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May 3, 2022

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BY ELECTRONIC FILING

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe Clerk of Court United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, NY 10007

Re: State of Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 21-1446

Dear Ms. Wolfe:

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), appellant writes in response to appellee's letters regarding the Fourth and Ninth Circuit's respective decisions in *Mayor & City Council of Baltimore* v. *BP p.l.c.* and *County of San Mateo* v. *Chevron Corp.* Both courts erred by rejecting removal based on federal common law, deepening existing circuit conflicts.

The Fourth Circuit rejected (Op. 24-25) this Court's holding in *City of New York* v. *Chevron Corp.*, 993 F.3d 81 (2021), that claims seeking redress for climate-change injuries arise exclusively under federal common law. This Court properly reasoned in *City of New York* that such "sprawling" claims are incompatible with our Constitution's federalist structure and the need for uniformity on matters of national energy and environmental policy. 993 F.3d at 91-92. That reasoning controls here, where the claims are premised on harms from transboundary emissions. J.A. 41-43, 51.

The Fourth Circuit deepened another circuit conflict (Op. 15) by holding that claims governed by federal common law but artfully pleaded under state law are not removable. *See* Reply Br. 12 (collecting cases).

Ms. Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe

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Finally, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly concluded (Op. 29-30) that jurisdiction is not present because the Clean Air Act has displaced the applicable federal common law. See also Board of County Commissioners v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 25 F.4th 1238, 1260 (10th Cir. 2022). That reasoning conflates the merits of the claims with the Court's jurisdiction. Reply Br. 8-9. Although the Act may displace any remedy under federal common law, it does not displace the entire source of law. See City of New York, 993 F.3d at 95 & n.7.

In San Mateo, the Ninth Circuit rejected the federal-common-law ground for removal (Op. 22-25) based on its earlier decision in City of Oakland v. BP plc, 969 F.3d 895 (2020). Oakland, however, was incorrectly decided for reasons appellants have already explained. Reply Br. 17-18. And the Baltimore and San Mateo courts' holdings on Grable, federal-officer, and OCSLA jurisdiction are likewise erroneous. Br. 29-47.

We would appreciate it if you would circulate this letter to the panel at your earliest convenience.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kannon K. Shanmugam Kannon K. Shanmugam

cc: All counsel of record (via electronic filing)