

Nos. 18-15499, 18-15502, 18-15503, 18-16376

IN THE
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHEVRON CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> , Defendants-Appellants.	No. 18-15499 No. 17-cv-4929-VC N.D. Cal., San Francisco Hon. Vince Chhabria presiding
CITY OF IMPERIAL BEACH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHEVRON CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> , Defendants-Appellants.	No. 18-15502 No. 17-cv-4934-VC N.D. Cal., San Francisco Hon. Vince Chhabria presiding
COUNTY OF MARIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHEVRON CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> , Defendants-Appellants.	No. 18-15503 No. 17-cv-4935-VC N.D. Cal., San Francisco Hon. Vince Chhabria presiding
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees v. CHEVRON CORPORATION; et al., Defendants-Appellants.	No. 18-16376 Nos. 18-cv-00450-VC; 18-cv-00458-VC; 18-cv-00732-VC N.D. Cal., San Francisco Hon. Vince Chhabria presiding

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Thomas G. Hungar
Joshua S. Lipshutz
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5306
(202) 955-8500
thungar@gibsondunn.com
jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90071-3197
(213) 229-7000
tboutrous@gibsondunn.com

*Counsel for Defendants-Appellants Chevron Corporation and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*

[Additional counsel listed on signature page]

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RULE 35(B)(1) STATEMENT AND INTRODUCTION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), a district court’s order remanding a case to state court is not reviewable, “except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 [federal-officer removal] or 1443 [civil-rights removal] of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” This case raises a recurring question of exceptional importance about the scope of appellate jurisdiction under Section 1447(d): Whether, in a case that has been removed in part on one of the specified grounds and then remanded, appellate jurisdiction extends to all aspects of the district court’s remand order.

The panel held that its jurisdiction was limited to the particular ground for removal that authorized the appeal under Section 1447(d), explaining that it was “bound by” this Court’s earlier decision to that effect in *Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 446 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006), “until abrogated by an intervening higher authority.” Op. 23. But the panel acknowledged that, “[w]ere [it] writing on a clean slate, [it] might conclude that [Defendants’ argument] provides a more persuasive interpretation of § 1447(d) than *Patel*.” *Id.*

As the panel also recognized, its holding squarely conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in *Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co.*, 792 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2015). Op. 19. And the panel’s holding conflicts with decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, as well. The panel further acknowledged that its holding is in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun*, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), which concluded that, where a district court certifies an issue for interlocutory review, appellate jurisdiction extends “over ‘any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the *order* that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.’” Op. 20.

En banc review is warranted to allow the full Court to reconsider *Patel*. The scope of appellate jurisdiction over remand orders is an issue of exceptional importance because removal jurisdiction exists to protect defendants’ rights and ensure that claims touching upon inherently federal interests can be resolved in a federal forum. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote nearly two centuries ago, federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” *Cohens v. Virginia*, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). Yet

the panel’s decision precludes this Court from exercising its appellate jurisdiction to decide whether the district court wrongfully deprived the defendant of a federal forum.

Because the panel’s holding departs from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in *Yamaha* and decides a “question[] of exceptional importance” in a manner that “conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals,” Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(A)–(B), this Court should grant rehearing en banc.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed actions against more than 30 energy companies in California state courts, alleging that “the dominant cause of global warming and sea level rise” is worldwide “greenhouse gas pollution,” ER216, and that “Defendants, through their extraction, promotion, marketing, and sale of their fossil fuel products, caused approximately 20% of global fossil fuel product-related CO₂ between 1965 and 2015, with contributions currently continuing unabated,” ER247.¹ Asserting numerous

¹ Eleven climate-change actions, filed by municipal governments in state court and removed by defendants, are currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. This appeal includes six such actions. Two others were consolidated before Judge Alsup, who found federal jurisdiction and

causes of action under California tort law, including for public and private nuisance, Plaintiffs demand compensatory and punitive damages, disgorgement of profits, abatement of the alleged nuisances, and other relief. ER292–312.

