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SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
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NO. 20-0558

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

V.

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET AL.,
Respondents.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS

From the Court of Appeals for the Second District
Sitting in Fort Worth, Texas, No. 02-18-00106-CV

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ABBREVIATIONS AND RECORD REFERENCES

PARTIES:

"ExxonMobil" or "Petitioner" means Exxon Mobil Corporation.

"The potential defendants" means the City and County of San Francisco, City of Oakland, County of San Mateo, County of Marin, City of Imperial Beach, City of Santa Cruz, and County of Santa Cruz, their representatives (Barbara J. Parker, Dennis J. Herrera, John C. Beiers, Serge Dedina, Jennifer Lyon, Brian Washington, Dana McRae, and Anthony P. Condotti), and Matthew F. Pawa.

OTHER:

"FOF/COL" ¶ [#] means the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case, dated April 24, 2018, with the relevant numbered paragraph. 3SCR113-28, App. A.

"Governor Amicus Ltr." [#] means the page numbers in Governor Greg Abbott's Amicus Curiae Letter in Support of ExxonMobil's Petition for Review.

"Op." [*#] means the page number in *City of San Francisco v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, No. 02-18-00106-CV, 2020 WL 3969558 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.), App. B.

"TXOGA Amicus Br." [#] means the page numbers in the Texas Oil & Gas Association's Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of ExxonMobil's Petition for Review.

"TCJL Amicus Br." [#] means the page numbers in the Texas Civil Justice League's Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of ExxonMobil's Petition for Review.

"Gov. Br." [#] means the page numbers in the Governmental Respondents' Brief on the Merits.

"Pawa Br." [#] means the page numbers in the Respondent Matthew Pawa's Brief on the Merits.

INTRODUCTION

The potential defendants feign surprise at finding themselves in a Texas courtroom. They deny any contact with Texas arising from their use of litigation to coerce Texas-based energy companies to adopt California's political stance on energy policy. In their telling, all they have done is file "lawsuit[s] seeking economic relief from harm to California property." Gov. Br. 12. Hardly. These California officials disagree with Texas energy policy and targeted leading members of Texas's energy sector to undermine that policy. As Governor Greg Abbott aptly observed, "When out-of-state officials try to project their power across our border, as respondents have done by broadly targeting the speech of an industry crucial to Texas, they cannot use personal jurisdiction to scamper out of our courts and retreat across state lines." Governor Amicus Ltr. 2. The potential defendants, through their use of lawfare, have established sufficient contacts with Texas to be held to account here.

First, an out-of-state government official establishes sufficient minimum contacts with Texas when it seeks to regulate speech in Texas.

In *Defense Distributed v. Grewal*, the Fifth Circuit held that Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over the New Jersey Attorney General for his actions to suppress a Texas firearms company's First Amendment-protected activity "*anywhere*, not just in New Jersey." 971 F.3d 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*,

141 S. Ct. 1736 (2021) (emphasis added). In that case, the Attorney General attempted to exercise "pseudo-national executive authority" over Texas-based speech about firearms, untethered from any conduct in New Jersey that was within his authority. *Id*. at 493. The potential defendants have done no different here. From their respective jurisdictions in California, they launched a campaign into Texas to limit Texans' ability to advocate for climate policy of their choosing. Their lawsuits target speech and activities well beyond the borders of California to coerce Texas residents to adopt the policies favored by California's political class. Their brand of "lawfare," the court of appeals recognized, boils down to "an ugly tool by which to seek the environmental policy changes [they] desire." Op. *20.

The potential defendants' lawfare targets speech primarily outside of California. By purposefully targeting state power beyond their borders to silence disfavored protected speech in Texas, the potential defendants cannot claim the contacts they create with the State are random, fortuitous, or attenuated. They are purposeful. As the trial court recognized, the potential defendants "created a continuing relationship with Texas by ... expressly target[ing] the speech ... of ExxonMobil and other Texas-based energy companies to chill and affect speech, activities, and property in Texas." FOF/COL ¶ 50. Such effects are "capable of deterring" Texans "from further exercising [their] constitutional rights" and thus

constitute jurisdictionally sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. *Morris v. Powell*, 449 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, while the relative size and prominence of the named defendants, standing alone, is not an independent factor in the jurisdictional analysis, here, it reflects the manner in which the potential defendants attempt to coerce policy changes in Texas. By targeting 18 well-established Texas oil and gas companies, the potential defendants attempt to chill the speech of not just ExxonMobil but the energy industry statewide. When foreign state actors work to "regulate the energy industry's speech on climate change," FOF/COL ¶ 13, Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Evidence of the potential defendants' intent to cause statewide effects by targeting 18 Texas-based energy companies' speech "tether[s] [the potential defendants] to [Texas] in [a] meaningful way." *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014).

Second, Respondents' grab bag of arguments for why minimum contacts are unsatisfied are without substance.

The cases on which Respondents principally rely—*Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski*, 513 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2008), and *Bulkley & Associates, L.L.C. v. Department of Industrial Relations*, 1 F.4th 346 (5th Cir. 2021)—are clearly distinguishable. *Stroman* involved the efforts of the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner to regulate the timeshare brokerage industry in Arizona.

Bulkley concerned the neutral regulation of safety practices on California roads by the California Health and Safety Department. Here, the potential defendants target speech and advocacy untethered to California in an attempt to change policies beyond their borders.

Respondents decry a supposed deluge of litigation that they assert will follow if this Court finds that Texas courts have jurisdiction over the potential defendants. This is a red herring. Jurisdiction is proper where, as here, an out-of-state official attempts to regulate protected speech in the forum to address conduct untethered to his or her own jurisdiction. On the other hand, jurisdiction will not lie where an out-of-state official's enforcement efforts merely have incidental effects in the forum. *See Bulkley*, 1 F.4th at 354; *Stroman*, 513 F.3d at 486.

ExxonMobil has never argued that intent, without more, is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. But intent is relevant to determine if a defendant's contacts with a forum were purposeful (and therefore support personal jurisdiction) or accidental (and therefore do not).

A showing of "additional conduct" is simply not required for Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over the potential defendants. On the contrary, additional conduct evidence is only necessary if it is otherwise unclear whether an out-of-state defendant intentionally targeted the forum. *See Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC*, 625 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. 2021). Despite

Respondents' protestations, such a requirement exists only where jurisdiction is predicated on the stream of commerce or broadcast signals reaching the forum. Here, it is obvious, based on the undisputed record, that the potential defendants intended to cause statewide effects in Texas through their campaign of speech suppression. A showing of "additional conduct" is therefore unnecessary.

Finally, all other remaining elements of the personal jurisdiction inquiry are met. ExxonMobil's claims arise out of the potential defendants' Texas contacts. The potential defendants' efforts to suppress speech and associational activities in Texas are the very basis of ExxonMobil's claims. Based on this Court's precedents, the Texas long-arm statute is satisfied.

The decision of the court of appeals should be reversed.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

At issue here is the first prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis: whether these California local governments, along with the potential defendant officials and attorneys, established "minimum contacts" with Texas by filing tortious lawsuits to chill the speech of ExxonMobil and others in the Texas energy industry.[1] Under federal and state law, the answer is yes.

I. The Potential Defendants' Conduct Establishes Minimum Contacts with Texas.

The "focus" of the minimum contacts inquiry is "on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 284. In assessing that relationship, Texas courts consider (i) the defendant's purposeful conduct (ii) aimed at the forum (iii) to avail the defendant of consequences or privileges in the forum state. *Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell*, 549 W.S.3d 550, 559 (Tex. 2018). In light of these factors, the record establishes that the potential defendants have created the requisite relationship with Texas.

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[1] A nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas if "the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state due process guarantees," and "the Texas long-arm statute provides for it." *Spir Star AG v. Kimich*, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010). To comply with due process, three elements must be satisfied: (i) a defendant must have established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, (ii) the cause of action must "arise[] out of" or "be related to" the defendant's forum contacts, and (iii) exercising jurisdiction must comport "with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." *Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom*, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013) (citations omitted).

A. When Government Officials Endeavor to Regulate Speech Beyond Their Borders, They Establish Minimum Contacts with the Affected States.

The potential defendants have intentionally targeted Texas through conduct designed to suppress the speech of the Texas energy sector. That conduct "create[d] the necessary contacts" with Texas for personal jurisdiction. *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 286-87.

The Fifth Circuit's decision in *Grewal* demonstrates that government officials who aim their regulatory power beyond their borders to silence First Amendment-protected speech create minimum contacts with the states they target. There, the New Jersey Attorney General sent a cease-and-desist letter to, and initiated a lawsuit against, a Texas company that produced information related to three-dimensional printing of firearms. 971 F.3d at 488-89. The company sued the Attorney General in Texas, "alleg[ing] that [the Attorney General's conduct] had a chilling effect on the exercise of [its] First Amendment rights ... and reduced Texans' access to the materials [it] seek[s] to publish." *Id*. at 495.

The Fifth Circuit sustained the exercise of jurisdiction over the Attorney General because he "projected himself across state lines and asserted a pseudo-national executive authority." *Id.* He "knew that the cease-and-desist letter would 'have a potentially devastating impact on' the [company]—and, by extension, those who wished to benefit from the [company's] activities, including Texas residents."

Id. (citation omitted). "The statewide impact" of the Attorney General's conduct, the Fifth Circuit observed, was "not unlike that of the defamatory article at issue in *Calder*." *Id.* (citing *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).

So, too, here. The potential defendants have "asserted a pseudo-national executive authority" in their efforts to "have a potentially devastating impact" on the Texas energy industry's ability to speak on issues of energy and climate policy. *Id.* As the court of appeals aptly summarized, the potential defendants have waged a campaign of lawfare. Their lawfare arose from a plan hatched by climate activists to use litigation as a "powerful means to change corporate behavior." FOF/COL ¶ 9. To achieve that goal, the lawsuits "expressly target speech and associational activities in Texas" in an effort "to suppress and chill speech and associational activities of the Texas energy sector." *Id.* ¶¶ 28, 59.

Respondents' efforts to avoid *Grewal*'s application here are unavailing.

First, Respondents suggest that, unlike the Attorney General, the potential defendants have merely engaged in "narrowly focused law enforcement proceeding[s]" to address "harms suffered by public entities, residents, and property in California." Gov. Br. 29-30. That characterization is incorrect. Their lawsuits seek substantial recourse based on the *global* phenomenon of climate change. *See* FOF/COL ¶¶ 32-36. The potential defendants do not—and cannot—tie their alleged harms to the Texas energy industry's limited California contacts: "[I]t is not

plausible to state which emissions—emitted by whom and at what time in the last several centuries and at what place in the world—... 'caused' [the potential defendants'] alleged global warming related injuries." *Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.*, 663 F. Supp. 2d 865, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Instead, they seek to hold the Texas energy industry liable for expressing policy positions disfavored by the potential defendants, *see* FOF/COL ¶ 34, "*in most if not all of the jurisdictions in which those companies operate*[]." Gov. Br. 19 (emphasis added). Thus, like the Attorney General in *Grewal*, the potential defendants seek to prevent Texans from exercising their First Amendment rights "*anywhere*, not just in [California]." 971 F.3d at 493 (emphasis added).

Second, Respondents seek to distinguish *Grewal* based on the remedy sought: while the Attorney General requested a nationwide injunction, the potential defendants seek "only" massive awards of damages. Gov. Br. 28-29. That is a distinction without a difference. "[T]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." *Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.*, 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012); *accord City of New York v. Chevron Corp.*, 993 F.3d 81, 92 (2d. Cir. 2021).

City of New York illustrates how government officials use suits for damages to improperly regulate out-of-state activity. Like the potential defendants, the City of New York purported to bring state law claims against Texas energy companies

for supposedly "downplay[ing] the risks [of climate change] and continu[ing] to sell massive quantities of fossil fuels, which has caused and will continue to cause significant changes to the City's climate." *City of New York*, 993 F.3d at 86-87. The Second Circuit unanimously rejected the municipality's argument that its damages remedy only sought to compensate state-specific harms. *Id.* at 92. "[S]uch a sprawling case," the court recognized, would "regulate … far beyond New York's borders." *Id*. Here too, the potential defendants' claims threaten to regulate the Texas energy industry through the imposition of potentially crippling liabilities.

Third, Respondents contend that the "decisive jurisdictional contact" in *Grewal* was the Attorney General's transmission of a cease-and-desist letter to the Texas-based company. Pawa Br. 30. Because the potential defendants did not have physical contacts, such as mailing letters to Texas, Respondents reason that they are not subject to jurisdiction in Texas. That is wrong. Physical contacts with the forum are indisputably "not a prerequisite to jurisdiction." *Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. IV, L.P.*, 493 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. 2016) (quoting *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 285). Jurisdiction in *Grewal*, for example, depended not on the Attorney General sending a physical document to Texas, but on "*the specific language used*" in that letter. 971 F.3d at 496 n.10 (emphasis added). That specific language "demonstrate[d] [the Attorney General's] intent to gut [the Texas plaintiff's] operations and restrict Texans' access to" the Texas plaintiff's protected

speech. *Id.* The potential defendants have exhibited the same intent to target Texas speech by putting pressure on the Texas energy industry to adopt California's perspective on climate policy. *See* FOF/COL ¶ 7 (The potential defendants used "civil litigation to 'maintain[] pressure on [an out-of-state] industry that could eventually lead to its support for [the official's desired] legislative and regulatory responses.'").

B. The Potential Defendants' Actions to Violate Rights in the Forum Establish Minimum Contacts.

The potential defendants' actions to suppress Texas-based speech and associational activities, in violation of the First Amendment, are sufficient to establish minimum contacts with Texas.

A First Amendment violation can occur when government action "is *capable* of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional rights." *Morris*, 449 F.3d at 686 (emphasis added). Respondents argue that jurisdiction turns on whether the potential defendants' lawsuits "in fact 'chill[ed]' Exxon's speech, or anyone else's." Gov. Br. 30. Incorrect. ExxonMobil is "not [] required to show that defendants' conduct had an actual chilling effect" to establish a First Amendment violation here. *Morrison v. Johnson*, 429 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2005). Nor was ExxonMobil required to prove that the potential defendants' conduct would chill future speech. A victim of speech suppression is not required to allow her speech to be curtailed prior to seeking vindication of her constitutional rights

because a First Amendment violation can occur regardless of whether any speech was or will actually be chilled. *Id*.

Even if ExxonMobil is required to allege a chilling effect, the potential defendants' lawsuits are more than "capable" of chilling protected speech in Texas. From the start, the potential defendants targeted corporate speech across the fossil fuel industry, a sector whose business is largely at-home in Texas. The trial court's unrebutted factual findings[2] set forth in painstaking detail the chronology of the potential defendants' efforts to curb corporate speech in Texas.[3] The constant threat of (and, later, realized) litigation filed by governmental actors is "capable of deterring" members of the Texas energy industry from "exercising [their] constitutional right[]" to support political views and policies that are unpopular in California. *Morris*, 449 F.3d at 686.

The next question is whether the violation occurs in California, Texas, or somewhere else. Federal precedent establishes that a "plaintiff suing because his freedom of expression has been unjustifiably restricted ... suffers harm only where

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[2] Although Respondents have since objected to the trial court's findings of fact, they made no effort before the trial court to contest ExxonMobil's evidence with evidence of their own.

