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6	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
7	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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9	SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER; SAVE THE BAY; COMMITTEE FOR GREEN	Case No: 3:19-cv-05941-WHA (lead case)
10	FOOTHILLS; CITIZENS' COMMITTEE TO COMPLETE THE REFUGE; and STATE	Consolidated with
11	OF CALIFORNIA, by and through XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GENERAL,	Case No: 3:19-cv-05943-WHA
12	Plaintiffs,	
13	V.	DEFENDANTS' AND INTERVENOR- DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
14	U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND ITS ADMINISTRATOR,	COURT'S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 5, 2020
15	Defendants,	
16	REDWOOD CITY PLANT SITE, LLC,	
17	Intervenor- Defendants.	
18	Defendants.	
19	Pursuant to the Court's Order dated September 5, 2020 (ECF No. 79), the defendants,	
20	United States Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator ("EPA"), and the	
21	intervenor on the side of the defendants, Redwood City Plant Site, LLC ("Redwood"),1 answer	
22	the Court's questions as follows:	
23	1. The decision maker, or those advising the decision maker, fully considered the	
24	contents of the November 2016 draft, a prior draft of EPA's final decision. EPA previously	
25	communicated that fact in March 2020, when it filed a privilege log which included, inter alia,	
26	the November 2016 draft. See Notice of Filing Privilege Log (ECF No. 66), at 2:7-11 (" EPA	
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28	¹ Redwood takes no position with respect to Question 1 and joins with EPA in the responses to Questions 2 and 3.	

hereby provides a log of deliberative documents that the decision-maker considered, directly or indirectly (*e.g.*, through staff) in making the March 1, 2019 determination."). EPA reiterated that fact in May 2020, when opposing Plaintiffs' motion challenging the adequacy of the administrative record. *See* Opp'n (ECF No. 70), at 1:28 to 2:2 (same). In addition, the declaration from an agency official that EPA filed in May 2020 addresses this fact. *See* Declaration of Dennis Lee Forsgren, Jr. Asserting Deliberative Process Privilege (ECF No. 70-1), at ¶8 ("This document was generated as part of lengthy internal discussion about the jurisdictional status of the Redwood City site. . . ."). And as EPA and Redwood noted in their summary judgment reply, "[c]omparing the draft document with EPA's final decision shows that the latter contains much of the same or substantially similar historical, operational, and hydrological facts concerning the Salt Plant, insofar as they pertained to the fast-land question." Combined Reply and Opp'n (ECF No. 69), at 18:2-5.

2. Based on the information provided, it appears that the landowners in both of the Court's hypotheticals would have very strong arguments that their parcels qualify as fast land. The hypotheticals highlight two facts: historical (i.e., pre-Clean Water Act) separation of property from tidal waters and historical changes in ground elevation. With respect to the latter fact, although the degree to which the placement of fill material raised the elevation of each property differs, constructing homes in either hypothetical would have necessarily required earthmoving and grading (i.e., filling) activities behind the levees. The historical conversion of the Salt Plant involved similar activities. *See* EPA's decision at 5 ("Leslie Salt initiated construction of the First Slough dam and the levees along Westpoint Slough in 1943 and worked throughout the 1940s to construct the Salt Plant by leveeing, excavating, filling, and compacting the Salt Plant to create the crystallizer beds, pickle ponds, bittern ponds, facility headquarters, and multi-use areas.") [AR 000007]; S.J. Mot. (ECF No. 56), at 9:14 to 10:15 (summary of pre-CWA filling activities at the site, citing historical permit, bulletin, and other documents).

United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), is the closest decision on point, although the United States is not aware of any precedent with the facts set forth in the Court's hypotheticals. See Milner, 583 F.3d at 1195 ("... [I]f land was dry upland at the time the CWA

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was enacted, it will not be considered part of the waters of the United States unless the waters actually overtake the land "); *id.* at 1194 (noting that a prior Ninth Circuit decision referencing the fast-land doctrine, *Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke*, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978), "declined to hold that the waters of the United States extended to all places the water would theoretically reach . . ."). These passages from *Milner* indicate that elevation is not controlling when applying the fast-land doctrine. As a result, the fact that the historical filling activities were more vertically extensive (changed the bottom elevation more) in the Court's second hypothetical than in the first would not compel different results. Both historically transformed properties would likely qualify as fast land.

