl. ¶ 90.

The Preferred Alternative identified in the Final EIS differed from the Recommended Alternative in the Draft EIS in several ways. Notably, the Preferred Alternative deferred the decision as to whether to create a new corridor west of Tucson in Pima County (the West Option), or whether to co-locate the Project with I-19 and I-10 in and around Tucson between Sahuarita and Southern Pinal County (the East Option). Def. Ex. 2, Final EIS at ES-4.

A thirty-day public review period followed the issuance of the Final EIS. Compl. ¶ 92.

All correspondence received was reviewed and made available on the EIS website. 1

D. FHWA Issues the Record of Decision for the Project

¹ Interstate 11 Corridor Tier 1 Environmental Impact Statement, Nogales to Wickenburg, Study Documents, Correspondence Report Appendix A - D2 (http://il1study.com/Arizona/Documents.asp), last visited Aug. 4, 2022.

On November 15, 2021, FHWA and ADOT issued the ROD for the I-11 Corridor.

Compl. ¶ 100. The ROD identified the Preferred Corridor Alternative analyzed in the Final EIS as the Selected Corridor Alternative for the I-11 Corridor Project and found that the No Build Alternative would not meet the purpose and need. *Id*.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the federal court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted when, looking at the entirety of the complaint, its allegations fail to establish jurisdiction either facially or factually. *Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). While in a facial attack all material allegations are taken as true, the court need not assume the truthfulness of the allegations in a factual attack and may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. *In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.*, 549 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008).

ARGUMENT

A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) Claim

The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) claim because Plaintiffs seek judicial review of a preliminary approval rather than a final agency action.

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides authority for the Court's review of decisions under Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c), but limits that review to "final agency action" under 5 U.S.C. § 704. *See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n*, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990). To be final, two conditions must be met: "the action must mark the consummation of the agency's decision-making process," and it must also determine

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"rights or obligations" or be one "from which legal consequences will flow." *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

First, FHWA's Tier 1 review of the Proposed Facility's impact on Section 4(f) resources decidedly does not "mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decision-making process." *Id.* (citation omitted). The Tier 1 ROD includes only a final preliminary Section 4(f) evaluation. Def. Ex. 3, ROD at 19. Though "FHWA completed a Preliminary Section 4(f) Evaluation, . . . ADOT will complete Section 4(f) evaluations during the Tier 2 analyses." *Id.* That evaluation will not only revisit but also expand upon the analyses FHWA performed at the Tier 1 level. Specifically, ADOT will: (1) select a specific roadway alignment; (2) identify and assess potential impacts and uses of Section 4(f) properties based on that alignment; (3) potentially identify additional Section 4(f) resources; (4) evaluate measures to avoid or minimize impacts to Section 4(f) properties; (5) identify and commit to measures to mitigate adverse impacts to Section 4(f) properties; (6) assess least overall harm as warranted; and (7) complete a Final Section 4(f) Evaluation prior to making a final Section 4(f) approval. *Id.* And "if new conditions, information, or regulations that change the boundaries of Section 4(f) properties within the corridors arise before Tier 2 studies, FHWA may evaluate alternatives outside the 2,000-foot-wide corridor." Id.

Second, the Tier 1 review does not make a determination from which rights or obligations flow. *Bennett*, 520 U.S. at 178. While FHWA's Tier 1 evaluation provides an initial overview of the Proposed Facility's potential impacts to Section 4(f) resources, the ROD notes that once ADOT "refine[s] the corridor to a specific roadway alignment" it will "identify and assess potential impacts and uses of Section 4(f) properties," "evaluate measures to avoid or minimize impacts to Section 4(f) properties," "identify and commit to measures to mitigate

adverse impacts to Section 4(f) properties," and "complete a Final Section 4(f) Evaluation prior to making a final Section 4(f) approval." Def. Ex. 3, ROD at 19. No rights or obligations flow from "the potential to require the use of resources protected under Section 4(f)" *Id.* Rather, ADOT will "complete the Draft and Final Section 4(f) Evaluation(s) as required" during Tier 2, when it "will focus on examining ways to avoid or minimize uses of the Section 4(f) properties in the development of alignment alternatives" *Id.* at 20.