[3] *See* FOF/COL ¶¶ 6-41 (including subheadings "Preparatory Activities Directed at Texas-Based Speech"; "Pawa and Others Develop a Climate Change Strategy"; "State Attorneys General Adopt the Climate Change Strategy"; "State Attorneys General Target Texas-based Speech, Activities, and Property"; and "Lawsuits Against the Texas Energy-Sector Are Directed at Texas-Based Speech, Activities, and Property").

the speech would have taken place, as opposed to the [forum] in which ... the decision to restrict th[e] plaintiff's speech was made." *Kalman v. Cortes*, 646 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Here, the speech targeted by the potential defendants would have taken place in Texas by Texans. *See* FOF/COL ¶ 28. Because First Amendment violations are "damaging not just to the speaker, but to surrounding audiences," the "harm occurs ... where it arrives." *Grewal*, 971 F.3d at 495 n.9. Here, the violation arrived in Texas. By purposefully targeting Texas speech for the *express purpose* of holding "BIG OIL ... to account," the potential defendants committed a First Amendment violation in Texas. FOF/COL ¶¶ 33-34.

C. The Potential Defendants' Efforts to Undermine Texas Energy Policy Establish Minimum Contacts.

ExxonMobil is not seeking special treatment for itself or the Texas energy sector. Nor is it arguing, as Respondents misapprehend, that the size of an industry has independent relevance when assessing minimum contacts. *See* Gov. Br. 41-42; Pawa Br. 48-50. The breadth of Texas's energy sector is relevant because it shows *how* the potential defendants endeavor to cause statewide effects in Texas. They are targeting Texas's energy sector by coercing the adoption of California-style energy policies with the expectation that the energy industry carries sufficient weight within Texas to affect climate policy here. This is simply additional support showing that the potential defendants' contacts are with the State and not merely entities that happen to reside here.

Walden recognized that a plaintiff's ties to a forum are relevant to determining whether a defendant's actions targeted the forum. 571 U.S. at 286, 288 (A plaintiff's forum ties "may be significant in evaluating [defendants'] ties to the forum" if the "'effects' caused by defendants' [conduct] ... connected the defendants' conduct to [the forum], not just to a plaintiff who lived there."). The potential defendants' efforts to silence 18 prominent Texas-based energy companies that "contribut[e] billions of dollars a year in taxes and royalties," Governor Amicus Ltr. 1, shows that the real target of their lawfare is Texas itself.

Why did the potential defendants target the State of Texas? Because Texas is perceived as the apex of the energy sector in the United States, and it has not adopted energy policies preferred by the potential defendants. That much was made evident at the June 2012 Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies in La Jolla, California. There, Pawa and other architects of the potential defendants' lawfare vowed to use litigation to maintain pressure on the energy industry to coerce its participants into supporting alternative legislative and regulatory responses to climate change. FOF/COL ¶ 7.

The potential defendants' lawsuits are the manifestation of this strategy. Each suit is pretextually motivated by a desire to punish past Texas speech and chill future Texas speech that the potential defendants believe "misleadingly downplay[s] global warming's risks." *Id*. ¶ 29. The suits seek to "h[o]ld to account" Texas companies

that express alternative views on climate policy. *Id.* ¶ 34; *see id.* ¶¶ 12-15. This is not the first time California authorities have sought to reach within the forum to coerce changes to Texas policy by putting pressure on a Texas industry.[4] Such efforts are intended to subvert the sovereign rights of Texans to set their own policies based on their own interests and beliefs. *See id.* ¶ 10 ("[T]he goals of this campaign included ... '[t]o force officials to dissociate themselves from Exxon ... by refusing campaign donations [and] … calling for a price on carbon.'").

Texas unquestionably has a distinct interest in ensuring the open exchange of ideas and perspectives on salient issues, such as climate change. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy." *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n*, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). Any effort by out-of-state parties to impede the free exchange of ideas in Texas is a violation of Texas's sovereign interests. The potential defendants' attempt to hijack and influence Texas energy policies triggers the State's sovereign right to self-governance.

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[4] A pattern has emerged whereby California state officials habitually reach into Texas in an effort to change Texas policies. For example, last year, California banned state-funded travel to 17 states including Texas, in an effort to address allegedly anti-L.G.B.T.Q. legislation in those states. Jill Cowan, *California bans state-funded travel to 5 states over anti L.G.B.T.Q. laws*, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/us/politics/california-state-travel-ban.html.

This is perhaps best illustrated by the codification in Texas of the "development of all the natural resources of this state [as] … a public right and duty." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.001. The aim of the potential defendants' lawfare is to undermine and change that right and duty. As the Supreme Court contemplated in *J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro*, "in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the State's authority by reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws." 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (plurality opinion). The potential defendants' "attempt to establish [their preferred energy] policy through litigation, as opposed to the ballot box, constitutes a direct attack on the sovereignty of this state." TCJL Amicus Br. 6.

II. Respondents' Efforts to Deny Minimum Contacts Are Not Supported By the Law or the Record.

Respondents strain to downplay the effects and likely effects of their tortious actions. *First*, Respondents rely on distinguishable case law that stands at most for the proposition that Respondents' slippery slope arguments are overblown. *Second*, Respondents falsely claim that their intent to target the forum is irrelevant to this dispute. To the contrary, a defendant's intent to cause statewide effects in Texas is an important component of the minimum contacts analysis. *Finally*, Respondents claim that a showing of "additional conduct" is a required element of any personal jurisdiction inquiry. But this Court's precedent is clear that such proof is only required in specific circumstances not present here.

A. Neither Precedent Nor Policy Counsel Against Finding Minimum Contacts Exist Here.

Respondents seek to dodge the record by citing distinguishable cases that address dissimilar situations and by making inapt policy arguments.

First, Respondents rely on *Stroman*. There, the Fifth Circuit found jurisdiction lacking over the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who had sent cease-and-desist letters to a Texas company for engaging in unlicensed timeshare resale brokering in Arizona. 513 F.3d at 480. The court explained that the Commissioner was "simply attempting to uniformly apply [Arizona's] laws" by "asserting nationwide authority over any real estate transactions involving Arizona residents or property." *Id.* at 486. The Commissioner did not seek to shape or suppress the speech of Texas residents or purposefully alter codified Texas policy. The focus of her activity was instead on real property in Arizona.

Unlike the Commissioner, the potential defendants are not "simply attempting to uniformly apply [California's] laws." *Contra* Gov. Br. 27-28. Rather, they aim to "regulate the political conduct and business activities of Texas residents" by "chill[ing] the speech rights of *all* Texans in a policy area of existential importance to their personal and community well-being." TCJL Amicus Br. 6 (emphasis in original). Each of the potential defendants' complaints expressly focus on Texas-based, First Amendment-protected activities. FOF/COL ¶ 28. For example, the complaints expressly target: (i) the exploration, production, and marketing of oil and

gas *in Texas*; (ii) ExxonMobil's corporate statements issued *from Texas*, such as ExxonMobil's annual *Outlook for Energy* reports; (iii) Mr. Tillerson's speech on climate change at a shareholder meeting *in Texas*; and (iv) corporate decisions made *in Texas* to fund nonprofit groups that perform climate-change research and advocacy disfavored by the potential defendants. *Id.* ¶¶ 29-30.

Second, Respondents turn to *Bulkley* for the proposition that government officials do not establish minimum contacts when they remedy violations of their own state's laws in a foreign jurisdiction. Gov. Br. 28. But, again, *Bulkley* is inapplicable here. There, a California agency assessed penalties on a Texas trucking company for violating California safety laws while operating in California. 1 F.4th at 348. The agency sent a letter to the Texas company about an accident in California and sought a remedy for safety violations. *Id*. at 349. The Texas company then sued the agency to prevent enforcement. Minimum contacts were present in Texas, the company argued, because the California agency "could only ... remedy [the] violations ... by changing its policies in Texas." *Id*. at 352. The Fifth Circuit disagreed because the "scope of the [agency's] letter [was] limited to California-related conduct," i.e., the accident in California. *Id*. at 354. At bottom, minimum contacts were lacking because the California agency had merely enforced laws relating to the plaintiff's California conduct. *Id*.

Here, by contrast, the "scope" of the potential defendants' lawsuits is not "limited to California-related conduct." *Id*. Quite the opposite. Unlike regulating local California transportation safety in California, an area of traditional state control, *see S.C. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros.*, 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938), the potential defendants seek to affect this State's energy policy by constraining the *Texas* energy industry from communicating its views on climate change policy, including to Texas policymakers. *See, e.g.*, FOF/COL ¶¶ 9-11. And to the extent the potential defendants seek recourse for climate change injuries, their claims necessarily sweep in *global* conduct. Climate change, after all, is the product of "undifferentiated ... greenhouse gas emissions from all global sources and their worldwide accumulation over long periods of time." *Kivalina*, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880. In contrast to *Bulkley*, the potential defendants established minimum contacts through sweeping efforts to chill and regulate out-of-state speech in Texas, wholly divorced from California-based interests.

Finally, Respondents try to alarm this Court with predictions of a slippery jurisdictional slope. They suggest that reversal will "invite ... countersuits against the Texas Attorney General anytime he sues companies" in other states. Pawa Br. 49. There is no such slippery slope. Jurisdiction over an out-of-state official is appropriate where that official seeks to target speech in a foreign jurisdiction, as the Attorney General did in *Grewal*. Respondents' own precedent confirms that state

officials who "attempt[] to uniformly apply [state] law" to conduct or persons in their own state will *not* be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction if their enforcement efforts merely incidentally regulate conduct elsewhere. *Bulkley*, 1 F.4th at 353; *see Stroman*, 513 F.3d at 486. Where, as here, an official intentionally weaponizes "civil litigation to 'maintain[] pressure on [an out-of-state] industry that could eventually lead to its support for [the official's desired] legislative and regulatory responses,'" jurisdiction is permissible. FOF/COL ¶ 7. It is the potential defendants' efforts to control Texans' speech across state lines that make jurisdiction appropriate in Texas.

B. Intent Supports Minimum Contacts When It Establishes That a Defendant's Conduct Purposefully Targeted the Forum.

Respondents contest the relevance of intent to the minimum-contacts inquiry. Gov. Br. 20-22. ExxonMobil has never argued that intent alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Nor does ExxonMobil argue for jurisdiction under a "direct a tort" theory, as it made clear in its earlier briefing. Pet. Br. 36-39. Rather, evidence of intent is relevant to establish that the potential defendants purposefully targeted the forum to cause statewide effects. *See*, *e.g.*, *Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 564 (Tex. 2018). Here, the potential defendants' intent to police Texas speech shows that they purposefully aimed their conduct at the forum and the resulting contacts, therefore, were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated.

Calder is instructive. There, jurisdictionally relevant minimum contacts existed where nonresident defendants intended their libelous conduct to create

statewide effects in California. The defendants in *Calder* "[e]xpressly aimed their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions at California because they knew the National Enquirer ha[d] its largest circulation in California, and that the article would have a potentially devastating impact there." *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 288 n.7 (discussing *Calder*) (citations omitted). These intentional contacts created "the necessary connection with the forum State" to confer jurisdiction. *Id.* at 285.

Respondents attempt to distinguish *Calder* by asserting that the potential defendants' only alleged contacts with Texas were the civil suits they filed in California against Texas-based companies. Gov. Br. 21-22. That argument is a red herring. It is no different from the defendants in *Calder* saying their only California contact was sending a periodical into California. Respondents miss the point. The potential defendants target speech originating *in Texas*, and in doing so, attempt to chill disfavored political speech spoken *in Texas* and heard *by Texas* citizens. *See, e.g.*, FOF/COL ¶ 30 (explaining how several California municipalities filed suits "focus[ed] on ExxonMobil's Texas-based speech and associational activities"). They seek to commandeer Texas energy policy by using litigation to compel the energy industry to "support legislative and regulatory responses to global warming." *Id*. ¶ 7.

As in *Calder*, where jurisdiction was proper because California was targeted, here, the potential defendants "expressly aimed" their conduct at Texas. 465 U.S. at

789. The defendants in *Calder* targeted California by publishing their libelous story there. The defendants knew California was home to their newspaper's largest circulation and that the libelous story would have a "devastating impact" in that market. *Id*. On that record, the Court found that the defendants established sufficient minimum contacts with California. *Id*. at 788-89. Here too, the potential defendants intentionally directed their efforts at Texas (by suing 18 of the largest and most prominent members of Texas's energy industry) because Texas is home to the oil and gas industry. They targeted Texas with the expectation that the suits "would have a potentially devastating impact" on Texas speech and established Texas energy policies. *Id.* at 789. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper in Texas.

Respondents cite several authorities which they read as holding that a defendant's intent is irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. Gov. Br. 20-24 (citing *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 282, 288-89; *Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 565; *Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten*, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005); *TV Azteca v. Ruiz*, 490 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2016)). Their reading is incorrect. Respondents' cases actually confirm that a defendant's intent to target a forum supports minimum contacts where it shows a purposeful effort to reach the forum.

In *Walden*, for example, the Supreme Court explained that "[a] forum State's exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on *intentional* conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with *the*

forum." 571 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added). Here, the potential defendants' "intentional conduct" was using lawfare to stifle constitutionally protected speech in Texas. They created the "necessary contacts with the forum" by filing lawsuits against 18 Texas-based energy companies aimed at chilling that speech. *See* FOF/COL ¶¶ 49-50 (finding that the potential defendants "expressly target[ed] the speech, research, and funding decisions of ExxonMobil and other Texas-based energy companies to chill and affect speech, activities, and property in Texas"). Under *Walden*, exercising jurisdiction is appropriate.

TV Azteca supports the same result. There, a Texas resident sued a Mexican television company and its producer for broadcasting a defamatory program. 490 S.W.3d at 35. This Court grappled with whether jurisdiction was proper in Texas, where the plaintiff was domiciled and witnessed the program. *Id*. This Court recognized that "[t]here is a subtle yet crucial difference between directing a tort at an individual who happens to live in a particular state and directing a tort at that state." *Id*. at 43. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at [Texas]" and where the "effects" of that conduct are felt in Texas. *Id*. at 40 (citation omitted). Applying this rule, this Court concluded that Texas courts could exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants because they intended to "distribute their programs and increase their popularity in Texas." *Id*. at 50.

Michiana also poses no obstacle to jurisdiction. That case involved allegedly fraudulent statements made by an out-of-state seller of a recreational vehicle. 168 S.W.3d at 784. This Court explained that the jurisdictional analysis must focus on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. *Id.* at 790. Because it was the Texas plaintiff-purchaser, not the nonresident defendant-seller, that initiated contact with the seller and arranged for the purchase and receipt of the recreational vehicle, this Court held that the defendant never intentionally contacted the forum. *Id*. at 794.

Finally, Respondents allege that ExxonMobil has improperly conflated the jurisdictional inquiry with the underlying merits of its claim by focusing on the potential defendants' intent. Gov. Br. 24-25; Pawa Br. 21. Not so. Whether the potential defendants intended to purposefully avail themselves of the forum is a separate inquiry from whether they are liable for violating ExxonMobil's First Amendment rights. *See Amec Foster Wheeler plc v. Enter. Prod. Operating LLC*, 631 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). The potential defendants' intent is relevant, regardless of ExxonMobil's arguments on the merits, to demonstrate that they made jurisdictionally relevant contacts with the forum. *See Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 789 (distinguishing between intent as an element of tort liability and the defendants' expectations on which jurisdiction depends).

C. Proof of "Additional Conduct" Is Not Required To Establish Minimum Contacts Here.

The court of appeals conditioned the exercise of personal jurisdiction on a showing that the potential defendants engaged in "additional conduct" to "continuously and deliberately exploit[] Texas." Op. *15-16. That was error. This Court's case law is clear: Evidence of "additional conduct" to "exploit Texas" is required only in stream of commerce and broadcasting cases (and perhaps, similar contexts). In those limited contexts, additional conduct serves to demonstrate the defendant's "intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, whether directly or indirectly." *Luciano*, 625 S.W.3d at 10; *see Asahi Metals Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California*, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion); *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 786; *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 46-47.

