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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

KELSEY CASCADIA ROSE JULIANA; **XIUHTEZCATL TONATIUH M.**, through his Guardian Tamara Roske-Martinez; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF JULIA A. OLSON in Support of Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony of Professor Catherine Smith

Case No.: 6:15-cv-01517-AA

DECLARATION OF JULIA OLSON in Support of Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony of Professor Catherine Smith

I, Julia A. Olson, hereby declare and if called upon would testify as follows:

1. I am an attorney of record in the above-entitled action. I make this Declaration in

support of Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to

Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony of Professor Catherine Smith (ECF No. 379). I

have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, except as to those stated on

information and belief.

2. On Wednesday, September 19, 2018, Defendants took the deposition of Professor

Smith at the offices of U.S. Department of Justice, Denver Field Office, 999 18th

Street, South Terrace, Suite 370, Denver, Colorado, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 30. I attended the deposition. A true and correct copy of the transcript

pages of Professor Smith's deposition cited in Plaintiffs' Response is attached to this

declaration as **Exhibit 1**.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

and correct.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julia Olson

Julia Olson

Exhibit 1

VIDEOTAPED ORAL DEPOSITION OF CATHERINE SMITH, produced as a witness at the instance of the Defendants, and duly sworn, was taken in the above-styled and above-numbered cause on the 19th day of September, 2018, from 8:30 a.m. to 2:18 p.m., before Lisa J. Gretarsson, CSR, RPR, CRR, reported by machine shorthand at the offices of U.S. Department of Justice, Denver Field Office, 999 18th Street, South Terrace, Suite 370, Denver, Colorado, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the provisions stated on the record.

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Page 6 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (Exhibits Number 1-2 marked.) THE VIDEOGRAPHER: My name is Dan Schmitz of 3 Veritext. The date today is September 19th, 2018, 4 5 and the time is approximately 8:38. This deposition is being held in the office 6 7 of the United States Department of Justice, Denver Field Office, located at 999 18th Street, South 8 9 Tower, Suite 370, Denver, Colorado. The caption of this case is Juliana, et al., 10 11 versus United States of America, in the 12 U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The name of the witness is Catherine Smith. 13 At this time, the attorneys will identify 14 15 themselves and the parties they represent, after 16 which our court reporter, Lisa Gretarsson, of 17 Veritext, will swear in the witness and we can 18 proceed. 19 MR. GREGORY: Phillip Gregory, counsel for Plaintiffs. 20 21 MS. OLSON: Julia Olson, counsel for 22 Plaintiffs. 23 MS. BORONOW: Clare Boronow on behalf of the United States. 24 /// 25

	Page 7
1	CATHERINE SMITH,
2	having been first duly sworn, testified as follows, to
3	wit:
4	EXAMINATION
5	BY MS. BORONOW:
6	Q. Good morning.
7	A. Good morning.
8	Q. So my name is Clare Boronow. I'm one of the
9	attorneys for the United States in this case. And I'm
10	going to start with some preliminary matters.
11	So have you been deposed before?
12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Okay. So you know the drill.
14	A. (Nods head.)
15	Q. You understand that you're under oath and are
16	sworn to tell the truth.
17	A. Yes.
18	Q. Okay. And is there any reason you can't
19	testify truthfully and fully today?
20	A. No.
21	Q. Okay. And, as you know, the court reporter
22	here is transcribing everything we say, so please
23	answer my questions verbally so the court reporter can
24	record your responses.
25	A. Okay.

Page 12 1 systems as I describe in the report. 2 Q. Okay. And you say in your first sentence here that you consider historical and sociological 3 4 legal analysis; is that correct? 5 Α. Yes. Okay. And you would still agree with that 6 0. statement? 7 8 Α. Yes. 9 Okay. What does a historical legal analysis Q. 10 mean to you? I think it means -- I think it means a number 11 Α. 12 of things but includes looking at history and how we can look back and think about and view a particular 13 14 issue and the evolution of that issue over time. 15 And when you say issue there, you mean a Q. 16 legal issue? 17 I think the -- legal, social, political, Α. 18 cultural. It can include many things. 19 Q. Okay. 20 I -- I -- I include those different things in Α. 21 the report. 22 Q. Well, to confirm, you consider this a legal 23 analysis. 24 MR. GREGORY: Objection, misstates the prior 25 testimony.

Q. (BY MS. BORONOW) When you -- I'll rephrase.

When you say the terms "historical" and "sociological legal analysis," ultimately what you're doing is a legal analysis?