Defendants removed the actions to the Northern District of California. The notices of removal asserted seven independent grounds for federal jurisdiction, including the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. ER145–47. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, which the district court granted after concluding that none of the seven grounds asserted by Defendants supported federal jurisdiction. ER5–6.

The panel dismissed Defendants’ appeal in all but one respect. Citing this Court’s decision in *Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 446 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006), the panel held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), it “ha[d] jurisdic-

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Those orders were reversed and vacated by the same panel that decided this appeal (in a decision that is the subject of a separate petition for rehearing). See *City of Oakland v. BP PLC*, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020). Three other actions are stayed pending these appeals. See *Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp.*, No. 18-cv-7477 (N.D. Cal.); *King County v. BP PLC*, No. 18-cv-758 (W.D. Wash.); *City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP*, No. 20-cv-163 (D. Haw.).

tion to review [Defendants'] appeal to the extent the remand order addresses § 1442(a)(1), but [it] lack[ed] jurisdiction to review their appeal from the portions of the remand order considering the . . . other bases for subject-matter jurisdiction.” Op. 19.

The panel acknowledged that its holding was in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun*, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), which interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)’s conferral of appellate jurisdiction over orders certified by the district court for interlocutory review as “giv[ing] an appellate court jurisdiction over ‘any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the *order* that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.” Op. 20. And it acknowledged that its holding squarely conflicted with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in *Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co.*, 792 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2015), “which concluded that because § 1447(d) authorizes appellate review of ‘an order,’ it authorizes review of ‘the order itself,’ not just ‘particular reasons *for* an order.” Op. 19. In fact, the panel acknowledged that, “[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might conclude that *Lu Junhong* provides a more persuasive interpretation of § 1447(d) than

Patel.” Op. 23. But the panel held that it was “bound by *Patel* until abrogated by an intervening higher authority,” *id.*, and thus declined to review the remand order except to the extent it rejected jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, which the panel affirmed, Op. 23–34.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. **The Panel’s Decision Is In Tension With Supreme Court Precedent And Conflicts With The Decisions Of Three Other Courts Of Appeals.**

Section 1447(d) prohibits appellate courts from reviewing remand orders, but contains an express exception authorizing appellate review of “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). There is no dispute that this case was removed pursuant to Section 1442, the federal-officer removal statute. Yet notwithstanding the plain text of the statute, the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the remand *order*, and instead could review only the federal-officer *ground* for removal. Op. 23.

That holding conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “order” in a closely analogous statute governing appellate jurisdiction. It also departs from the holdings of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh

Circuits. The panel acknowledged these conflicts but considered itself bound by *Patel*. *Patel*, however, arose in a different (and unusual) posture nearly a decade before the contrary appellate authority cited above, and neither the parties nor the Court in *Patel* mentioned *Yamaha*, let alone offered any justification for declining to adhere to the Supreme Court's interpretive approach.

1. The Panel's Decision Is In Tension With *Yamaha*.

In *Yamaha*, the Supreme Court confronted a question closely analogous to the one presented here: whether, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), can the courts of appeals exercise jurisdiction over any question that is included within the order that contains the controlling question of law identified by the district court,” or whether they have jurisdiction to address only the precise *issue* certified by the district court. 516 U.S. at 204. Applying a straightforward textual analysis, the Court adopted the former view: “As the text of § 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the *order* certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.” *Id.* at 205 (emphasis in original). Although “[t]he court of appeals may not reach beyond the certified order to address other orders made in the case,” the *Yamaha*

Court reasoned that it “may address any issue fairly included within the certified order *because it is the order that is appealable*, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.” *Id.* (citations omitted) (some emphasis added).

While *Yamaha* concerned a different jurisdictional statute, its analysis applies with equal force here. Section 1292(b) provides that when, among other things, “an order not otherwise appealable . . . involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” the district court may “so state in writing,” and the “Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such *order*.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (emphasis added). Likewise, Section 1447(d) provides that while remand orders generally are “not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,” when a case has been “removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title,” then “an *order* remanding [that] case to the State court from which it was removed shall be reviewable by appeal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (emphasis added).