Respondents double down on the court of appeals' error by arguing that ExxonMobil should bear the burden of proving additional conduct because "[t]here is no logical or conceptual reason" why that requirement "should be limited to stream of commerce or broadcasting cases." Gov. Br. 34. Not so. It is not always clear whether a defendant has specifically targeted a forum simply because its products have inadvertently reached the forum through the stream of commerce or on broadcast airwaves. Thus, in those types of cases, courts have required proof of additional forum conduct to ensure that the defendant's contacts were purposeful, rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.

In *Asahi*, for example, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that merely placing a product into the stream of commerce with awareness that it *might* arrive in the forum state, without more, is insufficient to establish that a defendant intended to serve the forum. 480 U.S. at 112. Thus, the Court required the plaintiff to produce evidence of "additional conduct" to demonstrate the defendant's "intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State," such as "designing the product for the market in the forum State" or "advertising in the forum State." *Id*. Similarly, in *Michiana*, this Court explained that the seller's placing a product into the Texas market was insufficient to prove the defendant targeted the forum. *See* 168 S.W.3d at 786. To have intended to target the forum, this Court held, would require the defendant to have advertised, designed, or distributed vehicles in Texas. *See id.* at 784.

TV Azteca applies the same principles in the analogous context of broadcasting. Just like knowledge that products placed into the stream of commerce may ultimately make their way to the forum, "the mere fact that the signals through which [defendants] broadcast their programs in Mexico travel into Texas is insufficient to support specific jurisdiction." *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 45. Such fortuitous contacts "do[] not establish that Petitioners purposefully directed their activities at Texas." *Id.* Rather, additional evidence was necessary to show that the defendant-broadcasters were actually targeting the forum.

Here, of course, there can be no mistake that the potential defendants "purposefully directed" their conduct toward Texas. *Asahi*, 480 U.S. at 112. The potential defendants seek to suppress the *Texas*-based speech and associational activities of ExxonMobil and others in the *Texas* energy sector, including through corporate statements, internal company memoranda, and speeches within *Texas*. FOF/COL ¶¶ 25, 28-30. As amicus TXOGA aptly observes, this "type of targeting is far different from conduct outside the forum that ... simply has an effect in the forum, whether intended or not." TXOGA Amicus Br. 7. The potential defendants' intentional efforts to control the speech and associational decisions of Texas residents renders evidence of additional conduct unnecessary.

Unable to assail this logic, Respondents endeavor to infer an additional conduct requirement in cases where none exists. They contend, for example, that the California-circulation of defendants' publication was necessary to satisfy the additional conduct requirement in *Calder*. Pawa Br. 29. That is unpersuasive. That the libelous story in *Calder* was read throughout California is not evidence of additional conduct. Rather, as the Supreme Court has since explained, it is the reason defendants' conduct was connected to *California*—not just a plaintiff who resided there. *See Walden*, 571 U.S. at 288. Same here. The potential defendants' efforts to chill the Texas energy industry's speech will be felt across Texas—by preventing Texans across the State, including Texas policymakers, from hearing that speech.

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (holding that citizens have a First Amendment "right ... to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus."). Like *Calder*, the potential defendants' tortious conduct is connected to Texas, not just ExxonMobil.

III. The Remaining Elements of Personal Jurisdiction and the Long-Arm Statute Are Satisfied.

The court of appeals did not reach the trial court's conclusions on the other aspects of personal jurisdiction, namely that (1) ExxonMobil's claims "would arise from the Potential Defendants' contacts with Texas"; (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction "would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"; and (3) jurisdiction "would be permitted under the Texas long-arm statute." FOL/COL ¶¶ 46, 53-54; *see Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 150; *Spir Star*, 310 S.W.3d at 872. This Court should address these issues of law and affirm the trial court. *See Segrest v. Segrest*, 649 S.W.2d 610, 611 (Tex. 1983).

A. ExxonMobil's Claims Arise from or Relate to the Potential Defendants' Texas Contacts.

ExxonMobil's potential claims necessarily arise out of, or relate to, the potential defendants' contacts with Texas. *See TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 37. The basis of ExxonMobil's prospective tort claims is the potential defendants' efforts to suppress ExxonMobil's speech and associational activities in Texas. *See* FOF/COL ¶ 53. Unlike cases in which a defendant's forum activity is an "isolated occurrence"

that is insufficiently related to a plaintiff's claims, *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the potential defendants intentionally targeted Texas to suppress the very speech that forms the basis of ExxonMobil's injuries. *See* FOF/COL ¶¶ 23-31.

Respondents' only rejoinder is that "none of the[ir] lawsuit-related conduct involved any constitutionally cognizable contacts with Texas." Gov. Br. 46. That merely restates Respondents' flawed argument for why they have not established sufficient minimum contacts with Texas. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, the First Amendment effects in Texas of the potential defendants' lawfare create the requisite minimum contacts to subject them to personal jurisdiction here.

B. Exercising Personal Jurisdiction Comports with Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice.

Respondents have failed to carry their burden of showing that the exercise of jurisdiction would not "comport with fair play and substantial justice." *Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co.*, 278 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Tex. 2009).

Burden on the Defendant. Respondents identify costs the potential defendants might incur while defending against ExxonMobil's claims, such as spending "over a hundred hours ... doing a privilege review." Pawa. Br. 51. Respondents misunderstand the relevant inquiry; the issue is not whether litigation itself is burdensome but whether "litigating in Texas" will be more burdensome than litigating elsewhere. *Kennard v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co.*, 2006 WL 3438653, at *5

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2006). Respondents have produced no persuasive evidence on that score. *See Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d 1 at 155.

Interests of the Forum. Respondents claim that "Texas has no extraordinary interest in this case." Pawa Br. 53. That contention is baffling. Texas courts always have a significant interest in resolving claims for torts committed in Texas against Texas residents. *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 156; *see also* Governor Amicus Ltr. 2; TXOGA Amicus Br. 5. That interest is heightened where, as here, out-of-state actors violate Texans' First Amendment rights, *see Kinney v. Barnes*, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014), as part of an effort to undermine Texas's sovereign right to set its own energy policy, *see* TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 89.001.

Convenient and Effective Relief. Respondents are incorrect that ExxonMobil "would face no injustice" by pursuing its claims as counterclaims in the potential defendants' California lawsuits. Gov. Br. 48. ExxonMobil has moved to dismiss those actions for lack of personal jurisdiction; if successful, there will be no forum in which to litigate counterclaims. In any event, that claims "might be fairly litigated in another forum does not mean that jurisdiction is inappropriate" in Texas. *Nw. Cattle Feeders, LLC v. O'Connell*, 2018 WL 2976440, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 14, 2018, no pet.).

Efficient Resolution of Controversies. Respondents simply ignore that Texas is the only forum in which ExxonMobil can pursue all of its claims against all

the potential defendants in a single action. Jurisdiction is favored where, as here, a Texas court can adjudicate "claims against all defendants in one proceeding." *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 56.

Further Substantive Social Policies. Respondents' hyperbole that exercising jurisdiction here would "inevitably lead to a multiplicity of such actions" and endanger "principles of interstate comity and state sovereignty" deserves no serious consideration. Gov. Br. 49-50. The only "inevitab[ility]" is that out-of-state parties would be incentivized to refrain from targeting another sovereign state to suppress speech or coerce policy changes.

In sum, all five fairness factors favor the exercise of jurisdiction over the potential defendants. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's holding that the Due Process Clause permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the potential defendants.

C. The Long-Arm Statute Is Satisfied.

Finally, Texas's long-arm statute is easily satisfied. Texas courts are authorized to assert personal jurisdiction over "nonresidents ... doing business in Texas." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 17.041-17.042. Under the statute, a "nonresident" is an individual that is not "a resident of the state." *Id*. § 17.041. And a nonresident "do[es] business in Texas" by "commit[ting] a tort in whole or in part in this state." *Id*. § 17.042(2). The potential defendants are indisputably residents of

California and Massachusetts. And their tortious activity was "commit[ed] in whole or in part" in Texas because "censorship's harm occurs ... where it arrives." *Grewal*, 971 F.3d at 495 n.9.

Relying on dicta from *Stroman*, Respondents contend that they nonetheless fall outside the statute's sweep because they have been sued in their official capacities. Gov. Br. 51. But the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in *Bulkley*—which Respondents repeatedly cite elsewhere, *see, e.g.*, *id.* at 26-31—made clear that *Stroman*'s "suggestion ... that the Texas long-arm statute does not apply to out-of-state officials ... contravenes Texas Supreme Court precedent." 1 F.4th at 355 n.52. Under that precedent, "there are no limits on Texas's long-arm statute beside federal due process." *Id.* (citing *Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C.*, 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)).

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The court of appeals' opinion recognized the potential defendants' lawfare for what it is—"an ugly tool [that] enlist[s] the judiciary to do the work that the other two branches of government cannot or will not do." Op. *20. When the Fifth Circuit in *Grewal* faced a similar campaign to regulate speech in Texas to project the political agenda of officials in other states, it did not hesitate to assert personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state official. If the court of appeals' decision holds, Texas state courts—unlike their federal counterparts—will be left without authority

to address such conduct. This Court should confirm that Texas courts are not powerless to adjudicate conduct that seeks to alter speech and affect policy within the State.

ExxonMobil requests that the Court grant the petition for review, reverse the court of appeals' judgment, affirm the trial court's order denying the special appearances, remand the case for further proceedings, and grant all other relief to which it is entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4(e), (i)

1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(C) because, according to the Microsoft Word 2016 word count function, it contains **7,433** words on pages 1 to 33, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 software in Times New Roman 14-point font in text and Times New Roman 12-point font in footnotes.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 18, 2022, the foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of the Court using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I also certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record via e-service, as shown below:

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APPENDIX

App. A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated April 24, 2018 (3SCR113-28)

App. B: *City of San Francisco v. Exxon Mobil Corp.*, No. 02-18-00106-CV, 2020 WL 3969558 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.)

App. A

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated April 24, 2018
(3SCR113-28)

CAUSE NO. 096-297222-18

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,	§	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
	§	
	§	TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS
Petitioner.	§	
	§	96th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

~~[PROPOSED]~~ FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

On January 8, 2018, Exxon Mobil Corporation ("ExxonMobil") filed a petition under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure seeking pre-suit discovery to evaluate potential claims and preserve evidence related to constitutional violations, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. ExxonMobil's potential claims arise from an alleged conspiracy by California municipalities to suppress Texas-based speech and associational activities on climate policy that are out-of-step with the prevailing views of California public officials. According to ExxonMobil's petition, the California municipalities alleged facts in their lawsuits against the Texas energy sector that are contradicted by contemporaneous disclosures to municipal bond investors. ExxonMobil seeks pre-suit discovery on whether the lawsuits were brought in bad faith as a pretext to suppress Texas-based speech and associational activities by members of Texas's energy sector.

The potential defendants and prospective witnesses named in ExxonMobil's petition (collectively the "Respondents") challenged this Court's personal jurisdiction by filing special appearances under Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ExxonMobil opposed. Both the Respondents and ExxonMobil filed affidavits and evidence in support of their respective positions. At a hearing held on March 8, 2018, the Court accepted all filed affidavits and evidence, as permitted by Rule 120a. Neither ExxonMobil nor the Respondents objected to the evidence at

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the hearing; the parties disputed only the legal significance of the uncontested factual record before the Court. On March 14, 2018, the Court denied all of the special appearances in light of the factual record.

On March 27, 2018, ExxonMobil filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting this Court's denial of the special appearances. In accordance with Rule 297 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the uncontested evidentiary record.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Parties

1. Petitioner ExxonMobil is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey with its principal place of business in Texas. It formulates and issues statements about climate change from its headquarters in Texas. Most of its corporate records pertaining to climate change are located in Texas, and it engages in speech and associational activities in Texas.

2. Potential Defendants the County of San Mateo, the County of Marin, the City of Imperial Beach, the City of Santa Cruz, the County of Santa Cruz, the City of Oakland, and the City of San Francisco are cities or counties in California that do not maintain a registered agent, telephone listing, or post office box in Texas.

3. Potential Defendants Barbara J. Parker, Dennis J. Herrera, John Beiers, Serge Dedina, Jennifer Lyon, Brian Washington, Dana McRae, and Anthony Condotti are California municipal officers who do not reside in Texas or maintain offices or registered agents in Texas.

4. Potential Defendant Matthew F. Pawa is an attorney in private practice,

based in Massachusetts and serving as outside counsel for Potential Defendants the City of Oakland and the City of San Francisco. Mr. Pawa does not maintain an office or registered agent in Texas and is not licensed to practice law in Texas.

5. Prospective Witnesses Sabrina B. Landreth, Edward Reiskin, John Maltbie, Andy Hall, Matthew Hymel, Carlos Palacios, and Martín Bernal are California municipal officers who do not reside in Texas or maintain a registered agent, telephone listing, or post office box in Texas.

B. Preparatory Activities Directed at Texas-Based Speech

Pawa and Others Develop a Climate Change Strategy

6. In June 2012, Potential Defendant Pawa and a group ~~of special interests~~ attended a conference in La Jolla, California, called the "Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies." Peter Frumhoff, the Director of Science and Policy for the Union of Concerned Scientists; Naomi Oreskes, then a professor at the University of California, San Diego; and Richard Heede, of the Climate Accountability Institute, conceived of this workshop and invited Mr. Pawa to participate as a featured speaker.

7. During the conference, participants discussed strategies to "[w]in [a]cess to [i]nternal [d]ocuments" of energy companies, like ExxonMobil, that could be used to obtain leverage over these companies. The conference participants concluded that using law enforcement powers and civil litigation to "maintain[ ] pressure on the industry that could eventually lead to its support for legislative and regulatory responses to global warming." One commentator observed, "Even if your ultimate goal might be to shut down a company, you still might be wise to start out by asking for compensation for injured parties."

8. At the conference, the attendees also concluded that "a single sympathetic

state attorney general might have substantial success in bringing key internal documents to light."

9. At the conference, Potential Defendant Pawa targeted ExxonMobil's speech on climate change, and identified such speech as a basis for bringing litigation. Mr. Pawa claimed that "Exxon and other defendants distorted the truth" (as Mr. Pawa saw it) and that litigation "serves as a 'potentially powerful means to change corporate behavior.'" Myles Allen, another participant at the La Jolla conference, claimed that "the fossil fuel industry's disinformation has effectively muted a large portion of the electorate."

10. In January 2016, Mr. Pawa engaged participants ~~special interests~~ at the Rockefeller Family Fund offices in New York City to further solidify the "[g]oals of an Exxon campaign" that Mr. Pawa developed at the La Jolla conference. According to a draft agenda for the meeting, the goals of this campaign included: (i) "[t]o establish in [the] public's mind that Exxon is a corrupt institution that has pushed humanity (and all creation) toward climate chaos and grave harm"; (ii) "[t]o delegitimize [ExxonMobil] as a political actor"; (iii) "[t]o drive divestment from Exxon"; and (iv) "[t]o force officials to disassociate themselves from Exxon, their money, and their historic opposition to climate progress, for example by refusing campaign donations, refusing to take meetings, calling for a price on carbon, etc."

11. According to the draft agenda, Mr. Pawa and the other participants aimed to chill and suppress ExxonMobil's speech through "legal actions & related campaigns," including "AGs" and "Tort[]" suits. The draft agenda notes that participants planned to use "AGs" and "Tort[]" suits to "get[] discovery" and "creat[e] scandal."

State Attorneys General Adopt the Climate Change Strategy

12. On March 29, 2016, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, and other state attorneys general, calling

themselves the "Green 20," held a press conference where they promoted regulating the speech of energy companies, including ExxonMobil, whom they perceived as an obstacle to enacting their preferred policy responses to climate change. Attorneys General Schneiderman and Healey discussed their investigations of ExxonMobil. They were also joined by former Vice President Al Gore, an investor in alternative energy companies.