- A. Well, I think it includes -- I think -- I -- it says that -- I think that it says I include that based on the historical and sociological legal analysis, so I think that's what it says. I think it includes more than just a legal analysis but a lot of different things.
 - Q. Okay.

A. And if you look -- I -- I talk about, in the report, that within this area, I consider legal structures, i.e. the legal system, legal processes, how law is made, and the interaction of the laws, societal changes, social control.

My scholarship and expertise is also informed by the importance of critically analyzing the impact, positive and negative, of law on age, race, class, gender, and other socially constructed differences.

And my theoretical approach in historical, sociological aspects of law is regarding law as a set of institutional practices that have evolved over time and developed in relation to and through interaction with cultural, economic, sociopolitical structures, and

September 19, 2018 Catherine Smith Page 14 1 institutions. 2 Q. Okay. And you refer to your scholarship there, right? 3 Α. Uh-huh. 4 5 Q. And to confirm, that's your legal scholarship 6 in your capacity as a law professor? 7 Α. Yes. Okay. And going back to historical and 8 Q. 9 sociological legal analysis, what does sociological 10 legal analysis mean to you? I think it includes the things that I just 11 12 read from the -- this previous expert -- excerpt --13 sorry -- and so looking at social behaviors, practices, structures, law is not a separate entity or animal 14 15 separate from those practices, and so those social 16 meaning and -- and -- is really important and so that's 17 what I would include as a sociological study. 18 Okay. So is it fair to say that your legal ο. 19 analysis is informed by your research and study into 20 the historical aspects and sociological aspects? 21 Α. Yes. 22 Okay. What did you do to prepare this Q. 23 report?

- A. I'm not quite sure what you're asking.
- Q. Okay. Let me break it down.

Catherine Smith

Page 26

Q. Have you reviewed any of the written declarations prepared by the plaintiffs?

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- Α. I have reviewed some of them. And to the extent they're included in the first amended complaint -- I mean, I've probably seen them by reading the complaint, but I haven't reviewed all of them in great detail.
- Okay. And would you agree that your expert ο. report doesn't state any opinions about specific plaintiffs?
 - MR. GREGORY: Objection. The document speaks for itself.
- Α. To the extent that, in my report, I talk about children as a class. If you look on page 5 of my report, I talk about and describe children along other classes of people battling historic and ongoing discrimination and -- and reference children as a class or as a classification as a group.

The children in this case, the plaintiffs, are certainly members of that class or classification, and so it's certainly speaking to them as members of that class.

And if you'll look at page 41 through 43, I talk about, in the report, the harms to children, economic deprivation, stigmatic and psychological

harms, barriers to family formation, health impacts, and I think that certainly encompasses the children in this case.

And I'd have to -- I don't recall. I'd have to spend more time with the report in terms of did I use a specific example of a -- of a child in this case and their actual harms, but I certainly think that it encompasses, as a class, children harmed by climate change.

And then the last thing I would add is that on page 44 it says certain groups of children are more vulnerable in -- with respect to -- to climate change, and these specific groups also include children who are plaintiffs in this case.

So, for example, native and indigenous children across the United States, including Alaska and the Pacific rim, are suffering disproportion consequences of climate change on their lands, resources, and people, sovereignty, culture, economy, and the ways of life developed by native communities over thousands of years are under assault, and that would include, as a class, specific children in this — in this case.

- Q. (BY MS. BORONOW) Okay.
- A. It would be a part of that -- that class.

Page 38 1 Q. Okay. So let's turn back to the beginning of 2 the report. Excuse me, Counsel. We've been 3 MR. GREGORY: going about an hour. Can we take a quick break? 4 5 MS. BORONOW: Yeah. This is a good time for 6 a break. The time is 9:36 and we're 7 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: off the record. 8 9 (Recess taken 9:36 to 9:56) The time is 9:56 and we're 10 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: 11 back on the record. 12 (BY MS. BORONOW) Okay. Welcome back. Q. 13 Α. Thanks. So I think where we left off was discussing 14 ο. the structure of the report. 15 16 Α. Uh-huh. 17 And looking at the table of contents, I 18 believe the first half of your report discusses the 19 history and tradition of children's rights in the 20 United States and internationally. Is that right? 21 I add history and tradition and also, as the 22 heading says, being recognized as a class. 23 Q. Right. You beat me to it. That was my next 24 question. So you use that history and tradition to conclude that children are a special class that have

certain rights?