The United States is not aware of any contrary authority. See Defendants' S.J. Reply (ECF No. 69) at 14:25-26 ("... Plaintiffs provide no support for the notion that the fast-land doctrine requires precise elevations."). In response to the Court's Order, Plaintiffs may point to *United* States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984), but it is distinguishable. The evidence adduced in Ciampitti showed extensive tidal flow onto the site in question. See 583 F. Supp. at 492 ("The tidal flow was graphically depicted through ground and aerial photographs showing water-filled tidal ditches and tidal creeks. Testimony from both the Government and the defendants' expert proved the movement of tidal flow from the west, south and east onto the site."). See also Combined Reply and Opp'n (ECF No. 69), at 12 n.7 (further distinguishing Ciampitti). Similarly, Golden Gate Audubon Soc., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 796 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1992), is inapposite. There, the court held that "if a site has been legally converted to dry land, so that it no longer meets the regulatory definition of 'wetlands,' that site will not come under the Corps jurisdiction." Id. at 1313. Here, the record shows that the Salt Plant has not supported wetlands at any time since (well) before the passage of the CWA. See, e.g., Redwood's JD request at 29 [AR 000060]. Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise or identify any record evidence to the contrary.

3. EPA considered, but judged immaterial, the existence of a pipe at the Salt Plant that allows Bay water to flow into a cell (when Cargill opens the valve). See EPA's decision at 9 ("A water intake is located on Pond 4, which connects to First Slough, where Cargill has at times

brought water in from the Bay.") [AR 000011]. As a factual matter, EPA noted, inter alia, a 1 2 letter report Cargill sent to the Corps of Engineers a decade before it applied for an approved 3 Clean Water Act jurisdictional determination, which explained that, after completion of the salt 4 harvesting, Cargill could bring Bay water onto the Salt Plant in a controlled manner (through 5 pumping or hydraulic pressure) for use in certain desalting activities associated with the Plant's 6 operation. 2002 Letter Report at 4 [AR 001109]. 7 As a legal matter, EPA cited *Milner*, the closest decision on point. The Ninth Circuit 8 explained that if an area that would otherwise qualify as fast land subsequently "become[s] submerged by the waters of the United States" - or, stated differently, if the waters surrounding 9 10 the putative fast land "actually overtake the land" - then the area at issue ceases to be fast land. 11 Milner, 583 F.3d at 1195. Here, EPA found that the circumstances associated with the pipe, 12 particularly its limited and controlled use of Bay water for desalting purposes, have not caused 13 Bay waters to "actually overtake" any particular cell (much less the site as a whole) and thus the 14 Salt Plant continues to qualify as fast land. See EPA's decision at 12 [AR 000014]; Defendants' 15 S.J. Mot. (ECF No. 56) at 19:1-3. 16 Respectfully submitted, 17 Dated: September 10, 2020 /s Andrew J. Doyle 18 ANDREW J. DOYLE (FL Bar No. 84948) Trial Attorney 19 United States Department of Justice 20 Environment and Natural Resources Division (202) 532-3156 (mobile) 21 andrew.doyle@usdoj.gov 22 Attorney for EPA and its Administrator 23 Dated: September 10, 2020 24 /s J. Tom Boer J. TOM BOER (Bar No. 199563) 25 Hogan Lovells US LLP 3 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1500 26 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 374-2336 (direct) 27 tom.boer@hoganlovells.com 28

Case 3:19-cv-05941-WHA Document 80 Filed 09/10/20 Page 5 of 5 DEIDRE DUNCAN Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP 2200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20037 (202) 955-1919 dduncan@huntonak.com Attorneys for Redwood City Plant Site, LLC