13. At the press conference, Attorney General Schneiderman discussed the need to regulate the energy industry's speech on climate change, just as Potential Defendant Pawa had urged at La Jolla and at the Rockefeller meeting. He stated, "There is no dispute but there is confusion, and confusion sowed by those with an interest in profiting from the confusion and creating misperceptions in the eyes of the American public that really need to be cleared up." Attorney General Schneiderman denounced the "highly aggressive and morally vacant forces that are trying to block every step by the federal government to take meaningful action" and announced that "today, we're sending a message that, at least some of us—actually a lot of us—in state government are prepared to step into this battle with an unprecedented level of commitment and coordination."

14. Attorney General Healey similarly echoed themes from the strategy Mr. Pawa developed at La Jolla. She stated, "Part of the problem has been one of public perception," and she blamed "[f]ossil fuel companies" for purportedly causing "many to doubt whether climate change is real and to misunderstand and misapprehend the catastrophic nature of its impacts." Attorney General Healey announced that those who "deceived" the public "should be, must be, held accountable." In the next sentence, she disclosed that she too had begun investigating ExxonMobil and concluded, before receiving a single document from ExxonMobil, that there was a "troubling disconnect between what Exxon knew . . . and what the company and industry chose

to share with investors and with the American public."

15. At the press conference, former Vice President Al Gore praised Attorney General Schneiderman's efforts to "hold to account those commercial interests" who "are now trying to convince people that renewable energy is not a viable option"~~, a position that aligned well with Mr. Gore's financial stake in renewable energy companies.~~ Mr. Gore also focused on First Amendment-protected activities, condemning the "political and lobbying efforts" of the traditional energy industry.

State Attorneys General Conceal Ties to Pawa

16. At a closed-door meeting held before the March 2016 press conference, Mr. Pawa and Dr. Frumhoff conducted briefings for assembled members of the attorneys general's offices. Mr. Pawa, whose briefing was on "climate change litigation," has subsequently admitted to attending the meeting, but only after he and the attorneys general attempted and failed to conceal it.

17. The New York Attorney General's Office attempted to keep Mr. Pawa's involvement in this meeting secret. When a reporter contacted Mr. Pawa shortly after this meeting and inquired about the press conference, the Chief of the Environmental Protection Bureau at the New York Attorney General's Office told Mr. Pawa, "My ask is if you speak to the reporter, to not confirm that you attended or otherwise discuss the event."

18. Similarly, the Vermont Attorney General's Office—another member of the "Green 20" coalition—admitted at a court hearing that when it receives a public records request to share information concerning the coalition's activities, it researches the party who requested the records, and upon learning of the requester's affiliation with "coal or Exxon or whatever," the office "give[s] this some thought . . . before [it] share[s] information with this entity."

State Attorneys General Target Texas-based Speech, Activities, and Property

19. Attorney General Schneiderman issued a subpoena and Attorney General Healey issued a civil investigative demand ("CID") to ExxonMobil requesting documents and communications concerning climate change and expressly referencing documents in ExxonMobil's possession in Texas.

20. The Massachusetts CID targets specific statements ExxonMobil and its executives made in Texas. For example, it requests documents concerning (i) a 1982 article prepared by the Coordination and Planning Division of Exxon Research and Engineering Company; (ii) former Chairman and CEO Rex Tillerson's "statements regarding Climate Change and Global Warming . . . at an Exxon shareholder meeting in Dallas, Texas"; (iii) ExxonMobil's 2016 Energy Outlook, which was prepared and reviewed in Texas; and (iv) internal corporate documents and communications concerning regulatory filings prepared at ExxonMobil's corporate offices in Texas. Many of the statements under government scrutiny pertain expressly to matters of public policy, such as remarks by ExxonMobil's former CEO that "[i]ssues such as global poverty [are] more pressing than climate change." The Massachusetts CID also seeks documents pertaining to ExxonMobil's associational activities, including its communications with 12 organizations derided as climate deniers and its reasons for associating with those entities.

21. The New York subpoena also targets ExxonMobil's speech and associational activities in Texas, including investor filings, the "*Outlook For Energy* reports," the "*Energy Trends, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Alternative Energy* reports," the "*Energy and Carbon - Managing the Risks Report*," and communications with trade associations and industry groups.

22. ExxonMobil filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against

Attorneys General Schneiderman and Healey. The Attorney General of the State of Texas, along with ten other state attorneys general, filed an amicus brief in support of ExxonMobil's claims, stating that a state official's power "does not include the right to engage in unrestrained, investigative excursions to promulgate a social ideology, or chill the expression of points of view, in international policy debates." Judge Ed Kinkeade of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas questioned whether the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General were attempting to "further their personal agendas by using the vast power of government to silence the voices of all those who disagree with them."

C. Lawsuits Against the Texas Energy-Sector Are Directed at Texas-Based Speech, Activities, and Property

23. With the investigations of the state attorneys general underway, Mr. Pawa next promoted his La Jolla strategy to California municipalities, as potential plaintiffs in tort litigation that would be filed against energy companies, including ExxonMobil.

24. Mr. Pawa sent a memo outlining this strategy to NextGen America, the political action group funded by political activist Tom Steyer. The memo "summarize[d] a potential legal case against major fossil fuel corporations," premised on the claim that "certain fossil fuel companies (most notoriously ExxonMobil), have engaged in a campaign and conspiracy of deception and denial on global warming." Mr. Pawa emphasized that "simply proceeding to the discovery phase would be significant" and "obtaining industry documents would be a remarkable achievement that would advance the case and the cause."

25. Mr. Pawa also gave a number of speeches in which he targeted speech that ExxonMobil formulated and made in Texas. At a 2016 conference, for instance, Mr. Pawa accused ExxonMobil of "undert[aking] a campaign of deception and denial" and targeted a speech concerning climate change delivered by former CEO Tillerson in Texas. In the same speech, Mr.

Pawa also discussed the company's internal memos from the 1980s, where company scientists evaluated potential climate change impacts.

26. Following through on the strategy Mr. Pawa outlined in his memorandum to NextGen America, Potential Defendants Parker, Herrera, and the Cities of Oakland and San Francisco filed public nuisance lawsuits against ExxonMobil and four other energy companies, including Texas-based ConocoPhillips. Mr. Pawa represents the plaintiffs in those actions, and Ms. Parker and Mr. Herrera signed the complaints on behalf of the City of Oakland and the City of San Francisco, respectively. They used an agent to serve the complaints on ExxonMobil's registered agent in California, whose role is to transmit legal process to ExxonMobil in Texas.

27. Potential Defendants Lyon, Washington, Beiers, Condotti, McRae, the City of Imperial Beach, Marin County, San Mateo County, and the City and the County of Santa Cruz filed similar public nuisance complaints against ExxonMobil and other energy companies, including the following 17 Texas-based energy companies: BP America, Inc., Shell Oil Products Company LLC, Citgo Petroleum Corp., ConocoPhillips, ConocoPhillips Company, Phillips 66, Total E&P USA Inc., Total Specialties USA Inc., Eni Oil & Gas Inc., Anadarko Petroleum Corp., Occidental Petroleum Corp., Occidental Chemical Corp., Repsol Energy North America Corp., Repsol Trading USA Corp., Marathon Oil Company, Marathon Oil Corporation, and Apache Corp. Potential Defendants Beiers, Lyon, McRae, Washington, and Condotti signed these complaints. They used an agent to serve the complaints on ExxonMobil's registered agent in Texas.

28. Each of the seven California complaints expressly target speech and associational activities in Texas.

29. The Oakland and San Francisco complaints, for example, target ExxonMobil's Texas-based speech, including a statement by "then-CEO Rex Tillerson" at

"Exxon's annual shareholder meeting" in Texas, where they claim Mr. Tillerson allegedly "misleadingly downplayed global warming's risks." These complaints also target corporate statements issued from Texas, such as ExxonMobil's "annual 'Outlook for Energy' reports," "Exxon's website," and "Exxon's 'Lights Across America' website advertisements." In addition, the complaints target ExxonMobil's associational activities in Texas, including corporate decisions to fund various non-profit groups that perform climate change-related research that the complaints deem to be "front groups" and "denialist groups."

30. The City of Imperial Beach, Marin County, San Mateo County, and the City and County of Santa Cruz complaints similarly focus on ExxonMobil's Texas-based speech and associational activities. For example, they target (i) a 1988 memo from an Exxon public affairs manager that proposes "[r]esist[ing] the overstatement and sensationalization [sic] of potential greenhouse effect"; (ii) a "publication" that "Exxon released" in "1996" with a preface by former "Exxon CEO Lee Raymond"; and (iii) a 2007 Corporate Citizenship Report, issued from the company's Texas headquarters.

31. Each of the seven California complaints also explicitly focus on ExxonMobil property in Texas, including ExxonMobil's internal memos and scientific research. (Imperial Beach Compl. ¶¶ 86-88, 91-92, 95-97, 99-102; Marin County Compl. ¶¶ 86-88, 91-92, 95-97, 99-102; San Mateo Compl. ¶¶ 86-88, 91-92, 95-97, 99-102; Oakland Compl. ¶¶ 60-61; San Francisco Compl. ¶¶ 60-62; County of Santa Cruz Compl. ¶¶ 130-32, 135-37, 140-42, 144-47; City of Santa Cruz Compl. ¶¶ 129-31, 134-36, 139-41, 143-46.)

32. Several Potential Defendants also made statements shortly after filing the lawsuits focusing on Texas-based speech. In a July 20, 2017 op-ed for *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, Potential Defendant Dedina, the mayor of the City of Imperial Beach, justified his

participation in this litigation by accusing the energy sector of attempting to "sow uncertainty" about climate change. In a July 26, 2017 appearance at a local radio station, Mr. Dedina accused ExxonMobil of carrying out a "merchants of doubt campaign."

33. Oakland City Attorney Barbara Parker issued a press release soon after filing suit, asserting that "[i]t is past time to debate or question the reality of global warming." According to Parker, "[j]ust like BIG TOBACCO, BIG OIL knew the truth long ago and peddled misinformation to con their customers and the American public."

34. San Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera similarly accused "fossil fuel companies" of launching a "disinformation campaign to deny and discredit what was clear even to their own scientists: global warming is real," and pledged to ensure that these companies "are held to account."

35. These allegations, ~~which pervade Respondents' lawsuits,~~ are contradicted by the Respondents' own municipal bond disclosures. While the California municipalities alleged in their complaints against the energy companies that the impacts of climate change were knowable, quantifiable, and certain, they told their investors the exact opposite. These contradictions raise the question of whether the California municipalities brought these lawsuits for an improper purpose.

36. For example, Oakland and San Francisco's complaints claim that ExxonMobil's and other energy company's "conduct will continue to cause ongoing and increasingly severe sea level rise harms" to the cities. However, the municipal bonds issued by Oakland and San Francisco disclaim knowledge of any such impending catastrophe, stating the Cities are "unable to predict" whether sea-level rise "or other impacts of climate change" will occur, and "if any such events occur, whether they will have a material adverse effect on the

business operations or financial condition of the City" or the "local economy."

37. Similarly, according to the San Mateo Complaint, the county is "particularly vulnerable to sea level rise," with "a 93% chance that the County experiences a devastating three-foot flood before the year 2050, and a 50% chance that such a flood occurs before 2030." Despite this, nearly all of the county's bond offerings contain no reference to climate change, and 2014 and 2016 bond offerings assure that "[t]he County is unable to predict whether sea-level rise or other impacts of climate change or flooding from a major storm will occur."

38. The Imperial Beach Complaint alleges that it is vulnerable to "significant, and dangerous sea level rise" due to "unabated greenhouse gas emissions." Imperial Beach has never warned investors in its bonds of any such vulnerability. A 2013 bond offering, for instance, contains nothing but a boilerplate disclosure that "earthquake . . . , flood, fire, or other natural disaster, could cause a reduction in the Tax Revenues securing the Bonds . . . ."

39. The Marin County complaint warns that "there is a 99% risk that the County experiences a devastating three-foot flood before the year 2050, and a 47% chance that such a flood occurs before 2030." It also asserts that "[w]ithin the next 15 years, the County's Bay-adjacent coast will endure multiple, significant impacts from sea level rise." However, its bond offerings do not contain any specific references to climate change risks, noting only, for example, that "natural or manmade disaster[s], such as earthquake, flood, fire, terrorist activities, [and] toxic dumping" are potential risks.

40. The Santa Cruz complaints warn of dire climate change threats. The county alleges that there is "a 98% chance that the County experiences a devastating three-foot flood before the year 2050, and a 22% chance that such a flood occurs before 2030." The Santa Cruz City Complaint similarly warns that "increased flooding and severe storm events associated with

climate change will result in significant structural and financial losses in the City's low-lying downtown." But none of the city or county bond offerings mention these dire and specific warnings. A 2016 county disclosure merely states that areas within the county "may be subject to unpredictable climatic conditions, such as flood, droughts and destructive storms." A 2017 city bond offering has a boilerplate message that,"[f]rom time to time, the City is subject to natural calamities," including flood and wildfire.

41. Potential Defendants Pawa, Parker, Herrera, Beiers, Dedina, Lyon, Washington, McRae, Condotti, County of San Mateo, County of Marin, City of Imperial Beach, City of Santa Cruz, County of Santa Cruz, City of Oakland, and City of San Francisco either approved or participated in filing the lawsuits against the Texas energy sector. That conduct was directed at Texas-based speech, activities, and property. Prospective Witnesses Landreth, Reiskin, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal approved the contemporaneous disclosures that contradict the allegations in the municipal complaints. Those witnesses, along with the Potential Defendants, are likely to have evidence pertaining to that contradiction.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

42. Under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a proper court may allow discovery of a potential claim if the court would have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendants to the anticipated suit.

43. Because this Court is not required to have personal jurisdiction over prospective witnesses who are not potential defendants, the special appearances of Prospective Witnesses Landreth, Reiskin, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal are denied.

44. This Court would not have general personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants to the anticipated suit.

45. This Court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants for the anticipated claims of constitutional violations, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy.

46. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants to the anticipated action would be permitted under the Texas long-arm statute, which allows a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2). Each of the Potential Defendants is a nonresident within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

47. A violation of First Amendment rights occurs where the targeted speech occurs or where it would otherwise occur but for the violation. ExxonMobil exercises its First Amendment rights in Texas, and Texas is the site of the speech challenged by the Potential Defendants' lawsuits. The anticipated claims therefore concern potential constitutional torts committed in Texas.

48. Exercising jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants in the anticipated action would comport with due process because the potential claims arise from minimum contacts initiated by the Potential Defendants which purposefully target Texas, including speech, activities, and property in Texas.

49. Mr. Pawa initiated contact and created a continuing relationship with Texas by, among other activities, (i) initiating a plan to use litigation to change corporate behavior of Texas-based energy companies at the La Jolla conference; (ii) engaging with the Rockefeller Family Fund to solidify and promote the goal of delegitimizing ExxonMobil as a political actor; (iii) instigating state attorneys general to commence investigations of ExxonMobil in order to obtain documents stored in Texas; and (iv) soliciting and actively promoting litigation by

California municipalities against the Texas energy industry, including ExxonMobil, to target Texas-based speech and obtain documents in Texas.

50. All of the Potential Defendants initiated contact and created a continuing relationship with Texas by (i) developing, signing, approving, and/or filing complaints that expressly target the speech, research, and funding decisions of ExxonMobil and other Texas-based energy companies to chill and affect speech, activities, and property in Texas; and (ii) using an agent to serve ExxonMobil in Texas.