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Well, that it's -- it's -- you know, so if Α. you -- in my report, on page 3, the Executive Summary, it says that, "In Obergefell v. Hodges, the landmark decision on the fundamental right to same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court explained that when interpreting the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses, "new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged." New insights and society's evolved understanding over time about the individual and societal harms of racial, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination led to the eradication of anti-miscegenation and male coverture laws, as well as same-sex marriage bans. This iterative process of gaining advanced understanding and then incorporating the lessons learned into the fabric of constitutional law is not reserved solely for adults; it also pertains to the unequal treatment of children."

And so I -- it does sort of document the history and tradition, but it's also speaking to how, as time evolves, we've gotten this more -- more of an understanding of children, but also how the things we do might harm children, and recognizing that children

are different than -- than adults.

And so it's really that -- that history is -- is not just about a history and tradition like in the context of fundamental rights argument, but also saying that it also evolves -- children have evolved as a class as well, and -- and -- and so that's really where I'm coming from in -- in developing that history in the report.

- Q. And when you say class, do you mean a protected class?
- A. Yes. But protected class as -- as the report talks about, not in the classic sense that we think of of a race, gender as protected class, but children as a class, as a unique class that -- that warrants when certain things happen to kids at the hands of the government, a heightened level of review --
 - Q. Okay.
 - A. -- under the equal protection clause.
- Q. Okay. So your discussion of the history and tradition and these Supreme Court cases informs your conclusion that children are a protected class, and then informs, as well, your development of this -- of this test to be applied to certain government actions that deny children rights or benefits and when those actions should be subject to heightened scrutiny.

Page 41 1 Α. Right. Yes. 2 Okay. Q. And it's relying on the series of cases 3 Α. that -- that I'm drawing on to say that that's -- that 4 5 that -- that history is present, and in the cases what 6 happens is they get overlooked often. 7 Q. Okay. And my expertise is to push those cases out 8 Α. 9 and say we can look at them from a different way. Q. And is it fair to say that the second 10 Okay. 11 half of your report essentially applies that test that 12 you formulated in the first half to government policies 13 related to climate change? I think that the -- that it's laying out --14 15 Let me see if I can pull this for us. hold on. If you look on page 24, when I'm talking 16 17 about the cases that I'm thinking about as children's 18 cases, in the -- after the -- right after footnote 94, 19 I say, In my expert opinion, we readily understand this 20 foundational principle from the -- from the -- the --21 that legislation imposing special disability groups --22 it's referencing the sentence before it -- that this 23 foundational principle in the context of race and

MR. GREGORY: Slow down so Lisa can --

gender, we understand that --

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And I point out the different pieces that we can take away from -- you could call it a test, but you could also say, hey, these are guidelines, these are guiding principles that a Court can look at, or even a legislature, or people trying to think about where's a line when we're thinking about state actions that imposes significant harms on children, and that's what I'm pulling out of these cases, saying it's present, because it often gets overlooked because we're looking at those cases from the lens of an adult and from adult lenses and adult interests.

- Q. (BY MS. BORONOW) Okay. So then going back to the second half of your report, is -- is it fair to say that you're applying your interpretation of those cases or those guidelines, as you said, that you developed specifically to climate change?
- A. Well, I think that I'm -- once again, as I pointed out, the first part of the paper and the second part of the paper are connected because it's a continuum of this notion that there's a historical and sociolegal context here.

And even in the law, children have traditionally been thought of as property. And as a result of the history of Brown and creating our kind of modern equal protection jurisprudence and the

subsequent cases, that history is important for all of us to think about when we're talking about this very unique context of climate change and the federal government's role in -- in that change and its harm and impact to children.

And so they're really looking at those cases and pulling out guidelines and factors and things that the Court considers — the Court has considered in those cases that are different than how it thinks about adults and how our society think about adults, children are different, and those can be taken into consideration.

And so when we talk about a protected class, we're not talking about the protected class in the typical sense that we learn about in our constitutional law courses or that we hear about on the street when we think about, oh, our race is really protected, and it is, and how we got there. But how we get there with children has been a different route, and I don't think that's been highlighted across the board. So that's what I'm -- I'm doing in the report, is trying to lay those things out so it's apparent.