Although *Yamaha*’s holding was based on the plain meaning of the word “order”—the same word used in Section 1447(d)—the panel considered itself bound by *Patel* “given that *Yamaha* was decided in 1996—a

decade before *Patel*—and thus is not “intervening higher authority.” Op. 20 n.7. As explained below, however, *Patel* is a fatally flawed decision on its own terms and independently merits reconsideration. *See infra*, § A.3. Because the panel understood *Patel* to conflict with the reasoning of *Yamaha*, this Court should also grant rehearing en banc to resolve this “conflict[] with a decision of the United States Supreme Court.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(A).

2. The Panel’s Decision Conflicts With The Decisions Of Three Other Courts Of Appeals.

The panel’s interpretation of Section 1447(d) also merits en banc review because it conflicts with decisions from the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, each of which has held that appellate jurisdiction extends to the entire remand “order” when the case was removed based, at least in part, on Section 1442 or 1443. In so holding, these courts have relied upon the plain meaning of the word “order” adopted in *Yamaha*.

The Seventh Circuit led the way with its decision in *Lu Junhong*. There, the defendant removed to federal court “asserting two sources of jurisdiction”—admiralty and federal-officer removal. 792 F.3d at 808. After rejecting federal-officer removal, the Seventh Circuit held that it

also had jurisdiction to consider the admiralty ground for removal raised below. Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook “appli[ed] *Yamaha* . . . to the word ‘order’ in § 1447(d)” and concluded that “if appellate review of an ‘order’ has been authorized, that means review of the ‘order.’ Not particular reasons *for* an order, but the order itself.” *Id.* at 812.

Although this interpretation was “entirely textual,” *id.*, the Seventh Circuit explained that it was also consistent with Section 1447(d)’s purposes. While “§ 1447(d) was enacted to prevent appellate delay in determining where litigation will occur,” this concern has little currency “once Congress has authorized appellate review of a remand order” because “[t]he marginal delay from adding an extra issue to a case where the time for briefing, argument, and decision has already been accepted is likely to be small.” *Id.* at 813. Under such circumstances, “a court of appeals has been authorized to take the time necessary to determine the right forum.” *Id.*

The Sixth Circuit is in accord. In *Mays v. City of Flint, Michigan*, 871 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2017), the defendants removed claims related to Flint’s water crisis “under two statutory provisions: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1442,

the federal-officer removal statute, and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which allows removal for state-law causes of action that raise substantial federal questions.” *Id.* at 441. After the district court granted the plaintiffs’ remand motion, the defendants appealed. The Sixth Circuit noted that “appeal of the remand order is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) because the [defendants] removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1442,” and then, citing *Lu Junhong*, squarely held that “[o]ur jurisdiction to review the remand order also encompasses review of the district court’s decision on the alternative ground for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.” *Id.* at 442.²

The Fifth Circuit also adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning. *See Decatur Hosp. Auth. v. Aetna Health, Inc.*, 854 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2017). The district court in that case remanded the matter to state court on the ground that the defendant failed to timely file a notice of removal. *Id.* at 294–95. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it “ordinarily

² The Sixth Circuit took a different view nearly four decades earlier. *See Detroit Police Lieutenants & Sergeants Ass’n v. City of Detroit*, 597 F.2d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). That decision, however, contained no reasoning to support its conclusion, which is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in *Yamaha*. *See supra*, § A.1.

lack[s] jurisdiction to review a remand order based on such a defect,” but concluded that “the fact that Aetna relied upon the federal officer removal statute in its notice of removal permits appellate review.” *Id.* at 296. Noting that “Congress expressly made Section 1447(d)’s bar inapplicable to ‘an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to . . . section 1442,’” the court held that its jurisdiction included not only “particular reasons for [the] order, but the order itself.” *Id.* (quoting *Lu Junhong*, 792 F.3d at 812).³