51. The Potential Defendants' contacts were deliberate and purposeful, and not random, fortuitous, or attenuated.

52. Purposeful availment is satisfied where Texas is the focus of the Potential Defendants' activities and where the object of the potential conspiracy is to suppress speech and corporate behavior in Texas. *See, e.g.*, *TV Azteca* v. *Ruiz*, 490 S.W.3d 29, 40 (Tex. 2016); *Hoskins* v. *Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.*, Nos. 02-15-00249-CV, 02-15-00253-CV, 2016 WL 2772164, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2016).

53. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, ExxonMobil's potential claims of First Amendment violation, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy would arise from the Potential Defendants' contacts with Texas.

54. Exercising jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants for the potential claims would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

55. It would not be burdensome for the Potential Defendants to litigate ExxonMobil's potential claims in Texas, and the Potential Defendants have failed to provide substantial evidence of burden.

56. Texas has a substantial state interest in adjudicating claims concerning

constitutional torts committed in Texas against Texas residents.

57. ExxonMobil has an inherent interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief by litigating its potential claims in Texas.

58. Exercising jurisdiction in this potential action would comport with the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies because ExxonMobil's anticipated action encompasses claims and parties that are not part of the Potential Defendants' California nuisance suits and ExxonMobil has objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in those suits.

59. Exercising jurisdiction in this potential action would support the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies because ExxonMobil's anticipated action concerns a conspiracy to suppress and chill speech and associational activities of the Texas energy sector. Texas has an inherent interest in exercising jurisdiction over actions that concern the infringement of constitutional rights within its borders.

60. To the extent the Court's findings of fact are construed by a reviewing court to be conclusions of law or vice-versa, the incorrect designation shall be disregarded and the specified finding and/or conclusion of law shall be deemed to have been correctly designated herein.

SIGNED this 24th day of Apr 2018.

R.H. Wallace Jr., Presiding Judge

App. B

City of San Francisco v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 02-18-00106-CV, 2020 WL 3969558 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.)

2020 WL 3969558
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

The CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Dennis J. Herrera in his official capacity as City Attorney for the City of San Francisco, and Edward Reiskin in his official capacity as Director of Transportation for the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, Appellants
v.
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Appellee
The City of Oakland, Matthew F. Pawa, Barbara J. Parker, and Sabrina B. Landreth, Appellants
v.
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Appellee
County of San Mateo, County of Marin, City of Imperial Beach, City of Santa Cruz, County of Santa Cruz, John Beiers, Serge Dedina, Jennifer Lyon, Brian Washington, Dana McRae, Anthony Condotti, John Maltbie, Andy Hall, Matthew Hymel, Carlos Palacios, and Martín Bernal, Appellants
v.
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Appellee

No. 02-18-00106-CV
|
Delivered: June 18, 2020

On Appeal from the 96th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, Trial Court No. 096-297222-18, HON. R. H. WALLACE, Judge

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Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

***1** Texas-based Exxon Mobil Corporation filed a Rule 202 petition in Texas state court seeking presuit discovery to evaluate potential claims for constitutional violations, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy against several California counties, cities, and government officials, and against Matthew Pawa, who is two of the cities' Massachusetts-based outside counsel. Exxon's potential claims arise from an alleged conspiracy by Pawa and these California counties and cities to use tort suits filed in California state court to suppress Exxon's Texas-based speech and associational activities regarding climate change. Exxon claims that in the California litigation, the counties and cities alleged facts against the Texas energy sector that contradict their bond-offering disclosures. Exxon thus seeks presuit discovery to determine whether the California suits were baseless and brought in bad faith as a pretext to suppress the Texas energy sector's Texas-based speech and associational activities regarding climate change and to gain access to documents that Exxon keeps in Texas.

Pawa and the California cities, counties, and officials filed special appearances challenging Texas's personal jurisdiction over them. This interlocutory appeal arises from the denial of those special appearances. *See* Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7). Because the potential defendants lack the requisite minimum contacts with Texas to be subject to personal jurisdiction here, we will reverse the trial court's order and render judgment denying Exxon's Rule 202 petition.

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties to the Rule 202 petition

Exxon is incorporated under the laws of New Jersey and has its principal place of business in Texas, with its corporate headquarters in Irving, Texas. Exxon formulates and issues its climate-change statements from its headquarters. The majority of its climate-change-related corporate records are located in Texas, and Exxon engages in speech and associational activities in Texas.

The cities of San Francisco, Oakland, Imperial Beach, and Santa Cruz are in California, as are the counties of San Mateo, Marin, and Santa Cruz. These cities and counties do not maintain a registered agent, telephone listing, or post-office box in Texas. They are potential defendants in Exxon's anticipated suit.

Certain officials of these California cities and counties are also potential defendants: Dennis Herrera, San Francisco's City Attorney; Barbara Parker, Oakland's City Attorney; John Beiers, San Mateo County's County Counsel; Brian Washington, Marin County's County Counsel; Dana McRae, Santa Cruz County's County Counsel; Serge Dedina, Imperial Beach's Mayor; Jennifer Lyon, Imperial Beach's City Attorney (and an attorney with the California law firm of McDougal, Love, Boehmer, Foley, Lyon & Canlas); and Anthony Condotti, Santa Cruz's City Attorney (and managing partner of the California law firm Atchison, Barisone & Condotti).

Other officials of each city and county are prospective witnesses only: Edward Reiskin, the Director of Transportation for the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency; Sabrina Landreth, Oakland's City Administrator; John Maltbie, San Mateo County's County Manager; Matthew Hymel, Marin County's County Administrator; Carlos Palacios, the Santa Cruz County Administrative Officer; Gary Andrew Hall, Imperial Beach's City Manager; and Martín Bernal, Santa Cruz's City Manager.

***2** All these individual potential defendants and prospective witnesses are, perhaps obviously, California residents. None of the individual potential defendants maintains an office or registered agent in Texas. Similarly, none of the prospective witnesses maintains a registered agent, telephone listing, or post-office box in Texas.

Potential defendant Pawa—the lone non-Californian—is a Massachusetts resident and attorney. He practices law in the Newton, Massachusetts office of Seattle-based Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. Pawa is not licensed to practice law in Texas. In addition to being a potential defendant, Pawa is Oakland's and San Francisco's outside counsel.

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B. The La Jolla conference on climate change, Pawa's climate-litigation strategy, and the Rockefeller Family Fund meeting

In June 2012, Pawa, a climate-change litigator, attended the "Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies" in La Jolla, California. Among the conference organizers was Peter Frumhoff, the Director of Science and Policy for the Union of Concerned Scientists.

At the conference, Pawa spoke about one of his pending cases against the energy industry seeking damages for coastal flooding allegedly caused by anthropogenic climate change. According to him, "Exxon and the other defendants [in that case] distorted the truth." Pawa also stated that litigation is not only a remedy for those suffering the effects of climate change but also "a potentially powerful means to change corporate behavior."

Conference participants discussed strategies for getting energy companies' internal documents and concluded that law-enforcement powers and civil litigation could be used to pressure the energy industry to support legislative and regulatory responses to climate change. Participants also planned to enlist state attorneys general to launch investigations into climate change that could bring "key internal documents to light."

In March 2015, Pawa sent a memorandum to NextGen America—a nonprofit group funded by Tom Steyer, the California billionaire hedge-fund manager, environmental activist, and erstwhile candidate in the 2020 Democratic presidential primary—summarizing Pawa's legal strategy against fossil-fuel companies "for their contributions to California's injuries from global warming." The memo stated that "certain fossil[-]fuel companies (most notoriously ExxonMobil), have engaged in a campaign and conspiracy of deception and denial on global warming." Pawa further stated that "[a] global warming case would be grounded in the doctrine of public nuisance" and noted that "simply proceeding to the discovery phase would be significant" and that "obtaining industry documents would be a remarkable achievement that would advance the case and the cause."

Early the following year, in January 2016, Pawa and others met at the Rockefeller Family Fund offices in New York City to discuss the goals of an "Exxon campaign." According to the meeting's draft agenda, the goals included (1) establishing in the public's mind that "Exxon is a corrupt institution that has pushed humanity (and all creation) toward climate chaos and grave harm"; (2) delegitimizing Exxon as a political actor; (3) driving divestment from Exxon; and (4) forcing "officials to disassociate themselves from Exxon, their money, and their historic opposition to climate progress, for example by refusing campaign donations, refusing to take meetings, calling for a price on carbon, etc." As "main avenues for legal actions [and] related campaigns," the participants identified "AGs" and tort suits. The participants planned to use these avenues to obtain discovery and create scandal.

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C. State attorneys general enter the fray

***3** Two months later, then-New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, and 18 other state attorneys general—the "Green 20"—held the "AGs United for Clean Power Press Conference." Just before that March 2016 press conference, Pawa and Frumhoff attended a closed-door meeting with the AGs, and Pawa briefed them on "climate[-]change litigation." Pawa tried but failed to conceal from the media his involvement in the meeting.

During the press conference, the AGs promoted regulating the speech of energy companies like Exxon—companies that they perceived as hostile to AGs' policy responses to climate change. New York's Schneiderman declared that there "is no dispute" about climate change but that there is confusion "sowed by those with an interest in profiting from the confusion and creating misperceptions in the eyes of the American public that really need to be cleared up." He denounced "highly aggressive and morally vacant forces that are trying to block every step by the federal government to take meaningful action" and announced that the Green 20 was "sending a message that, at least some of us—actually a lot of us—in state government are prepared to step into this battle with an unprecedented level of commitment and coordination."

Healey of Massachusetts identified climate change "as a matter of extreme urgency," and stated that

> [p]art of the problem has been one of public perception, and it appears, certainly, that certain companies, certain industries, may not have told the whole story, leading many to doubt whether climate change is real and to misunderstand and misapprehend the catastrophic nature of its impacts. Fossil[-]fuel companies that deceived investors and consumers about the dangers of climate change should be, must be, held accountable. That's why I, too, have joined in investigating the practices of ExxonMobil. We can all see today the troubling disconnect between what Exxon knew, what industry folks knew, and what the company and the industry chose to share with investors and with the American public.

Around the time of the press conference, Schneiderman issued a subpoena and Healey issued a civil investigative demand to Exxon to investigate what they considered the company's potential consumer and securities fraud. The subpoena and demand each sought production of communications and documents concerning climate change (including Exxon's climate-change research), documents related to statements made at shareholder meetings in Texas, internal corporate documents and communications concerning regulatory filings, public-facing and investor-facing reports, communications with trade associations and industry groups, and communications with "climate deniers."

Exxon responded by suing Schneiderman and Healey in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting various claims: conspiracy to deprive Exxon of its constitutional rights; violations of Exxon's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; violations of the

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Dormant Commerce Clause; preemption; and abuse of process. *See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman*, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), *appeal docketed*, No. 18-1170 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2018). Exxon asserted that "Pawa, Frumhoff, and others hatched a scheme to promote litigation" at the La Jolla conference and "saw litigation as a means to uncover internal Exxon documents regarding climate change and to pressure fossil[-]fuel companies like Exxon to change their stance on climate change." *Id.* at 690. As evidence of Pawa's influence on the investigations, Exxon pointed to the La Jolla conference, the Rockefeller Family Fund meeting, and the briefing before the Green 20 press conference. *See id.* at 689–90, 709. According to Exxon, Schneiderman's and Healey's intended goal in conducting their investigations was to intimidate and silence the fossil-fuel industry's side of the climate-change debate. *See id.* at 688. Exxon believed that Schneiderman's and Healey's involvement with Pawa and their statements at the March 2016 press conference suggested that their investigations were politically motivated and that they were using the document-production requests to pressure Exxon to change its position on climate change. *See id.* at 688–91. The federal district court dismissed Exxon's complaint. *Id.* at 713–14.

D. Pawa's climate crusade continues

***4** In November 2016, Pawa spoke at a conference and accused Exxon of "under[taking] a campaign of deception and denial about global warming that confused the American people and consumers of Exxon's product and all fossil[-]fuel products about the nature and harms of global warming." According to Pawa, Exxon scientists had researched global warming in the late 1970s and early 1980s and found that the atmosphere's carbon-dioxide level was increasing and that the "overwhelming opinion of scientists was that the source of this problem was the burning of fossil fuels." In Pawa's telling, Exxon scientists further warned that an increase in carbon dioxide would result in an average global-temperature rise that would "bring about significant changes in the earth's climate." These scientists supposedly informed Exxon management that mitigation would require major reductions in fossil-fuel combustion. Pawa claimed that Exxon management knew about the scientists' findings but classified the information as proprietary and barred its distribution outside the company.

In the same talk, Pawa specifically targeted a 2013 speech concerning climate change delivered by former Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, declaring that Tillerson's implication that "the planet was not even warming" was either false or misleading. Pawa also criticized a 2015 speech to shareholders in which Tillerson "questioned whether or not the computer models used to project future warming are 'lousy,' even though ... Exxon has been using these same kinds of computer models since the 1980s to protect its own business assets by projecting future sea[-]level rise."

E. The California counties and cities sue Exxon (and others) and give statements to the media about their litigation targets

In 2017, the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, Imperial Beach, and Santa Cruz, along with the counties of San Mateo, Marin, and Santa Cruz, each filed lawsuits in California state court against Exxon and other fossil-fuel companies, many of which are also based in Texas.[1] These

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suits alleged that fossil-fuel emissions have caused and continue to cause global warming and consequent rising sea levels, resulting in increasingly severe coastal flooding, erosion, and salt-water intrusion. In addition, these suits complained that despite knowing that their products are causing global climate change, fossil-fuel companies continue to produce and sell them while engaging in advertising and public-relations campaigns that promote fossil-fuel use, discredit scientific research on global warming, and downplay global-warming risks.

As noted, Pawa is one of the lawyers representing San Francisco and Oakland. In separate suits, those two cities brought public-nuisance claims and sought an abatement-fund remedy "to provide for infrastructure ... necessary ... to adapt to global[-]warming impacts, such as sea[-]level rise." Both cities expressly disclaimed that they were seeking "to impose liability on Defendants for their direct emissions of greenhouse gases" or seeking "to restrain Defendants from engaging in their business operations." San Francisco and Oakland each served its complaint on Exxon's registered agent in California.[2]

***5** Similarly, in five separate suits, the cities of Imperial Beach and Santa Cruz and the counties of San Mateo, Marin, and Santa Cruz alleged claims for public and private nuisance, negligence, products liability, and trespass. In addition to "equitable relief to abate the nuisances," these suits (collectively, the "San Mateo suits") sought compensatory and punitive damages and profit disgorgement. The San Mateo suits were served on Exxon's registered agent in Texas.[3]

Each of the cities' and counties' complaints discusses Exxon's internal memos and scientific research concerning climate change. The complaints also focus on Exxon's Texas-based speech and associational activities regarding climate change. San Francisco and Oakland, for example, stated that at Exxon's 2015 annual shareholder meeting in Texas, "then-CEO Rex Tillerson misleadingly downplayed global warming's risks by stating that climate models used to predict future impacts were unreliable." San Francisco's and Oakland's complaints also mention allegedly misleading corporate statements about climate change issued from Texas, such as Exxon's "annual 'Outlook for Energy' reports," which the cities describe as a "self-serving means of promoting fossil fuels and undercutting non-dangerous renewable energy and clean technologies"; statements on Exxon's website emphasizing the " 'uncertainty' of global[-]warming science and impacts"; and Exxon's " 'Lights Across America' website advertisement," which states "that natural gas is 'helping [to] dramatically reduce America's emissions,' even though natural gas [according to the cities] is a fossil fuel causing widespread planetary warming and harm to coastal cities." San Francisco's and Oakland's complaints also attack Exxon's decisions to fund climate-change researchers and research groups that the cities have labeled as "front groups" and climate-change "denialists."

