Denver, CO 80202 (303) 592-3123

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**INTRODUCTION** 

King County asks this Court to adjudicate ConocoPhillips' responsibility for *global* climate change, here in Washington courts, using Washington law. As set forth in Defendants' joint motion to dismiss, the global nature of King County's allegations (along with the thorny federal questions raised) makes this suit both nonjusticiable and substantively meritless.

But King County's claims must be dismissed for another fundamental, predicate

But King County's claims must be dismissed for another fundamental, predicate reason—the Court lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. ConocoPhillips is not "essentially at home" in Washington. *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). Nor do King County's claims "arise out of" ConocoPhillips' alleged Washington contacts. *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). ConocoPhillips' "suit-related conduct" simply does not "create a substantial connection with the forum State." *Id.* For these very reasons, the Northern District of California dismissed nearly identical claims against ConocoPhillips for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. *See California v. BP P.L.C.*, Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018) (Doc. # 287). The same result is warranted here.

Ninth Circuit precedent requires that a defendant's contacts with Washington be a "necessary" or "but for" cause of the alleged harm before this court can exercise specific jurisdiction. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, 248 F.3d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2001), *abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co.*, 851 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017). Yet far from asserting claims based on forum-directed activity, King County's complaint unabashedly rests on alleged worldwide fossil fuel production, promotion, and resulting emissions:

ConocoPhillips' alleged contribution to the necessarily global "increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide" causing "planetary warming." Compl. ¶ 93; *see also id.* ¶¶ 79–96.

King County has not even plausibly asserted that ConocoPhillips' alleged worldwide fossil fuel production and promotion appreciably contributed to global climate change. *See* Defendants' Joint 12(b)(6) Motion at 36–37 ("Joint Motion"). There is still less basis for concluding that ConocoPhillips' minimal Washington-connected conduct constitutes a sufficient cause of the claimed nuisance for a Washington court to exercise jurisdiction. The

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Court thus lacks personal jurisdiction over ConocoPhillips to adjudicate any contribution to the complex, international, and decades-in-the-making effects of global climate change.

The absence of jurisdiction is no mere technicality, procedural gambit, or pleading footfault. Instead, Washington courts' inability to referee worldwide contributions to climate change reflects time-honored geographic limitations on judicial power. Consistent with courts' abstention from disputes with vast international, political, and economic consequences, see Joint Motion at 38–40, the limits on jurisdiction to regulate a global phenomenon like climate change are necessary to preserve order and consistency. If any climate-change claims are viable (they are not), plaintiffs must assert them where ConocoPhillips is at home.

#### CONOCOPHILLIPS-SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS

ConocoPhillips is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas. Compl. ¶ 18. While ConocoPhillips allegedly "does business in Washington, including through its subsidiaries," id. ¶ 58, the asserted forum-specific contacts are de minimis.<sup>1</sup>

King County's basis for hauling ConocoPhillips into this Court is its assertion that ConocoPhillips itself "is the ultimate decision maker" on "climate change risks." *Id.* ¶ 55. Yet there is no allegation that any such decision-making has ever occurred in Washington or has ever been directed at the state. As for other claimed forum-related contacts, King County has pleaded only two facts. First, that ConocoPhillips operated a single refinery six years ago before ConocoPhillips "spun off its downstream [i.e. refining and marketing] assets as a new independent energy company, Phillips 66." Id. ¶ 59. And second, that ConocoPhillips periodically "ships Alaskan crude oil to Washington." *Id.* ¶ 60.

King County's complaint otherwise barely mentions ConocoPhillips, providing no basis for jurisdiction. For example, there is no allegation that ConocoPhillips has ever extracted fossil fuels in Washington or that it promotes fossil fuels in the state today. Nor is

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ConocoPhillips is a distinct legal entity from its subsidiaries but does not move for dismissal on corporate separateness grounds. Even assuming that the activities of its subsidiaries could be imputed to ConocoPhillips, personal jurisdiction is lacking.

there an allegation that any of ConocoPhillips' forum-specific contacts make ConocoPhillips "at home" in the state or constitute a but-for cause of climate change.