Consistent with those courts’ straightforward textual reading of Section 1447(d), the leading federal practice treatises agree that Section 1447(d) confers appellate jurisdiction over the entire remand order so long as removal is based at least in part on Section 1442 or 1443. *See*,

³ In *City of Walker v. Louisiana*, 877 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2017), the Fifth Circuit suggested that it had “rejected . . . in the past” the argument that Section 1447(d) permits review of the entire remand order. *Id.* at 566 n.2 (citing *Decatur Hosp. Auth.*, 854 F.3d at 296). But even if this statement could be reconciled with *Decatur*, it is dicta because, as the *City of Walker* court conceded, “[a]ppellants d[id] not argue that the § 1447(d) exception for federal officer jurisdiction allows us to review the entire remand order.” *Id.*

e.g., Wright & Miller, 15A *Fed. Prac. & Proc.* § 3914.11 (2d ed.) (“Although § 1447(d) allows review of the ‘order remanding’ the case, it has been held that review is limited to removability under § 1443. Review should instead be extended to all possible grounds for removal underlying the order.”); J. Moore, *et al.*, 19 *Moore’s Federal Practice*, § 107.156[3][a], 107-527 (3d ed.) (“This comports with related case law holding that when an appellate court has jurisdiction to review an ‘order,’ it may review all of the reasons supporting the order.”).

Other courts of appeals have taken the opposite approach, holding that Section 1447(d) confers appellate jurisdiction not over the “order,” but rather only over enumerated *issues* encompassed in the order. But nearly all of those decisions predated the three decisions above—sometimes by decades, and often with little or no reasoning.⁴ At least one court has recognized the tension between its older decisions and *Yamaha*, but

⁴ See, *e.g.*, *Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.*, __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 3777996 (10th Cir. July 7, 2020); *Jacks v. Meridian Res. Co.*, 701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir. 2012); *Alabama v. Conley*, 245 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001); *Davis v. Glanton*, 107 F.3d 1044 (3d Cir. 1997); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baasch*, 644 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1981); *Noel v. McCain*, 538 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1976).

considered itself bound by precedent. *See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.*, 952 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit “found *Yamaha* persuasive in interpreting the word ‘order’ under § 1447(d) as a matter of first impression,” but concluding that “we simply cannot conclude that our contrary interpretation in *Noel* is abrogated”), *petition for cert. filed*, No. 19-1189 (Mar. 31, 2020).

So, too, here. As noted above, the panel conceded that, “[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might conclude that *Lu Junhong* provides a more persuasive interpretation of § 1447(d) than *Patel*.” Op. 23. But, reasoning that “[p]recedents . . . do not cease to be authoritative merely because counsel in a later case advances new arguments,” the panel concluded that it “remain[ed] bound by *Patel* until abrogated by an intervening higher authority.” *Id.* This Court should therefore grant en banc rehearing to resolve this Circuit’s “conflict[] with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(B).

3. This Court’s Holding In *Patel* Merits Reconsideration.

The above conflicts alone are sufficient to merit rehearing en banc. But even absent those conflicts, en banc rehearing would still be proper

to reconsider this Court's decision in *Patel*, which arose in a highly unusual posture and failed to meaningfully address the key issue for which it was cited by the panel here.

Patel involved the alleged breach of a franchise agreement. The franchisor secured a favorable judgment in arbitration and filed a petition to confirm the award in California state court. 446 F.3d at 998. Four days before the hearing on the franchisor's petition, however, the franchisees filed a separate complaint in federal district court alleging fraud and civil-rights violations against the franchisor. *Id.* In addition to these claims, “[i]n the fourth claim for relief in their federal complaint, the [franchisees] sought to remove to federal court [the franchisor's] pending state court petition to confirm the arbitration award.” *Id.* The district court “determined that removal was not proper under either 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or § 1443(1),” and this Court affirmed, reasoning that “[w]e lack jurisdiction to review the remand order based on § 1441” and “[t]he arbitration petition was not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1).” *Id.* at 998–99.