Q. Okay. And when you talk about what these child-centered cases tell us, you're interpreting those cases, right?

A. I say that there is interpretation of those cases, but not just interpreting them in terms of the doctrine but the -- looking at the social and historical context and how those cases have evolved and how to look at or think about or talk about cases, not necessarily doctorially or just the legal analysis of them, but the role they've played in our history with respect to children and how that has often -- is often overlooked socially, historically, and legally, and politically because of adult interests.

- Q. Okay. So, again, I guess going back to this historical and social context, you're looking at or interpreting these cases in the -- in the context of history, in the context of sociology, and in the context of these other aspects. Is that accurate?
- A. Can you rephrase -- can you say that again? Sorry.
 - Q. Sure.

So when you're interpreting these cases, you're interpreting them in light of the broader historical and social context. Is that a fair statement?

A. What -- I don't think it's just a matter of -- it's because we, as lawyers, think about and talk about interpreting cases, meaning, you know, we might

look at a doctrine and say, I interpret this to mean X or Y, so I want to be clear what you mean by interpretation.

- Q. So I guess what I'm thinking of as an interpretation may be broader than that, maybe a broader analysis of the case, and what it means, and how it can be used in future legal arguments like the ones you develop in your report.
- A. Uh-huh. So in other words, broadly looking at it and saying this history has -- has -- because remember that I'm stepping back and saying we have evolved in our understanding, as Justice Kennedy phrased it in Obergefell, our understanding of children and their capacities and their vulnerabilities. We've evolved in our understanding of harm and discrimination and we're using -- and -- and rights and protections, and as a society we're gaining greater understanding that influences how we think about previous treatment and the rules we apply to -- to children.

And so if you're thinking about interpretation in that broader sense, then I -- as opposed to a narrow interpretation of a case and it sort of -- the precedent and the doctrine behind it, then -- then I'd say, yes, it encompasses all of those things as a way to inform us about the progression of

our understanding of children, of conduct and behavior that we engage in that harms children, and what that means in the context of climate change.

And I think there -- I'm pointing out things that are factors or guidelines or principles that are consistent with our equal protection values with respect to children and that they're unique with respect to children.

Q. Okay.

- A. And so -- and I think I'm drawing on all of those to -- to say this is one way -- this is a way to think about these cases as opposed to kind of the traditional framework of equal protection law, product factors solely, like we do with adults in sex-orientation cases or some race cases or gender cases. Those cases have traditionally been focused on adults, and so...
- Q. So is it your opinion that the child-centered cases that you discuss reflect this evolution, this evolution in the understanding of children? Is that accurate?
- A. Yes. My opinion is that it reflects that evolution, but it -- and it is a continuum. It's not separated or divorced from the previous history that's been, you know, documented or talked about in the -- in

the -- in the report.

- Q. Okay. All right. Can we turn to the first part of your report, section 1(a), which I think is on page 6. And this section discusses the founding documents, and you state your opinion that the founding documents lay the groundwork for recognizing the interests of children in future generations; is that right?
 - A. Uh-huh.
- Q. And when you refer to founding documents here, are you referring to the Constitution?
- A. I say in the introduction -- I say in the introduction to the first paragraph, A(1), "The Whole Constitutional Construct Protects Our Posterity and Our Children Across Generations. It has remained a central tenet of our democracy that the Union was about ensuring each child had equal opportunity to invent him or herself and that the blessings of that liberty we pass down from generation to generation. The founders opened the Constitution with their intergenerational concern."
- Q. So you are referring to the Constitution as a founding document?
- A. (Nods head.)
- 25 Q. Yes?

referencing the founding documents, but it certainly is referencing cases that are referencing the founding documents. And so if you look at the footnote on page 4 -- I'm sorry -- page 3, note 4 --

Q. Okay.

A. -- it says that -- there's a cite to
Obergefell about this interpreting the due process and
equal protection clause. It says that "New insights
and societal understanding can reveal unjustified
inequality within our most fundamental institutions
that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged." And it
goes on to talk about that evolution in the context of
racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and male
coverture laws, and ultimately sexual-orientation
discrimination, as the Court found that same-sex
couples had a fundamental right to marry.

And if you'll look at that footnote it cites
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus & Mary from 1924. And that case -- we talked
about -- it talks about the -- there's a quote from it.
"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere" -- sorry -- "The

child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." And those are certainly referencing our founding and constitutional provisions within, you know, the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, due process and equal protection clauses.

- Q. Okay. So it's appropriate, in your view, for the Court to consider the founding documents in developing this understanding of certain inequalities.