#### **ARGUMENT**

King County bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction consistent with due process. *Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd.*, 328 F.3d 1122, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 2003). King County must meet that burden "as to each defendant," *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cty.*, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017), based on either general jurisdiction (*i.e.*, "all-purpose" jurisdiction) or specific jurisdiction (*i.e.*, "case-linked" jurisdiction), *id.* at 1779–80. As explained below, ConocoPhillips is neither "at home" in Washington for general jurisdiction nor susceptible to specific jurisdiction for its global exploration and production activities.

## I. There Is No General Jurisdiction Over ConocoPhillips in Washington

For a state to exercise general jurisdiction, a defendant's affiliations with the forum must be "so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State." *Daimler AG*, 571 U.S. at 127. For corporations, the "paradigm" fora are "the place of incorporation and principal place of business." *Id.* at 137. Only in an "exceptional" case may general jurisdiction exist elsewhere. *Id.* at 139 n.19; *see also AM Tr. v. UBS AG*, 681 F. App'x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[A] corporation is typically subject to general personal jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or where it maintains its principal place of business.").

ConocoPhillips' place of incorporation (Delaware) and its principal place of business (Texas), Compl. ¶ 18, both begin and end the general-jurisdiction inquiry. King County has alleged nothing to establish that this is an "exceptional" case where general jurisdiction in Washington would nevertheless be proper. King County's meager jurisdictional facts—that ConocoPhillips and its subsidiaries are registered to do business in Washington, ship crude oil to Washington, and at one time operated a refinery, *see id.* ¶¶ 58–60—fall far short. *See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell*, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that BNSF is not subject to general jurisdiction in Montana despite more than 2,000 employees and over 2,000 miles of track).

### II. The Court Lacks Specific Jurisdiction Over ConocoPhillips

Nor are there case-linked grounds for jurisdiction. For a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be a close nexus between the defendant's activities, the forum, and the plaintiff's alleged harms. *See Bristol-Myers*, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. Among other hurdles, the Ninth Circuit requires that any claim "arise[] out of or relate[] to" the defendant's forum contacts, which means the defendant's relationship with the forum must constitute a "necessary" or "but for" cause of the harm. *Unocal Corp.*, 248 F.3d at 923–25; *see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc.*, 223 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000); *Doe v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross*, 112 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 1997); *Ballard v. Savage*, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).<sup>2</sup> In addition, any assertion of jurisdiction must "comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable." *Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int'l, Inc.*, 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017).

Taking the Complaint's allegations as true, ConocoPhillips' activities in Washington cannot conceivably be considered a but-for cause of the claimed nuisance or King County's alleged injuries. King County's claims rest on a complex and lengthy alleged causal chain, that (1) ConocoPhillips extracts fossil fuels, (2) which are later refined into finished products and promoted, (3) which are combusted by millions of consumers, (4) causing the emission of greenhouse gases, (5) which combine with other greenhouse gases from innumerable other sources, (6) which accumulate in the atmosphere over long periods of time, (7) which accumulation results in a warmer global climate, (8) which leads to higher air temperatures, rising sea levels, changing weather patterns, extreme weather events, and other environmental effects, (9) which ultimately harm Plaintiff's proprietary interests. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 93–95, 133–54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Other circuits have held, correctly, that a defendant's contacts with the forum must not only be a but-for cause of the injury but also the *proximate* cause to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. *See SPV Osus Ltd. v. UBS AG*, 882 F.3d 333, 344 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing circuit split). ConocoPhillips preserves this issue for appeal. Regardless, King County cannot show that its claims arise from Washington-specific conduct under either test.

In *Walden*, the Supreme Court held that specific jurisdiction cannot rest "on the 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated'" contacts connecting out-of-state conduct with the forum. 571 U.S. at 286. So too here. The numerous, attenuated links in the causal chain between ConocoPhillips' conduct and the harms claimed foreclose any argument that ConocoPhillips' alleged worldwide activities are either directed at Washington State or that any Washington-focused contacts constitute a but-for cause of the claimed harms.

King County's claims necessarily arise from the *global* effect of the *global* conduct of a whole host of actors—including countless other energy companies, businesses, governments (including King County itself), and other consumers. King County does not even attempt to allege that ConocoPhillips' activities in Washington—previously operating a single refinery and shipping an unspecified amount of crude (*i.e.*, unrefined) oil, Compl. ¶¶ 58–60—are a substantial cause, let alone a but-for cause, of global climate change. None of King County's claimed injuries can be traced to any Washington-related ConocoPhillips conduct.