The Court's decision in *Patel* warrants reconsideration for at least three reasons. *First*, the Court's jurisdictional ruling comprised only

three sentences, and provided no reasoning or citations beyond a passing reference to Section 1447(d) itself. In fact, even that citation omitted the relevant language of Section 1447(d):

The district court determined that removal was not proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 or § 1443(1). We lack jurisdiction to review the remand order based on § 1441. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal”). Accordingly, the [franchisees’] appeal from the remand order based on § 1441 is dismissed.

Id. Second, neither the parties nor this Court in *Patel* made any mention of *Yamaha*, despite the fact that it was decided a decade earlier and was highly relevant to the interpretive question at issue. *Third*, the *Patel* panel’s interpretation of Section 1447(d) was unnecessary to the judgment because the Court concluded that the franchisees “had *no* objectively reasonable basis for removal” in any event. *Id.* at 999 (emphasis added).

Before this Court forswears jurisdiction over remand orders in cases removed under Section 1442 or 1443—contrary to *Yamaha* and the well-reasoned position of three other courts of appeals—it should give the matter more thorough consideration than it received in *Patel*. That is

especially so considering the exceptional importance of the issue both as a general matter and in this litigation.

B. The Scope Of Appellate Jurisdiction Under Section 1447(d) Is A Question Of Exceptional Importance.

Under the panel’s decision, this Court is powerless to correct a district court’s erroneous conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over a removed case where that error goes to any ground other than the two enumerated in Section 1447(d). As explained above, the fact that this question is the subject of a circuit conflict renders it “a question of exceptional importance” warranting en banc review, especially given the tension between the panel’s decision and *Yamaha*. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2), (b)(1)(B). Even apart from this conflict, moreover, the question is intrinsically one of exceptional importance for several reasons.

First, the panel’s holding implicates fundamental questions of federal judicial power. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” *Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); *see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (“We have often acknowledged that federal

courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.”). As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” *Cohens v. Virginia*, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). While Congress has the power to limit the appellate courts’ jurisdiction to review remand orders, this Court should not lightly conclude that Congress has exercised that power where such important interests are at stake.

Second, the existence of removal jurisdiction goes to the basic rights of defendants. Indeed, “[t]he removal process was created by Congress to protect defendants.” *Legg v. Wyeth*, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). For this reason, the Supreme Court long ago explained that, “[w]hile the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state courts,” it is “equally true” that federal courts must not “prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.” *Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co.*, 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907); *see also* *Wright &*

Miller, *Fed. Prac. & Proc.* § 3641 (discussing *Wecker*). The panel’s interpretation of Section 1447(d), however, *requires* the Court to abandon this vigilant protection of defendants’ right to proceed in federal court even though Congress has unequivocally authorized the Court to review the remand “order.”

Third, removal jurisdiction ensures that cases that implicate important federal interests may be heard in a federal forum. This appeal presents a case in point. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ *global* extraction of fossil fuels—and billions of third parties’ *global* combustion of those fuels—has contributed to *global* climate change. Every court to reach the merits of these claims has soundly rejected them because they intrude on the prerogatives of the federal Executive and Legislative Branches.⁵ But under the panel’s decision, this Court lacks jurisdiction

⁵ *City of New York v. BP P.L.C.*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“To litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas emissions in federal court would severely infringe upon the foreign-policy decisions that are squarely within the purview of the political branches of the U.S. Government.”); *City of Oakland*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The problem deserves a solution on a more vast scale than can be supplied by a district judge or jury in a public nuisance case. . . . The Court will stay its hand in favor

even to *consider* whether these concerns support federal jurisdiction—with the result that the primacy of the national government’s political branches in this inherently global field is left to be resolved by the judicial branch of an entirely different sovereign. The en banc Court should reconsider whether such a counterintuitive result is indeed required by Section 1447(d), which authorizes appellate review of remand “order[s]” in cases removed under the federal-officer removal statute.

CONCLUSION

This case should be reheard en banc, and the district court’s judgment should be reversed.

of solutions by the legislative and executive branches.”), *vac’d on other grounds*, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020).