 Is that fair?
- A. Well, I think it's appropriate for the Court to consider what the Court considers, as I would tell my students. The -- you know, the -- sure, the Court could consider founding documents and other sources and materials and arguments or evidence.
- Q. And could a Court consider, for example, these -- these statements from presidents and presidential conferences if it was looking into this issue on equal protection rights for children?
 - A. In what context?
 - Q. So, for example, in this case.
- A. As to what issue?
 - Q. As to the issues you talk about in your

report, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and the application of heightened scrutiny for children.

- A. Well, I think my point here is to say that
 the Court can -- my point here is that these are
 examples of our evolution and understanding of children
 as a class and the evolution of the rights of children
 from a historical perspective. But if the Court
 chooses to reference the president's statements or
 other, you know -- historically for other reasons, I
 mean I don't really have much to say about that.
- Q. That's understandable. But in your position as a law professor, you wouldn't think it inappropriate for a Court to look at these presidential statements in reaching its conclusion that there's been this evolution over time of children's rights and in reaching a conclusion about the level of scrutiny to be applied?
- A. I think it goes back to looking at social shifts and changes in society, and I think the Court does that often, and it can reference lots of different provisions, statements, speakers in doing so, whether it's a presidential statement or a statement from civil rights activists or -- or anyone else.

But I -- I would say that I think it's

Page 62 1 Sixteen, on page 16, if you turn to international 2 jurisprudence on children's rights and the convention of rights -- convention on the rights of a child. 3 Uh-huh. 4 Α. 5 Q. Why did you look at the convention on the rights of the child for this expert report? 6 7 Α. I would say similar to my response about looking at precedence and the Constitution, that it's a 8 9 part of our evolved understanding of children and the 10 rights of children. 11 (Interruption in the proceedings.) 12 THE WITNESS: That's really funny. That -- that it's a part of our evolved 13 Α. understanding of the rights of children and on a global 14 15 scale; and that the United States led this 16 international effort in drafting the United Nations 17 convention on the rights of the child, and that also 18 shows our country's appreciation of this shifting view 19 of children as a class. (BY MS. BORONOW) And when you reference 20 Q. 21 evolved understanding there, whose evolved 22 understanding are you referring to? Well, I -- I'd say of -- going back to the 23 Α.

historical and sociolegal understanding and study of

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appreciation of the interests of children for society, the United States, and for the -- for the political process for courts and decision makers, you know, decision makers, and for families and parents, sort of -- that's the sort of social component of this. It's cultural, it's social, and it is -- is, and has, shifted, and is shifting, and it's okay for us to recognize that and recognize unique to children.

- Q. And can you see the same evolved understanding in the U.S. in like the Supreme Court cases, you say, for example, the child-centered cases?
- A. I think that there is an evolved understanding. And if you look at the cases, we see that. And it's not a linear trajectory. It's this dialogue that's taking place in some ways with -- in different directions.

There's this dialogue that's taking place with -- between the public goers, social media, and the -- you know, individuals and people. There's a dialogue between the legislature and courts. There's a dialogue with the Supreme Court and the lower level courts, both at the state level and the federal level, that's taking place. It's not linear, necessarily, but if you look at it, there's a movement. And I think I talk about this in the report. Let's see if I can find

unique constitutional protections in a number of contexts, including substantive due process in juvenile proceedings, reproductive rights, freedom of expression, and equal protection. With children "rarely seen as bearers of due process and equal protection rights" Brown v. Board of Education served as a catalyst for the expansion of children's rights."

And I think that -- this is where I think

people see this and they recognize this. Scholars and

jurist and lawyers, they think what gets lost is this

next series of cases that I think are -- and articulate

as children's rights cases and post Brown, Levy v.

Louisiana, and all the non-marital status cases that

are -- stem from that.

And remember that Levy -- there were a series of cases for the non-marital status or kids of unmarried parents. And what's really striking about that is, you know, through this back and forth, the Supreme Court having this dialogue, and having this dialogue, whether it's through a case going up to the Supreme Court and then lower courts having to percolate on what the Supreme Court meant, it was in the, you know, mid 1980s that the Supreme Court said, after a series of these cases, we're going to apply intermediate scrutiny or heightened scrutiny to

children of unmarried parents. Why? Because when the government goes too far and engages in harms to children because of things they don't have control over, like the fact that their parents aren't married, the Court steps in and says that's a violation of their equal protection rights. We've said in Gault they're persons, and we're saying now that — that — that this is impermissible because it harms children.