Not unlike the ROD and final EIS in *Openlands v. U.S. Department of Transportation*, 124 F. Supp. 3d 796, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2015), the ROD here "expressly states that the Agencies' determinations as to all 4(f) properties are preliminary" *Openlands* concerned FHWA's environmental review of a proposed interstate tollway that ran from Will County, Illinois to Lake County, Indiana. *Id.* at 798. Among the plaintiffs' claims was a challenge to FHWA's evaluation of the project's impacts to Section 4(f) resources. *Id.* at 809-10. Concluding that the agencies' Section 4(f) determinations were preliminary and not final, the court found it convincing that "opportunities to minimize harm at subsequent stages [were] not precluded by decisions made in Tier One," "Section 4(f) approval [would] be finalized in Tier Two," and "[a] preliminary Section 4(f) approval would be subject to a reevaluation if new or more detailed information bec[ame] available during the Tier Two NEPA studies." *Id.* at 810 (citations omitted).

FHWA's Section 4(f) analysis here is no less preliminary than the analysis the agency provided at Tier 1 in *Openlands*. As discussed above, opportunities to minimize harm at subsequent stages were not precluded by decisions made in FHWA's Tier 1 analysis because ADOT is now tasked with Tier 2 analysis that includes examining ways to minimize harm to Section 4(f) properties and identifying appropriate mitigation. These are the very same

outstanding determinations the court noted in *Openlands* before finding that FHWA's Section 4(f) evaluation was merely preliminary and not final agency action.

The Court should thus dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) claim for failure to plead final agency action.

B. Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act Claim is Not Ripe

The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim because Plaintiffs seek judicial review of a deferred rather than final agency action (*i.e.*, selection of the West Option). *See* Def. Ex. 3, ROD at 12 ("The Preferred Alternative . . . carries forward two options (west option and east option) for further study in Pima County"). The agency's deferment of the decision as to whether to select the West or East Options through Pima County renders Plaintiffs' claim unripe.

"To determine ripeness in an agency context, [the Court] must consider: (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented." *Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr.* v. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

First, the facts demonstrate that Plaintiffs would suffer no hardship were the Court to delay review of Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim. That the Proposed Facility in Pima County is presently unfunded means that ADOT cannot actually select the West Option that Plaintiffs' claim assumes the agency has already selected. *See* Def. Ex. 3, ROD at 17 ("At the time of this ROD, no funding has been identified to plan, design, purchase right-of-way, or construct any part of I-11, including any Tier 2 analysis."). Even if the Proposed Facility were funded, ADOT would not only have to resume but also reevaluate the NEPA analysis FHWA

performed in light of its specific freeway design. *Id.* ("The Tier 2 process would include NEPA analysis to inform the selection of a specific alignment within the 2,000-foot-wide selected corridor alternative, site-specific environmental analyses and mitigation measures, and preliminary design."). Should ADOT determine that the West Option best meets the Proposed Facility's purpose and need, complete coordination under the FWCA, and officially select that alternative, Plaintiffs can then file their Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim.

Second, assuming ADOT secures Tier 2 funding, Plaintiffs file a motion for preliminary injunction, and the Court grants said motion, the Court's interference would mean that ADOT could not resume its evaluation of the respective environmental impacts of the West and East Options in Pima County. FHWA's Tier 1 NEPA analysis more broadly addresses the 2,000-foot-wide corridor but it cannot possibly address the precise potential environmental impacts of a freeway that ADOT has not yet designed. Def. Ex. 1, Declaration ¶ 4. ADOT could not resume its environmental review, let alone begin freeway design, were the Court to interfere with Tier 2 advancement now. Whether the agency ultimately selects the West or East Option, that route represents a significant and inextricable part of the proposed I-11 Corridor in Arizona. *See* Def. Ex. 3, ROD at 13 (Figure 6).

Third, ADOT's review of and expansion upon FHWA's analysis regarding any potential impacts to the Tucson Mitigation Corridor could only stand to benefit the Court and its own review of the agencies' decision-making. This is assuming, of course, that ADOT not only secures funding for the resumption of such environmental review but that it also selects the West Option after such review.

None of the three ripeness factors supports the survival of Plaintiffs' Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act claim. Thus, the Court should dismiss this claim.

CONCLUSION 1 2 For these reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion for 3 Partial Dismissal and dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 4(f) and Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 4 claims. 5 Respectfully submitted on August 5, 2022. 6 TODD KIM 7 Assistant Attorney General 8 Environment & Natural Resources Division 9 Christopher M. Chellis CHRISTOPHER M. CHELLIS 10 Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice 11 Environment & Natural Resources Division 12 Natural Resources Section P.O. Box 7611 13 Washington, D.C. 20044-7611 14 Tel: (202) 305-0245 Fax: (202) 305-0506 15 christopher.chellis@usdoj.gov 16 Counsel for Federal Defendants 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28