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The San Mateo suits similarly focus on Exxon's Texas-based speech and associational activities concerning climate change such as:

> • a 1988 memo from an Exxon public-affairs manager describing the "Exxon Position," which emphasized "the uncertainty in scientific conclusions regarding the potential enhanced Greenhouse Effect" and resisted "the overstatement and sensationalization [sic] of potential greenhouse effect which could lead to noneconomic development of non-fossil[-]fuel resources";
>
> • a 1996 publication released by Exxon entitled, "Global Warming: Who's Right?," which was prefaced by a statement from Exxon's then-CEO Lee Raymond: "taking drastic action immediately is unnecessary since many scientists agree there's ample time to better understand the climate system"; and
>
> • a declaration in Exxon's 2007 Corporate Citizenship Report that in 2008, Exxon would "discontinue contributions to several public policy [climate-change-denial] research groups whose position on climate change could divert attention from the important discussion on how the world will secure the energy required for economic growth in an environmentally responsible manner."

***6** Shortly after these lawsuits were filed, several of the cities' officials made media statements supporting the suits. In an op-ed for *The San Diego Union-Tribune* supporting Imperial Beach's lawsuit, Mayor Dedina claimed that Exxon and "its industry colleagues" had known for 50 years that carbon-dioxide pollution from fossil fuels "would cause the air and oceans to warm and sea levels to rise." Dedina further claimed that instead of taking steps to remedy the problem and warn the public and policymakers, fossil-fuel companies "embarked on a multimillion-dollar campaign, taken straight from the tobacco industry's playbook, to sow uncertainty around both the science and the impacts to put off regulation of their [carbon-dioxide] pollution for as long as possible." During a radio appearance soon after, Dedina accused Exxon of carrying out a "merchants of doubt" campaign.

In the same vein was a press release issued by Parker, Oakland's City Attorney, declaring that "[i]t is past time to debate or question the reality of global warming." She went on to claim: "Just like BIG TOBACCO, BIG OIL knew the truth long ago and peddled misinformation to con their customers and the American public."

For his part, San Francisco City Attorney Herrera accused fossil-fuel companies of "profit[ing] handsomely for decades while knowing they were putting the fate of our cities at risk," but rather than "owning up to it, they copied a page from the Big Tobacco playbook" and "launch[ed] a multi-million dollar disinformation campaign to deny and discredit what was clear even to their own scientists: global warming is real, and their product is a huge part of the

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problem." He pledged that San Francisco was "going to ensure that those responsible for the problem are held to account."

F. In contrast, the cities' and counties' bond offerings downplay climate-change risks

The cities' and counties' recent bond-offering disclosures are at odds with the claims made in their lawsuits. For example, one of San Francisco's 2017 bond offerings states that according to the California Climate Change Center, the city is at risk from sea-level rise and flooding caused by climate change. But the offering also states that San Francisco is "unable to predict whether sea-level rise or other impacts of climate change ... will occur, when they may occur, and if any such events occur, whether they will have a material adverse effect on the business operations or financial condition of the City and the local economy."

San Mateo County's 2014 and 2016 bond offerings also refer to the California Climate Change Center's prediction but similarly state that the county is "unable to predict whether sea-level rise or other impacts of climate change or flooding from a major storm will occur" and what impact those events would have on the local economy or on the county's business operations or financial condition if they did occur.

Oakland's 2017 bond offering discusses earthquake and wildfire risks, but not climate-change risks, stating merely that the city "is unable to predict when seismic events, fires[,] or other natural events, such as searise or other impacts of climate change or flooding from a major storm, could occur, when they may occur, and, if any such events occur, whether they will have a material adverse effect on the business operations or financial condition of the City or the local economy."

In a 2013 bond offering, Imperial Beach does not mention climate change, including under the heading "Natural Disasters"; rather, it states only that "earthquake, flood, fire, or other natural disaster, could cause a reduction in the Tax Revenues securing the Bonds." Similarly, Marin County's 2010 bond offering warns only about "the complete or partial destruction of taxable property caused by natural or manmade disaster, such as earthquake, flood, fire, terrorist activities, [and] toxic dumping."

***7** Santa Cruz County's 2016 bond offering, under the heading "Geologic, Topographic and Climatic Conditions," warns merely of "unpredictable climatic conditions, such as flood, droughts[,] and destructive storms." The City of Santa Cruz's 2017 bond offering states that "[f]rom time to time, the City is subject to natural calamities," including "earthquake, flood, tsunami, or wildfire."

G. Exxon files its Rule 202 petition

Based on the disconnect between the cities' and counties' bond-offering disclosures and what they alleged in their lawsuits, Exxon theorizes that the California cities and counties "do not actually believe the allegations in their complaints" and that those allegations "were not made in

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good faith." Exxon further believes that these lawsuits have been brought to silence and delegitimize Exxon "as a political actor" and to coerce it and other Texas-based energy companies into adopting "the climate[-]change policies favored by special interests and their allies in municipal government." Exxon points to Pawa's direct involvement in the San Francisco and Oakland suits as further evidence that they were brought for the "improper purpose" that Pawa endorsed at the La Jolla conference, discussed at the Rockefeller Family Fund meeting, explained to the state AGs before the Green 20 press conference, and described in his memo to NextGen America.

Based on these beliefs, Exxon filed a Rule 202 petition in Tarrant County District Court to investigate potential claims for constitutional torts (specifically, violations of Exxon's First Amendment rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions), abuse of process, and civil conspiracy, and to perpetuate and obtain testimony in anticipation of filing suit. *See generally* Tex. R. Civ. P. 202. Exxon identified as potential defendants the seven California cities and counties that have sued Exxon and other Texas-based energy companies in California, the eight city and county officials responsible for filing those suits,[4] and Pawa (collectively, "the Potential Defendants"). Exxon also sought to depose seven city and county officials who signed the bond offerings[5] (collectively, "the Prospective Witnesses"). Exxon alleged that Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants under Section 17.042(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. *See* Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(2).

The Potential Defendants and Prospective Witnesses filed special appearances supported by affidavits. *See* Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a. Exxon responded and presented its own evidence. After a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the special appearances and, at Exxon's request, filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order.

II. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions

The trial court filed 60 findings of fact and conclusions of law. *See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand*, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (recognizing that trial court may make findings of fact in connection with a special-appearance ruling). As relevant here, the trial court found and concluded the following:

> **FINDINGS OF FACT**
>
> ....
>
> 10. In January 2016, Mr. Pawa engaged participants at the Rockefeller Family Fund offices in New York City to further solidify "the [g]oals of an Exxon campaign" that Mr. Pawa [had] developed at the La Jolla conference....
>
> ***8** 11. According to the draft agenda, Mr. Pawa and the other participants aimed to chill and suppress ExxonMobil's speech through "legal actions & related campaigns," including "AGs"

and "Tort[ ]" suits. The draft agenda notes that participants planned to use "AGs" and "Tort[ ]" suits to "get[ ] discovery" and "creat[e] scandal."

....

13. At the [Green 20] press conference, Attorney General Schneiderman discussed the need to regulate the energy industry's speech on climate change, just as Potential Defendant Pawa had urged at La Jolla and at the Rockefeller meeting....

14. [At the Green 20 press conference,] Attorney General Healey similarly echoed themes from the strategy Mr. Pawa developed at La Jolla....

....

23. With the investigations of the state attorneys general underway, Mr. Pawa next promoted his La Jolla strategy to California municipalities, as potential plaintiffs in tort litigation that would be filed against energy companies, including ExxonMobil.

....

26. Following through on the strategy Mr. Pawa outlined in his memorandum to NextGen America, Potential Defendants Parker, Herrera, and the Cities of Oakland and San Francisco filed public[-]nuisance lawsuits against ExxonMobil and four other energy companies, including Texas-based ConocoPhillips. Mr. Pawa represents the plaintiffs in those actions, and Ms. Parker and Mr. Herrera signed the complaints on behalf of the City of Oakland and the City of San Francisco, respectively. They used an agent to serve the complaints on ExxonMobil's registered agent in California, whose role is to transmit legal process to ExxonMobil in Texas.

27. Potential Defendants Lyon, Washington, Beiers, Condotti, McRae, the City of Imperial Beach, Marin County, San Mateo County, and the City and County of Santa Cruz filed similar public[-]nuisance complaints against ExxonMobil and other energy companies, including ... 17 Texas-based energy companies.... Potential Defendants Beiers, Lyon, McRae, Washington, and Condotti signed these complaints. They used an agent to serve the complaints on ExxonMobil's registered agent in Texas.

28. Each of the seven California complaints expressly target speech and associational activities in Texas.

....

32. Several Potential Defendants also made statements shortly after filing the lawsuits focusing on Texas-based speech....

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....

35. The[ ] allegations [in the California complaints] are contradicted by the Respondents' own municipal[-]bond disclosures. While the California municipalities alleged in their complaints against the energy companies that the impacts of climate change were knowable, quantifiable, and certain, they told their investors the exact opposite. These contradictions raise the question of whether the California municipalities brought these suits for an improper purpose.

....

41. Potential Defendants Pawa, Parker, Herrera, Beiers, Dedina, Lyon, Washington, McRae, Condotti, County of San Mateo, County of Marin, City of Imperial Beach, City of Santa Cruz, County of Santa Cruz, City of Oakland, and City of San Francisco either approved or participated in filing the lawsuits against the Texas energy sector. That conduct was directed at Texas-based speech, activities, and property. Prospective Witnesses Landreth, Reiskin, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal approved the contemporaneous disclosures that contradict the allegations in the municipal complaints. Those witnesses, along with the Potential Defendants, are likely to have evidence pertaining to that contradiction.
***9**

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

42. Under Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a proper court may allow discovery of a potential claim if the court would have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendants to the anticipated suit.

43. Because this Court is not required to have personal jurisdiction over prospective witnesses who are not potential defendants, the special appearances of Prospective Witnesses Landreth, Reiskin, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal are denied.

....

45. This Court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants for the anticipated claims of constitutional violations, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy.

46. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants to the anticipated action would be permitted under the Texas long-arm statute, which allows a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code [Ann.] § 17.042(2). Each of the Potential Defendants is a nonresident within the meaning of the long-arm statute.

47. A violation of First Amendment rights occurs where the targeted speech occurs or where it would otherwise occur but for the violation. ExxonMobil exercises its First Amendment

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rights in Texas, and Texas is the site of the speech challenged by the Potential Defendants' lawsuits. The anticipated claims therefore concern potential constitutional torts committed in Texas.

48. Exercising jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants in the anticipated action would comport with due process because the potential claims arise from minimum contacts initiated by the Potential Defendants which purposefully target Texas, including speech, activities, and property in Texas.

49. Mr. Pawa initiated contact and created a continuing relationship with Texas by, among other activities, (i) initiating a plan to use litigation to change corporate behavior of Texas-based energy companies at the La Jolla conference; (ii) engaging with the Rockefeller Family Fund to solidify and promote the goal of delegitimizing ExxonMobil as a political actor; (iii) instigating state attorneys general to commence investigations of ExxonMobil in order to obtain documents stored in Texas; and (iv) soliciting and actively promoting litigation by California municipalities against the Texas energy industry, including ExxonMobil, to target Texas-based speech and obtain documents in Texas.

50. All of the Potential Defendants initiated contact and created a continuing relationship with Texas by (i) developing, signing, approving, and/or filing complaints that expressly target the speech, research, and funding decisions of ExxonMobil and other Texas-based energy companies to chill and affect speech, activities, and property in Texas; and (ii) using an agent to serve ExxonMobil in Texas.

51. The Potential Defendants' contacts were deliberate and purposeful, and not random, fortuitous, or attenuated.

52. Purposeful availment is satisfied where Texas is the focus of the Potential Defendants' activities and where the object of the potential conspiracy is to suppress speech and corporate behavior in Texas. *See, e.g., TV Azteca v. Ruiz*, 490 S.W.3d 29, 40 (Tex. 2016); *Hoskins v. Ricco Family Partners, Ltd.*, Nos. 02-15-00249-CV, 02-15-00253-CV, 2016 WL 2772164, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2016[, no pet.]) [(mem. op.)].

***10** 53. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, ExxonMobil's potential claims of First Amendment violation[s], abuse of process, and civil conspiracy would arise from the Potential Defendants' contacts with Texas.

54. Exercising jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants for the potential claims would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

....

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60. To the extent the Court's findings of fact are construed by a reviewing court to be conclusions of law or vice-versa, the incorrect designation shall be disregarded and the specified finding and/or conclusion of law shall be deemed to have been correctly designated herein.

III. Applicable Law

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 202 allows a trial court to authorize a deposition either (1) to perpetuate or obtain testimony for use in an anticipated suit or (2) to investigate a potential claim or suit. *See* Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.1 . Rule 202 requires that requests for presuit discovery be filed in a "proper court." Tex. R. Civ. P. 202.2(b); *In re Doe* (*Trooper*), 444 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). A "proper court" is one that has personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant. *See Trooper*, 444 S.W.3d at 604, 608–10. Thus, a trial court may grant a Rule 202 petition only if it has personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant. *See id.* at 604, 608–11.

A. Establishing personal jurisdiction

A Texas court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of such jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due-process guarantees. *Moncrief Oil Int'l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom*, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013). The Texas long-arm statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident that "commits a tort in whole or in part in this state." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(2); *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 36. Because the long-arm statute reaches "as far as the federal constitutional requirements for due process will allow," a Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident so long as doing so "comports with federal due[-]process limitations." *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 36 (quoting *Spir Star AG v. Kimich*, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010)).

In determining whether federal due-process requirements have been met, we rely on precedent from the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts, as well as our own state's decisions. *BMC Software*, 83 S.W.3d at 795; *TravelJungle v. Am. Airlines, Inc.*, 212 S.W.3d 841, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Federal due process is satisfied when (1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the state and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. *BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell*, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 36.

1. Minimum contacts

A nonresident defendant "establishes minimum contacts with a forum when it 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.' " *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 150 (quoting *Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co.*, 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009)). Three principles

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govern our purposeful-availment analysis: (1) only the defendant's contacts with Texas are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or third person; (2) the defendant's acts must be purposeful and not random, isolated, or fortuitous; and (3) the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of Texas's jurisdiction so that it impliedly consents to suit here. *M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co.*, 512 S.W.3d 878, 886 (Tex. 2017) (citing *Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten*, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005)).

***11** To constitute purposeful availment, the defendant's contacts must be "purposefully directed" to Texas. *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 38 (quoting *Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C.*, 815 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. 1991)). Those contacts also must result from the defendant's own "efforts to avail itself of the forum." *Id.* (quoting *Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg*, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007)). A defendant will not be haled into Texas based solely on contacts that are "random, isolated, or fortuitus," *id.* (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 785), or on the "unilateral activity of another party or a third person," *id.* (quoting *Guardian Royal*, 815 S.W.2d at 226). "The defendant's activities, whether they consist of direct acts within Texas or conduct outside Texas, must justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court." *Retamco*, 278 S.W.3d at 338 (quoting *Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman*, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002))

Minimum contacts can give rise to either specific or general jurisdiction. *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 37. Here, Exxon contends—and the trial court agreed—that Texas has specific jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants.[6] Specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from or is related to a defendant's purposeful activities in the state. *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 150. "For a Texas court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant, '(1) the defendant's contact with Texas must be purposeful, and (2) the cause of action must arise from those contacts.' " *Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell*, 549 S.W.3d 550, 559 (Tex. 2018) (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 795). That is, the defendant's purposeful contacts must be substantially connected to the operative facts of the litigation or form the basis of the cause of action. *Id.* at 559–60 (citing *Moki Mac*, 221 S.W.3d at 585; *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 795). When analyzing specific jurisdiction, our focus is thus on the relationship between Texas, the defendant, and the litigation. *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 150.

2. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

But even when a nonresident has established minimum contacts with Texas, due process permits Texas to assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident only if doing so comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 55 (quoting *Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)). Typically, though, "[w]hen a nonresident defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in a foreign jurisdiction, it is both fair and just to subject that defendant to the authority of that forum's courts." *Id.* (quoting *Spir Star*, 310 S.W.3d at 872). "Thus, '[i]f a nonresident has minimum contacts with the forum, rarely will the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident

not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " *Id.* (quoting *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 154–55).

B. The parties' shifting trial-court burdens and appellate standard of review

In the trial court, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to bring the nonresident defendant within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute. *Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc.*, 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). Once the plaintiff has done so, the burden shifts to the defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction as pleaded by the plaintiff. *Id.* "Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the lawsuit, the defendant's corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the allegations in the plaintiff's pleading." *Id.*

***12** The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis. *Id.* at 659. Factually, the defendant can negate jurisdiction by presenting evidence that it has no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff's allegations; the plaintiff risks dismissal of its suit if it does not then present the trial court with evidence affirming its jurisdictional allegations and establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. *Id.* Legally, the defendant can negate jurisdiction by showing that even if the plaintiff's alleged jurisdictional facts are true, (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish jurisdiction, (2) the defendant's Texas contacts fall short of purposeful availment, (3) the claims do not arise from the defendant's Texas contacts, or (4) exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. *Id.*

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a legal question that we review de novo. *Moncrief Oil*, 414 S.W.3d at 150. But a trial court may have to resolve fact questions before deciding the jurisdiction question. If the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying a special appearance, the appellant may challenge the fact findings on legal-and factual-sufficiency grounds, and we review the challenged findings for both legal and factual sufficiency. *BMC Software*, 83 S.W.3d at 794. We review challenged legal conclusions de novo to determine their correctness based on the facts. *See id.*

IV. The California Parties' Issues

The San Francisco parties,[7] the Oakland parties,[8] and the San Mateo parties[9] (collectively, "the California Parties") filed separate notices of appeal and separate appellate briefs raising similar issues. For efficiency's sake, we combine and recast the California Parties' issues and arguments as follows:

1. The cities, counties, and their officials are nonresidents under the Texas long-arm statute and are thus not within the statute's reach.
2. Exxon failed to plead sufficient allegations to bring the San Francisco parties and the Oakland parties within the Texas long-arm statute.[10]

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3. The California Parties lacked minimum contacts with Texas because they did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas.

4. Exxon's anticipated claims did not arise from or relate to the California Parties' forum contacts.

5. A Texas court's exercising jurisdiction over the California Parties would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

6. The evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's fact findings. The Oakland parties additionally argue that the federal district court's dismissing Exxon's complaint against attorneys general Schneiderman and Healey precluded the trial court's findings concerning Pawa's motives.
7. In a Rule 202 proceeding, a trial court must have personal jurisdiction over prospective witnesses, not just potential defendants.[11]

We will assume without deciding that the cities, counties, and their officials are nonresidents within the meaning of the Texas long-arm statute,[12] and begin our analysis by addressing the sufficiency of Exxon's pleadings. Then, we will address whether the California Parties established that they lack sufficient minimum contacts with Texas. Because the minimum-contacts issue is dispositive, we will not address the remaining issues.

V. The Sufficiency of Exxon's Pleadings

***13** As noted, the Texas long-arm statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who "commits a tort in whole or in part in this state." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042(2). Exxon pleaded that Texas has specific personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants under Section 17.042(2) because

> the potential abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and constitutional violations were intentionally targeted at the State of Texas to encourage the Texas energy sector to adopt the co-conspirator's desired legislative and regulatory responses to climate change. Exxon[ ] and 17 other Texas-based companies that are named in the California ... lawsuits exercise their First Amendment right in Texas to participate in the national dialogue about climate change. The speech and other First Amendment activity of the energy sector in Texas is precisely what the potential defendants have attempted to stifle through their abuse of law enforcement powers and civil litigation. [Footnote omitted.]

In short, Exxon pleaded that the Potential Defendants committed a tort in whole or in part in Texas because they committed torts that were targeted at Texas. We conclude that these allegations satisfied Exxon's initial burden of alleging a cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[13] *See Lombardo v. Bhattacharyya*, 437 S.W.3d 658, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (concluding that "Bhattacharyya's allegations that Lombardo committed torts in

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Texas satisfied his initial burden of alleging a cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Texas long-arm statute"); *see also TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 43, 47–52 (concluding that allegations and evidence that defendants "intentionally targeted Texas through [their] broadcasts" established purposeful availment). We thus overrule the San Francisco parties' and the Oakland parties' arguments regarding the sufficiency of Exxon's pleadings.

"Although allegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute, such allegations do not necessarily satisfy the U.S. Constitution." *Moncrief*, 414 S.W.3d at 149. But because Exxon met its initial pleading burden, the burden shifted to the California Parties to negate Exxon's basis for jurisdiction—that the Potential Defendants committed a tort in whole or in part in Texas. *See id.* at 149–50. The California Parties responded that exercising jurisdiction over them would violate due process because they lacked minimum contacts with Texas.

VI. The Potential Defendants Lack Minimum Contacts with Texas

***14** The California Parties argue that the Potential Defendants lack minimum contacts with Texas because they did not purposefully avail themselves of conducting activities in Texas. Exxon counters that the Potential Defendants purposefully directed their activities at Texas by (1) commencing baseless lawsuits in California intended to suppress speech in Texas and to gain access to documents in Texas and (2) serving Exxon with process in Texas.

A. The Potential Defendants' contacts

As an initial matter, we note that a plaintiff must establish specific jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis unless all the asserted claims arise from the same forum contacts. *See id.* at 150–51. Here, Exxon's anticipated claims—First Amendment violations, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy—do all arise from the same alleged forum contacts:

- The Potential Defendants signed, approved, or participated in filing the California lawsuits against Exxon and other Texas-based energy companies intended to suppress speech and associational rights in Texas and to obtain documents in Texas through the discovery process.

- The Potential Defendants hired a process server to serve their complaints on Exxon in Texas, either by serving the complaints on Exxon's registered agent in Texas or by serving the complaints on Exxon's registered agent in California to transmit them to Exxon in Texas.

Regarding Pawa, Exxon alleged that he had additional contacts with Texas: (1) he developed and promoted a plan at the La Jolla conference in California and at the Rockefeller meeting in New York to suppress Texas-based speech and to obtain Texas-based documents in order to delegitimize Exxon and other Texas-based energy companies; (2) he encouraged state AGs to

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investigate Exxon, focusing on Texas-based speech and documents; and (3) he promoted tort litigation by California municipalities against Exxon and others in the Texas energy sector in furtherance of his plan.

B. Exxon's evidence and the trial court's fact findings

Much of Exxon's responsive evidence and the trial court's fact findings relate to the merits of Exxon's potential tort claims—that is, the Potential Defendants' intent in filing and serving the California lawsuits. "The mere existence or allegation of a conspiracy directed at Texas is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction." *Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 560 (citing *Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson*, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995)). The personal-jurisdiction analysis in tort cases must focus on the "physical fact" of a defendant's contacts with Texas without attempting to decide the merits of the case:

> Business contacts are generally a matter of physical fact, while tort liability ... turns on what the parties thought, said, or intended. Far better that judges should limit their jurisdictional decisions to the former rather than involving themselves in trying the latter.

Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 791; *see Moncrief*, 414 S.W.3d at 147 (reiterating that "what the parties thought, said, or intended is generally irrelevant to their jurisdictional contacts").

Moreover, the supreme court has "expressly disapproved of the notion that 'specific jurisdiction turns on whether a defendant's contacts were tortious rather than the contacts themselves.' " *Estate of Hood*, No. 02-16-00036-CV, 2016 WL 6803186, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 792). As we have recently observed, "[W]e do not address the merits of the tort claims in reviewing the special appearance; rather, we instead analyze the quality and nature of [a defendant's] proven contacts in light of [the plaintiff's] pleaded tort claims." *OZO Capital, Inc. v. Syphers*, No. 02-17-00131-CV, 2018 WL 1531444, at *6 n.9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 790–92).

***15** Accordingly, the trial court's findings regarding the Potential Defendants' intent in filing the California lawsuits are irrelevant to our personal-jurisdiction analysis, and we thus will not address the California Parties' challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those findings. Instead, we focus on the quality and nature of the Potential Defendants' contacts with Texas.

C. Analysis

We begin by noting that for Texas to have specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the nonresident's conduct need not actually occur in Texas, as long as the defendant's acts were purposefully directed toward Texas as opposed to a Texas resident. *See Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1112 (2014); *TravelJungle*, 212 S.W.3d at 847; *see also Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Mgmt. IV, L.P.*, 493 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. 2016) ("Although 'physical presence in the forum' is 'a relevant contact,' it 'is not a prerequisite

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to jurisdiction.' ") (quoting *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 285, 134 S. Ct. at 1122). Relying primarily on the Texas Supreme Court's opinions in *TV Azteca* and *Retamco*, Exxon argues that the Potential Defendants purposefully directed their conduct at Texas by targeting Texas and Texas property by filing and serving the California suits in furtherance of a conspiracy directed at Texas to suppress Texas-based speech and associational activities and to gain access to Exxon's documents in Texas through discovery in the California suits.

In *TV Azteca*, a Mexican recording artist residing in South Texas sued two Mexican television broadcasters and a Mexican news anchor and producer for defamation based on broadcasts that originated in Mexico but reached parts of Texas. 490 S.W.3d at 34–35. The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that the defendants had indeed purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas by intentionally targeting Texas through the allegedly defamatory broadcasts. *Id.* at 52.

But in reaching its holding, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendants' having simply "directed a tort" at her in Texas was a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over them: "No one disputes that [the plaintiff] resides in Texas and the brunt of any injuries she suffered from [the defendants'] broadcasts occurred in Texas," but "courts cannot base specific jurisdiction merely on the fact that the defendant 'knows that the brunt of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in the forum state.' " *Id.* at 43 (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 788). The court then stated that "[t]here is a subtle yet crucial difference between directing a tort at an individual who happens to live in a particular state and directing a tort at that state." *Id.* "The fact that the plaintiff lives and was injured in the forum state is not irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry, but it is relevant only to the extent that is shows that *the forum state* was 'the focus of the activities of the defendant.' " *Id.* (quoting *Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, 465 U.S. 770, 780, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (1984)). But "the mere fact that [the defendants] directed defamatory statements at a plaintiff who lives in and allegedly suffered injuries in Texas, without more, does not establish specific jurisdiction over [the defendants]." *Id.*

Nonetheless, the *TV Azteca* court ultimately concluded that through their broadcasts the nonresident defendants had intentionally targeted Texas and thus purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in Texas because "additional conduct" evidence showed that they intended to serve the Texas market with their broadcasts. *See id.* at 46–52. The court explained that "a plaintiff can establish that a defamation defendant targeted Texas by relying on other 'additional conduct' through which the defendant 'continuously and deliberately exploited' the Texas market." *Id.* at 47 (quoting *Keeton*, 465 U.S. at 781, 104 S. Ct. at 1481). Evidence that the defendants had physically entered into Texas to produce and to promote their broadcasts, had derived substantial revenue and other benefits from selling advertising to Texas businesses, and had made substantial efforts to distribute their programs and to increase their popularity in Texas was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendants had "continuously and deliberately exploited the [Texas] market." *Id.* at 52 (quoting *Keeton*, 465 U.S. at 781, 104 S. Ct. at 1481).

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***16** But here, no similar acts of "additional conduct" exist through which the Potential Defendants can be said to have continuously and deliberately exploited Texas. Exxon contends that the Potential Defendants made "substantial efforts" to spread their viewpoints in Texas and to suppress Texas-based speech about climate change by making public statements and filing pretextual lawsuits against Exxon and others in the Texas energy sector. Yet even though the California suits and some of the Potential Defendants' public comments target Exxon's climate-change speech, these out-of-state actions were directed at Exxon, not Texas. Without more, the mere fact that the Potential Defendants directed these statements at Texas-based Exxon and that Exxon might suffer injury here does not establish personal jurisdiction. *See id.* at 43.

Quoting *TV Azteca*, Exxon nevertheless asserts that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at" Texas and where the "effects" of that conduct are felt in Texas. *Id.* at 40 (quoting *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 790, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487 (1984)). Because this quotation embeds one from *Calder*, we interpret Exxon's assertion as urging us to adopt the *Calder* "effects test" for determining specific jurisdiction. *See* 465 U.S. at 788–89, 104 S. Ct. at 1486–87 (holding that California properly asserted personal jurisdiction over Florida-based defendants in part because California resident suffered "the brunt of the harm" in California).

Calder involved a Florida-based national newspaper that published an allegedly defamatory article about a California actress. *Id.* at 784–85, 104 S. Ct. at 1484–85. The Supreme Court examined the various contacts that the defendants had created with California in writing the article: the defendants had relied on phone calls to "California sources" for information for the article; the article concerned the actress's activities in California; the defendants caused reputational injury in California by writing an allegedly defamatory article that was widely circulated in California; and the actress suffered the "brunt" of that injury in California. *Id.* at 788–89, 104 S. Ct. at 1486. "In sum, California [was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered." *Id.* at 789, 104 S. Ct. at 1486. The Court held that personal jurisdiction over the Florida defendants was "therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California." *Id.*, 104 S. Ct. at 1486–87.

The Supreme Court has since clarified, however, that the *Calder* "effects test" requires that the alleged tort's "effects" must connect the defendant's conduct to the forum state, not just to a plaintiff who lives there. *See Walden*, 571 U.S. at 288, 134 S. Ct. at 1124. In *Walden*, the Court reaffirmed that the specific-jurisdiction inquiry "focuses 'on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' " *Id.* at 284, 134 S. Ct. at 1121 (quoting *Keeton*, 465 U.S. at 775, 104 S. Ct. at 1478). "For a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State." *Id.*, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. This "relationship must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant *himself*' creates with the forum State." *Id.* at 284, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (1985)). And the "analysis looks to the

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defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there." *Id.* at 285, 134 S. Ct. at 1122. That is, mere injury to a forum resident is an insufficient connection to the forum, and "an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum State." *Id.* at 290, 134 S. Ct. at 1125. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the nonresident defendant's conduct is aimed at the forum state—the question is thus "not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way." *Id.*, 134 S. Ct. at 1125.

***17** The Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of *Calder* aligns with the Supreme Court's: "Mere knowledge that the 'brunt' of the alleged harm would be felt—or have effects—in the forum state is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction." *Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc.*, 496 S.W.3d 58, 68–69 (Tex. 2016). Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court has "explicitly rejected an approach to specific jurisdiction that turns upon where a defendant 'directed a tort' rather than on the defendant's contacts." *Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 565 (citing *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 790–92). Thus, "the 'effects test' is not an alternative to [the] traditional 'minimum contacts' analysis, and it does not displace the factors we look to in determining whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the state." *Id.*

Here, the Potential Defendants' alleged Texas contacts—(1) filing suit in California state court asserting state-law claims against Texas-based Exxon and serving Exxon with process in furtherance of that litigation, which might result in the discovery of documents located in Texas and (2) Pawa's out-of-state activities and statements regarding Exxon's climate-change stance—are not contacts with Texas, but with a Texas resident. Without more, their knowledge that Exxon will feel the effects in Texas does not suffice. Under these circumstances, the nonresident Potential Defendants could not reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Texas. We thus conclude that these contacts are insufficient to establish purposeful availment. *See, e.g., SpaceCo Bus. Sols., Inc. v. Mass Engineered Design, Inc.*, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154 (D. Colo. 2013) (pointing out lack of authority interpreting *Calder* to support proposition that "any time a plaintiff files a suit in a jurisdiction other than the defendant's principal place of business, at least where the defendant accuses him of an abuse of process or malicious prosecution, he renders himself vulnerable to being sued by the defendant in the defendant's home state, again regardless of whether the plaintiff turned defendant has had any other contacts with that state"). And to the extent Exxon argues that specific jurisdiction exists in this case under the directed-a-tort theory, we reject that argument as well. *See Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 790–92 (holding that allegation or evidence that nonresident defendant directed a tort at a Texas resident was insufficient to support specific jurisdiction); *see also Old Republic*, 549 S.W.3d at 565 ("Moreover, we have explicitly rejected an approach to specific jurisdiction that turns upon where a defendant 'directed a tort' rather than on the defendant's contacts." (citing *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 790–92)).