And Plyler is even stronger. Plyler says, hey, you know, you can't -- you can't do this to kids. We can't harm kids in this way psychologically, economically, through family formation, and render them essentially an underclass, second-class citizens in our country, and I think that evolution is really critical for this discussion as well on climate change.

- Q. Okay. So your understanding of the evolution of children's rights and their status as a class flows from this long line of Supreme Court cases that begins in the nineteen -- well, I don't want to say begins, maybe that's unfair, but there's cases in the '20s leading up to Brown, which I think you referred to as a catalyst --
 - A. Uh-huh.

Q. -- and then flowing from Brown through these other lines of cases you refer to as the child-centered

- Q. Okay. And on page 17 you also mention a case by the Supreme Court of Colombia.
 - A. Uh-huh.

- Q. And that's in this past paragraph.
- A. Uh-huh.
- Q. And this case, to confirm, is a judicial opinion by a Colombian court; is that right?
- A. Uh-huh. Let me take a look. It says -- on page 17, just this month, April 2018, the Supreme Court of Colombia issued an important ruling in favor of 25 young people, including children.
- Q. Okay. So it is a judicial opinion by a Colombian court.
- A. Yes.
 - Q. And are you saying here that it's appropriate for a U.S. court to look to this case by the Supreme Court of Colombia in determining equal protection issues?
 - A. I would take us back to the point that I've been making; that I drafted the report as a way to talk about the evolution of children's rights, and -- and the convention of rights of the child clearly is a representation of that over time, historically, socially, and politically, so that's a part of my report and why I have it as a part of the report.

The question on whether the Court could look to this convention or an international opinion is -- I know can be a dicey question, but the Court has done so with respect to children's cases with the death penalty and other cases. So I think the answer is the Court certainly could, but it also could not, right? It's the Court, so I think sure.

- Q. Would you testify at trial that the Court should look to this specific Colombian case?
- A. I think that that's up to the Court in terms of what the Court chooses to do. I just offer it as an example of the evolution on the rights of kids. As a descriptive matter, as a normative matter, that's certainly for the Court to make that call.
- Q. Okay. So does that mean you would testify that the Court should look to it?
- A. I think your original question said -- was as to equal protection clause, and I'm saying that this is information in the context of my expert report demonstrating the evolution of the rights of kids, as an example. So if the Court is looking for examples of that, I would say this could be an example of that progression.
- Q. Okay. I guess I'm just trying to understand if you're on the stand at trial --

A. Uh-huh.

- Q. -- and you're testifying about this convention in this Colombian case, is your testimony to the Court that these are documents that the Court should take into account and consider in its analysis of equal protection issues?
- A. I don't -- I'd have to think about it. I don't think I would -- I think I'd be standing behind the report in saying this is an example of the evolution of children's rights and that the -- there are other countries that have recognized that this is an important issue.
- Q. Okay. All right. Let's turn to page 35.

 Okay. So at the top of page 35, in the first full

 paragraph, you say, "In my expert opinion, based on a

 historical and sociological analysis, the

 child-centered cases tell us that when large-scale

 government systems leads to economic deprivation,

 stigmatic psychological harm, and family formation

 barriers that place significant obstacles in the path

 of children, imposing a lifetime of hardship for

 matters beyond their control, the Court takes a closer

 and more in-depth look at the government's actions."
 - A. Uh-huh.
 - Q. And when you say the child-centered cases

A. Uh-huh.

- Q. -- that a Court should consider when deciding whether to apply --
 - A. Uh-huh.
 - Q. -- heightened reviews. Is that right?
- A. I would think of them as factors and as an example of -- of thinking about kids as kids in a class in a particular context.
- Q. And to be clear, these are factors that lawyers or a Court would consider in determining the appropriate standard of review in a case.
- A. The Court could. I think there are other factors that a Court could draw on from those cases as well. By way of example are important ones when we think about the equal protection values historically and also the -- what the kid's cases, the child-centered cases that get overlooked, seem to be pushing on, or at least advancing, but I do think there could be other factors for a Court to pull out and draw on.
- Q. And when you created this test, would you agree that this test is informed by everything we've discussed so far in the rest of the report, the founding documents, the evolution of the United States' understanding of children, and the line of Supreme

Court cases -- oh, and the international -- evolution of the international understanding of children?