A judge in the Northern District of California just today held that personal jurisdiction over climate-change claims did not exist over ConocoPhillips in California, applying binding Ninth Circuit precedent. As the court explained, "whatever [alleged] sales or events occurred in California were causally insignificant in the context of the worldwide conduct leading to the international problem of global warming." *California*, Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018) (Doc. # 287), at 6. "It is manifest that global warming would have continued in the absence of all California-related activities of defendants. Plaintiffs have therefore failed to adequately link each defendants' alleged California activities to plaintiffs' harm." *Id.* at 5. The same analysis mandates dismissal of King County's complaint against ConocoPhillips in this Court.

In all events, personal jurisdiction over ConocoPhillips' alleged worldwide conduct—premised on de minimis connections with the State of Washington—is not "reasonable" and does not "comport with fair play and substantial justice." *Axiom*, 874 F.3d at 1068. King County's theory of jurisdiction cannot be squared with due process.

## III. Traditional Limits on Judicial Power Support the Absence of Jurisdiction

The conclusion that there is no personal jurisdiction over ConocoPhillips in Washington related to global warming is not just a procedural quirk. The requirements of personal jurisdiction set forth in binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent are not technicalities but fundamental principles reflecting the proper role of courts and the geographical limits on their reach. Courts' limited geographical power, enshrined in the Due Process Clause, is also echoed in longstanding doctrines about which disputes are justiciable and which are not. *See* Joint Motion at 38–40. The Supreme Court has of late been jealously guarding the outer bounds of personal jurisdiction against novel or expansive theories of judicial power like the one invoked by King County here. *See*, *e.g.*, *Daimler AG*, 571 U.S. at 134–36 (general jurisdiction); *Bristol-Myers*, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (specific jurisdiction).

Under Plaintiff's theory, ConocoPhillips—and countless other named and unnamed defendants—could be hauled into court not just in King County but virtually anywhere. Numerous courts in every state or district would then have a "super" form of jurisdiction to regulate and adjudicate ConocoPhillips' alleged worldwide contribution to global climatic events. Indeed, 13 plaintiffs have already asserted lawsuits in 13 different courts, seeking to bring ConocoPhillips to account for the same worldwide conduct.

For the same reasons that a uniform federal rule of decision is required for climate-change claims, *see* Joint Motion at 7–11; *City of New York v. BP P.L.C.*, No. 18 Civ. 182 (JFK), 2018 WL 3475470, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018) (citing *California v. BP P.L.C.*, Nos. C 17-06011 WHA, C 17-06012 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018)), personal jurisdiction related to global climate change cannot exist in an unlimited number of courts. Otherwise courts could split along a patchwork of inconsistent determinations regarding the same alleged global conduct and global harms. King County was required to bring this lawsuit, if at all, where ConocoPhillips is home.

1	CONCLUSION
2	For the foregoing reasons, King County's claims against ConocoPhillips should be
3	dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
4	DATED this 27th day of July, 2018.
5	By: /s/ Katherine A. Christofilis
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28	CONOCOPHILLIPS' MOTION TO  DISMISS – PERSONAL JURISDICTION 7  (CASE NO. 2:18-ev-00758)  BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT  1801 Wewatta St. Suite 1200 Denver, CO 80202 (303) 592-3123

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** The undersigned hereby certifies that on July 27, 2018, I electronically filed the 2 foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification 3 4 of such filing to all CM/ECF participants. 5 DATED this 27th day of July, 2018. 6 /s/ Jameson R. Jones 7 Jameson R. Jones (pro hac vice) BARTLIT BECK HERMAN 8 PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP 1801 Wewatta St., Suite 1200 9 Denver, Colorado 80202 Telephone: (303) 592-3123 10 Facsimile: (303) 592-3140 Email: jameson.jones@bartlit-beck.com 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CONOCOPHILLIPS' MOTION TO BARTLIT BECK HERMAN PALENCHAR & SCOTT 1801 Wewatta St. Suite 1200 DISMISS – PERSONAL JURISDICTION 8