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We likewise conclude that filing lawsuits in California that would yield, through the discovery process, the production of documents located in Texas is not sufficiently targeting Texas property to subject the Potential Defendants to personal jurisdiction here. In *Retamco*, the supreme court held that the defendant had "reached out and created a continuing relationship in Texas" by purchasing and taking assignment of real-property interests in Texas even though the defendant never entered the state to do so. 278 S.W.3d at 339. The defendant's ownership made the defendant "liable for obligations and expenses related to the interests" and allowed the defendant to " 'enjoy ... the benefits and protections of [Texas laws.]' " *Id.* (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 787). The court also noted that the contact was not merely fortuitous: the property's location was "fixed in this state." *Id.* Moreover, the defendant sought a "benefit, advantage[,] or profit" in Texas, *id.* at 340 (quoting *Michiana*, 168 S.W.3d at 785), because the assignment gave it "valuable assets in Texas, including the right to enforce warranties and covenants related to the real property," *id.* The court thus held that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas. *Id.*

***18** Consistent with the court's reasoning in *Retamco*, we determined several years ago that nonresidents' alleged backdating of documents to be filed in a Texas property's chain of title was directed at Texas in light of Texas's interest in maintaining stability and certainty regarding title to Texas real property. *Hoskins*, 2016 WL 2772164, at *7. As a result, we held that these actions were directed at the state of Texas rather than solely at a Texas resident and showed "purposeful availment necessary to support minimum contacts for the purposes of specific jurisdiction." *Id.* Similarly, in a case predating *Retamco*, we found that an overseas-based travel company purposefully directed its activities toward Texas when it used computer software to repeatedly and continuously intentionally access information from the plaintiff's computer servers that were physically located in Texas. *TravelJungle*, 212 S.W.3d at 844, 849–50. In reaching our holding, we explained that the travel company's actions went beyond just looking at the website; rather, the company took up valuable computer capacity, depriving the plaintiff of the "ability to use that same capacity to serve its other customers." *Id.* at 850.

Based on these cases, Exxon argues that interfering with Texas property—whether real or personal—can provide sufficient contacts with Texas to establish personal jurisdiction, and that the Potential Defendants' seeking Exxon's Texas documents through discovery in the California suits sufficiently targets Texas property to subject them to personal jurisdiction here. We disagree. As noted, whether Texas may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, which "must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant *himself*' creates with the forum State." *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 284, 134 S. Ct. at 1122. And to constitute purposeful availment, the defendant's contacts must result from the defendant's own "efforts to avail itself of the forum." *TV Azteca*, 490 S.W.3d at 38. And "[t]he defendant's activities, whether they consist of direct acts within Texas or conduct outside Texas, must justify a conclusion that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court." *Retamco*, 278 S.W.3d at 338.

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Here, the Potential Defendants' seeking discovery from a Texas resident during the course of California litigation was not an effort to avail themselves of Texas and does not justify a conclusion that they could reasonably anticipate being haled into a Texas court. Initiating an out-of-state lawsuit where some discoverable documents might be physically located in Texas and are under Exxon's control does not invoke the benefits or protections of Texas's laws. If it did, any plaintiff in an out-of-state lawsuit against a Texas defendant who maintained documents here would be subject to specific jurisdiction in a Texas case arising from or relating to that out-of-state suit.

Several cases demonstrate that contacts similar to the ones alleged here between a state resident and a nonresident in connection with out-of-state litigation do not suffice for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in cases arising from that out-of-state litigation. For example, allegedly abusive litigation and service of process are insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. *See, e.g., Allred v. Moore & Peterson*, 117 F.3d 278, 280, 287 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that in case arising from Louisiana litigation, Mississippi did not have personal jurisdiction over Texas and Louisiana attorneys who had sued Mississippi resident in Louisiana and served resident in Mississippi by mail); *Diddel v. Davis*, No. H-04-4811, 2005 WL 8164061, at *1–2, *5–7 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2005) (relying on *Allred* to hold that Texas lacked personal jurisdiction over Maryland resident and his Maryland and Florida lawyers for claim arising from their allegedly frivolous Florida lawsuit against Texas resident concerning a Florida land transaction, concluding that mailing draft complaint to Texas resident, serving Texas resident in Texas, and Texas resident's suffering harmful effects in Texas were insufficient jurisdictional contacts); *Estate of Hood*, 2016 WL 6803186, at *1–3, *6–7 (holding that, in connection with a Mississippi probate proceeding involving Texas property, a Mississippi attorney's mailing to a Texas resident a petition to close the probate proceeding, a notice of hearing, a proposed release, and a cover letter threatening to withhold funds unless release was signed did not meet purposeful-availment standard in case brought in Texas against Mississippi attorney and his firm arising from the attorney's actions in the Mississippi probate proceeding); *cf. Stanton v. Gloersen*, No. 05-16-00214-CV, 2016 WL 7166550, at *2–3, *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (relying on *Michiana* to hold that Texas lacked personal jurisdiction over Florida lawyer who made allegedly false statements concerning Texas resident to Texas authorities as part of lawyer's representation of Florida resident). The fact that most, if not all, of the Potential Defendants are governmental entities or government officials[14] does not affect this conclusion. *See Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Antt*, 528 F.3d 382, 383, 386–87 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no personal jurisdiction in Texas over Texas resident's suit against Florida and California licensing and regulatory government officials where the only contacts between officials and Texas were cease-and-desist orders mailed to the resident, California's correspondence with the Texas Real Estate Commission regarding the resident, and Florida's making a public-information-act request to the Texas Attorney General for information about the resident); *Wercinski*, 513 F.3d at 480, 483–84 (holding Texas did not have personal jurisdiction over Texas resident's suit against Arizona licensing and regulatory government official where the only contacts between official and Texas were a cease-and-desist

order mailed to the resident in Texas and correspondence with resident's attorneys).

***19** Having examined the Potential Defendants' contacts with Texas, we conclude that they do not meet the purposeful-availment standard and that the Potential Defendants thus lacked minimum contacts with Texas. Because sufficient minimum contacts are not present, we need not address whether Exxon's potential claims arise from or relate to those contacts or whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

VII. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Prospective Witnesses

Exxon argues that a court is not required to have personal jurisdiction over prospective witnesses in a Rule 202 proceeding and thus the trial court properly denied the Prospective Witnesses' special appearances. If Exxon maintains that a Texas court can grant a Rule 202 petition ordering depositions from prospective witnesses when it does not have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendants, Texas Supreme Court authority compels us to disagree.

In *Trooper*, the court concluded that because the Rule 202 petitioner did not establish that Texas had personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant, the trial court abused its discretion by granting the petition to allow the petitioner to depose Google (which did not oppose the petition) to discover the potential defendant's identity. *See* 444 S.W.3d at 604–05. In so concluding, the court stated that the "proper court" in which to file a Rule 202 petition must have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant. *Id.* at 608. The court gave two reasons for its conclusion:

> *First*: To allow discovery of a potential claim against a defendant over which the court would not have personal jurisdiction denies him the protection Texas procedure would otherwise afford. Under Rule 120a, a defendant who files a special appearance in a suit is entitled to have the issue of personal jurisdiction heard and decided before any other matter. Discovery is limited to matters directly relevant to the issue. To allow witnesses in a potential suit to be deposed more extensively than would be permitted if the suit were actually filed would circumvent the protections of Rule 120a. When a potential defendant could challenge personal jurisdiction, the potential claimant could simply conduct discovery under Rule 202 before filing suit.
>
> ....
>
> *Second*: To allow a Rule 202 court to order discovery without personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant unreasonably expands the rule. Even requiring personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant, Rule 202 is already the broadest pre-suit discovery authority in the country. If a Rule 202 court need not have personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant, the

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> rule could be used by anyone in the world to investigate anyone else in the world against whom suit could be brought within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. The reach of the court's power to compel testimony would be limited only by its grasp over witnesses. This was never contemplated in the procedures leading to Rule 202, from 1848 to 1999, nor was it the intent of Rule 202.

Id. at 608–10 (footnotes omitted).

Based on *Trooper*, we conclude that the relevant personal-jurisdiction inquiry in a Rule 202 proceeding is whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant. If not, a trial court has no discretion to grant a Rule 202 petition. *See id.* at 604, 608–11; *eBay*, 2015 WL 3898240, at *2–3 (relying on *Trooper* and rendering judgment denying petitioner's Rule 202 petition because in seeking to depose, on written questions, third-party's corporate representative to discover potential defendants' identities, petitioner failed to plead jurisdictional facts to establish personal jurisdiction over potential defendants). Thus, whether Texas has personal jurisdiction over a person or entity that is only a prospective witness is irrelevant.

VIII. Conclusion

***20** Because the Potential Defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within Texas, they lack sufficient contacts for a Texas court to exercise specific jurisdiction over them. This conclusion is dispositive of the California Parties' appeal, and we thus reverse the trial court's order denying their special appearances and render judgment denying Exxon's Rule 202 petition. *See eBay*, 2015 WL 3898240, at *3.

IX. Some Final Thoughts

We confess to an impulse to safeguard an industry that is vital to Texas's economic well-being, particularly as we were penning this opinion weeks into 2020's COVID-19 pandemic-driven shutdown of not only Texas but America as a whole. Lawfare is an ugly tool by which to seek the environmental policy changes the California Parties desire, enlisting the judiciary to do the work that the other two branches of government cannot or will not do to persuade their constituents that anthropogenic climate change (a) has been conclusively proved and (b) must be remedied by crippling the energy industry. And we are acutely aware that California courts might well be philosophically inclined to join the lawfare battlefield in ways far different than Texas courts.

Being a conservative panel on a conservative intermediate court in a relatively conservative part of Texas is both blessing and curse: blessing, because we strive always to remember our oath to follow settled legal principles set out by higher courts and not encroach upon the domains of the other governmental branches; curse, because in this situation, at this time in history, we would very much like to follow our impulse instead.

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In the end, though, our reading of the law simply does not permit us to agree with Exxon's contention that the Potential Defendants have the purposeful contacts with our state needed to satisfy the minimum-contacts standard that binds us.

Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth

Judge Learned Hand, a friend and admirer of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., once recounted a parting conversation shared between the two:

> I remember once I was with [Justice Holmes]; it was a Saturday when the Court was to confer. It was before we had a motor car, and we jogged along in an old coupé. When we got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a response, so as he walked off, I said to him: "Well, sir, goodbye. Do justice!" He turned quite sharply and he said: "Come here. Come here." I answered: "Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not my job. My job is to play the game according to the rules."

Michael Herz, *"Do Justice!": Variations of a Thirce-Told Tale*, 82 Va. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1996).

Doing one's job and abiding by the rules is not always a comfortable path. As Justice Holmes confessed, "I loathed most of the things in favor of which I decided." *See* David M. Levitan, *The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice*, 28 U. Tol. L. Rev. 37, 49 n.66 (1996).

As intermediate appellate court justices, we are, on occasion, somberly reminded that our job is not to mete out justice, but to apply the law. For me, this is one such occasion.

I urge the Texas Supreme Court to reconsider the minimum-contacts standard that binds us.

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Footnotes

1 Oakland and San Francisco also sued Texas-based ConocoPhillips. Imperial Beach, Marin County, San Mateo County, Santa Cruz, and Santa Cruz County sued Exxon and 17 other Texas-based energy companies.

2 Exxon and the other defendants removed the San Francisco and Oakland suits to federal court, and the federal district court judge in those cases dismissed them for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. *See City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA, 2018 WL 3609055, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018); *City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018); *California v. BP p.l.c.*, Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018). The Ninth Circuit, however, recently determined that removal was improper because San Francisco's and Oakland's state-law public-nuisance claims did not arise under federal law and thus remanded the cases to district court to determine whether there was an alternate basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. *See City of Oakland v. BP PLC*, No. 18-16663, 2020 WL 2702680, at *1, *9 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020).

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3 The defendants in the San Mateo suits also removed those suits to federal court, but the federal district court judge in those cases remanded them to state court. *Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.*, Nos. 18-15499, 18-15502, 18-15503, 18-16376, 2020 WL 2703701, at *1–2 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020). In an opinion issued concurrently with the opinion in the San Francisco and Oakland cases, the same Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's remand order. *Id.* at *2 n.3, *9.

4 Parker, Herrera, Beiers, Dedina, Lyon, Washington, McRae, and Condotti.

5 Landreth, Reiskin, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal.

6 The trial court concluded that Texas does not have general jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants, a conclusion that no party challenges.

7 The City of San Francisco, Herrera, and Reiskin.

8 The City of Oakland, Pawa, Parker, and Landreth.

9 San Mateo County, Marin County, Santa Cruz County, City of Santa Cruz, City of Imperial Beach, Beiers, Dedina, Lyon, Washington, McRae, Condotti, Maltbie, Hall, Hymel, Palacios, and Bernal.

10 The San Mateo parties did not contest that Exxon's pleadings were sufficient to bring them within the Texas long-arm statute. And unlike the San Francisco parties and the Oakland parties, the San Mateo parties did not adopt the arguments made in the other parties' briefs. *See* Tex. R. App. P. 9.7 ("Any party may join in or adopt by reference all or any part of a brief ... filed in an appellate court by another party in the same case.").

11 The San Mateo parties did not raise this issue.

12 *See* Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.041 (stating that the term " 'nonresident' *includes* ... an individual who is not a resident of this state" and "a foreign corporation, joint-stock company, association, or partnership" (emphasis added)), § 17.042(2) (stating that a nonresident does business in Texas if the nonresident "commits a tort in whole or in part in this state"); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 312.011(19) (stating that " '[i]ncludes' and 'including' are terms of enlargement and not of limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms does not create a presumption that components not expressed are excluded"). *But cf. Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski*, 513 F.3d 476, 482–83 (5th Cir. 2008) (dicta) (explaining that the Texas long-arm statute may not reach an out-of-state official in cases involving "a challenge to an out-of-state regulator's enforcement of her state's statute, rather than a conventional contract or tort claim").

13 Exxon failed to plead any allegations to bring the Prospective Witnesses within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute, presumably because it contends—and the trial court agreed—that a court is not required to have personal jurisdiction over nonresident prospective witnesses in a Rule 202 proceeding. But whether Exxon was required to so plead is irrelevant because we conclude that Texas does not have personal jurisdiction over the Potential Defendants and thus must render judgment denying Exxon's Rule 202 petition. *See Trooper*, 444 S.W.3d at 604–05, 610–11 (concluding that trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 petition to allow the petitioner to depose Google to discover the potential defendant's identity because the petitioner did not establish personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant); *eBay Inc. v. Mary Kay Inc.*, No. 05-14-00782-CV, 2015 WL 3898240, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rendering judgment denying Rule 202 petition because in seeking to depose, upon written questions, eBay's corporate representative to discover the potential defendants' identities, Mary Kay failed to plead jurisdictional facts to establish personal jurisdiction over the potential defendants).

14 We are agnostic about whether Pawa in his capacity as counsel for the cities of San Francisco and Oakland could be considered a government official.

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Michelle Meuhlen		michelle.meuhlen@haynesboone.com	1/18/2022 3:25:59 PM	SENT
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