- A. I think that that's by way of -- yeah, I think it informed that in terms of by way of an example of what Kennedy says in Obergefell about the evolution of rights, and the -- saying, hey, let's not -- we have this history and this evolution and it can continue -- it can continue and it's evolving and it's continuing to change. So I very much think of it as an example and factors that a Court consider, that a legislative body could consider, and it's informed by those things that you mentioned.
- Q. And how did you develop these specific factors in this paragraph?
- A. Just through eight to ten years of research and writing on the constitutional rights and equal protection rights, rights of children, Fourteenth Amendment, in general, but also of children.
- Q. So did you draw these factors from any particular case or source, or is it more your -- your personal thought process of all the information that you've read, all the cases you've read and coming up with your own factors?
- A. Yeah, I did -- it's my own work and thoughts and research and writing in this area, and that's why I

think it's critically important, because very few scholars -- very few scholars are -- are making this point that children are their own class and can be their own class under the equal protection clause.

And there's a lot of information we can draw on to look at it that way, as opposed to they're invisible, or they have to be sorted into the products factors as some sort of a test to the get heightened classification.

- Q. And do you plan to testify in trial that the Court should consider these factors in this paragraph?
- A. I think that they're important factors and the Court will have to decide whether to consider them or not. I mean, the report is what the report is.
- Q. So, again, I'm just trying to understand what you would say if you were actually on the stand. Would you set forth these factors as something that you thought the Court should consider in its analysis of equal protection for children?
- A. It's a part of my expert report so I don't know how I would be able to retreat from them or not say that they weren't important or that the Court shouldn't at least think about these set of cases and what they're saying and the back drop in terms of history and the evolution of the rights of kids, so...

- Q. So to be clear, that's a yes, you would present these factors to the Court as something you think the Court should consider?
- A. I think there are factors that are important for the Court's consideration.
- Q. Okay. You used the terms "intermediate scrutiny" and "heightened scrutiny" in this report.
 - A. Uh-huh.

- Q. Do you use those interchangeably?
- A. That's a -- I do use them interchangeably, but heightened scrutiny could also include strict scrutiny as well, or it could also include rational basis or rational basis plus, depending on how -- how one sorts them or looks at them, the different tiers.
- Q. So in terms of your opinion as to the appropriate level of scrutiny for children, is it your opinion that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. So when you use heightened scrutiny in your report to refer to the appropriate level of scrutiny for children, what you mean is intermediate scrutiny?
- A. In referencing the cases and the history of -- of -- of how the Court has evolved, it's a

Page 86 1 about the appropriate standard of review for an alleged 2 equal protection violation in their brief; is that right? 3 MR. GREGORY: Objection, incomplete 4 5 hypothetical, calls for speculation. I think anything can happen. You know, 6 Α. lawyers certainly could articulate these sorts of 7 factors in a brief. I think that what I'm bringing to 8 9 this is a history, years of studying the historical and 10 sociological and legal dynamics and institutions that is difficult for a lawyer to do. 11 12 (BY MS. BORONOW) I understand. What I'm ο. 13 getting at, though, is in a case involving an alleged equal protection violation --14 15 Uh-huh. Α. 16 -- would a lawyer identify the level of Q. 17 scrutiny that that lawyer's client thinks is 18 appropriate? 19 MR. GREGORY: Objection, incomplete 20 hypothetical, lacks foundation, calls for 21 speculation. 22 I think lawyers, or a lawyer, might argue the Α. 23 level of review based off prior precedent that they've read in a case, based off their lack of knowledge about 24 the history of the rights of children, and the 25

progression of the evolution of the rights of children, and I think that that's why -- or their lack of time to study the culture and social development of these issues because they're, you know -- and I think that's what I'm bringing to bear here as an expert, is -- are those insights. And these insights aren't out there, and I think it's because it requires someone with a certain level of expertise and study and reflection on the social and historical and legal context to draw them out and to talk about them.

- Q. (BY MS. BORONOW) But to be clear, there's nothing that would prevent a lawyer, if that person engaged in the analysis and consideration of these documents like you do, from making those arguments in a brief.
- A. I think that's true for almost everything. I mean, there would be nothing that would stop me from become -- you know, going out and trying to figure out how to become a meteorologist or to -- I mean, that's true for almost everything. I don't know how that's unique in this -- in this context.
- Q. Right, but you would agree that lawyers know about law and routinely consider the constitution, for example. Is that a yes?
 - A. Yes, lawyers do know about law and consider

sufficient -- that based off the evolution and -- based off the historical and social understanding of the evolution of the right to children, that a court could find that the federal government's controls, the -- has control over climate change and poses a risk to children that could result in a lifetime of hardship.

- Q. And are you prepared to testify at trial that the U.S. government's control over the energy system and over climate change could harm children in these ways and thereby result in a lifetime of hardship?
- A. Once again, the report relies on the assumptions and evidence in other expert reports and the testimony that's provided, and the Court could certainly find that those harms are present from the government's action and find a -- and apply heightened scrutiny based off the -- my analysis of the report.
- Q. Okay. Again, though, I'm not sure that answered my question.

Do you plan to testify that the U.S. government's control over the energy system will deny rights and benefits to children and thereby result in a lifetime of hardship?

A. I think I'll be testifying to what's a part of my report, I'm saying in my report. I'm not sure if I'm saying something different than what you're asking.

I think I might be missing what you're saying, but...

- Q. Okay. So are you saying you can't answer that question?
 - A. I think I answered it.

- Q. Well, it was a yes or no question of whether you're prepared to testify specifically that the U.S. government's control over the energy system will deny rights and benefits to children and thereby result in a lifetime of hardship.
- A. Well, I think that the statement includes a number of conclusions that the Court will have to ultimately decide. But I think that what I'm saying is that if the Court finds those things, intermediate scrutiny could certainly apply and the Court finding intermediate scrutiny could conclude that that's accurate.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. Could conclude that there's a lifetime of hardship on children in terms of these different economic deprivations, stigmatic and psychological harm, but once again, as I said earlier, the report is depending on the expert testimony of others --
- Q. Okay.
- A. -- and has a number of assumptions built into it.

Catherine Smith

Page 141

Α. Uh-huh.

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- Plyler, Weber, Levy; is that right? Q.
- And you said -- what page are you on? 3 Α.
 - I'm starting on page 18 --Q.
 - Α. Uh-huh.
 - -- under Roman Numeral I, and then through 0. that section, which continues on the following pages --
 - Uh-huh. Α.
 - -- you discuss many of the same cases that Q. you've discussed in your expert report.
 - Α. Uh-huh.
- 12 Is that correct? 0.
 - Α. And that's just on page 18 or --
- No, page 18 and the following pages within 14 ο. Roman Numeral one, so I think it's 18 through 29. 15 16 for example, on page 25, there's a paragraph that 17 starts with, "Levy, Weber, and Plyler establish that 18 discrimination against children cannot be justified 19 based on moral disapproval of parents' marital or 20 immigration status."
 - Uh-huh, yes, I see that those are some similar -- many of the same cases.
 - Q. And you're making a similar point here, correct, that these cases stand for the fact that discrimination cannot be justified based on moral

disapproval of parents' marital or immigration status?

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A. Well, it's a slightly different point. My research is building on these cases to argue that — that when the state goes too far in terms of harming kids for matters beyond their control, and I'm making that argument that this is a scenario that it could be applied to for matters beyond their control.

In those cases they're focused on the matter beyond their control that they can't control their parents. And I think what I'm saying in my expert opinion is that these issues -- these cases are giving us guideposts about equal protection values and principles, and one of those guideposts is that when children are faced with state action or the creation of a risk or that -- that threaten to harm them by relegating them to some sort of second-class status or significant injury, that it's appropriate for the Court to step in and say we're going to apply a heightened level of review because children are different, and they're unique, and we need to step in, like I talked about all the vulnerabilities about kids, because they can't vote and because they're not a part of the political process, they don't have economic power. And so it's really taking it and arguing -- it's the development of my research agenda for Obergefell until

Page 143 1 now. 2 Okay. On page 29 of Exhibit 2, you conclude Q. that state marriage bans harm children of same-sex 3 4 couples by depriving them of the important legal, 5 economic, and social benefits of marriage without justification. Do you see that? 6 7 Α. Uh-huh. And then you go on to say that state marriage 8 Q. 9 bans impose legal, economic, and social harms on children of same-sex couples. 10 11 Α. Uh-huh. 12 And on page 31 you talk about familial Q. formation harms. 13 14 Α. Uh-huh. 15 And on page 35 you talk about economic harms. Q. 16 Uh-huh. Α. And on page 37 you talk about psychological 17 Q. 18 harms. 19 Α. Uh-huh. 20 And are these types of harms also derived Q. 21 from the same child-centered cases that we've discussed 22 earlier? 23 Α. They're the type of harm or the kinds of harms that in my expert opinion are saying that the 24 Court has found to be important considerations when it 25