Dated: July 9, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Jonathan W. Hughes

By: **/s/ Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.

Jonathan W. Hughes
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE
SCHOLER LLP
Three Embarcadero Center, 10th Floor
San Francisco, California 94111-4024
Telephone: (415) 471-3100
Facsimile: (415) 471-3400
E-mail: jonathan.hughes@apks.com

Matthew T. Heartney
John D. Lombardo
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE
SCHOLER LLP
777 South Figueroa Street, 44th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017-5844
Telephone: (213) 243-4000
Facsimile: (213) 243-4199
E-mail: matthew.heartney@apks.com
E-mail: john.lombardo@apks.com

Philip H. Curtis
Nancy Milburn
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE
SCHOLER LLP
250 West 55th Street
New York, NY 10019-9710
Telephone: (212) 836-8383
Facsimile: (212) 715-1399
E-mail: philip.curtis@apks.com
E-mail: nancy.milburn@apks.com

*Attorneys for Defendants BP P.L.C.
and BP AMERICA, INC.*

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
Thomas G. Hungar
Andrea E. Neuman
William E. Thomson
Joshua S. Lipshutz
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
333 South Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 229-7000
Facsimile: (213) 229-7520
E-mail: tboutrous@gibsondunn.com
E-mail: aneuman@gibsondunn.com
E-mail: wthomson@gibsondunn.com
E-mail: jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com

Herbert J. Stern
Joel M. Silverstein
STERN & KILCULLEN, LLC
325 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 110
Florham Park, NJ 07932-0992
Telephone: (973) 535-1900
Facsimile: (973) 535-9664
E-mail: hstern@sgklaw.com
E-mail: jsilverstein@sgklaw.com

Neal S. Manne
Johnny W. Carter
Erica Harris
Steven Shepard
SUSMAN GODFREY LLP
1000 Louisiana, Suite 5100
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 651-9366
Facsimile: (713) 654-6666

E-mail: nmanne@susmangodfrey.com

E-mail: jcarter@susmangodfrey.com

E-mail: eharris@susmangodfrey.com

E-mail: shepard@susmangodfrey.com

*Attorneys for Defendants CHEVRON
CORP. and CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.*

**** Pursuant to Ninth Circuit L.R. 25-5(e), counsel attests that all other parties on whose behalf the filing is submitted concur in the filing's contents**

By: /s/ Sean C. Grimsley

Sean C. Grimsley
Jameson R. Jones
BARTLIT BECK LLP
1801 Wewatta St., Suite 1200
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: 303-592-3123
Facsimile: 303-592-3140
Email: sean.grimsley@bartlitbeck.com
Email: jameson.jones@bartlitbeck.com

Megan R. Nishikawa
Nicholas A. Miller-Stratton
KING & SPALDING LLP
101 Second Street, Suite 2300
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 318-1200
Facsimile: (415) 318-1300
Email: mnishikawa@kslaw.com
Email: nstratton@kslaw.com

Tracie J. Renfroe
Carol M. Wood
KING & SPALDING LLP
1100 Louisiana Street, Suite 4000
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 751-3200
Facsimile: (713) 751-3290
Email: trenfroe@kslaw.com
Email: cwood@kslaw.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
CONOCOPHILLIPS and CONO-
COPHILLIPS COMPANY*

By: /s/ Dawn Sestito

M. Randall Oppenheimer
Dawn Sestito
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
400 South Hope Street
Los Angeles, California 90071-2899
Telephone: (213) 430-6000
Facsimile: (213) 430-6407
E-Mail: roppenheimer@omm.com
E-Mail: dsestito@omm.com

Theodore V. Wells, Jr.
Daniel J. Toal
Jaren E. Janghorbani
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHAR-
TON &
GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019-6064
Telephone: (212) 373-3000
Facsimile: (212) 757-3990
E-Mail: twells@paulweiss.com
E-Mail: dtoal@paulweiss.com
E-Mail: jjanghorbani@paulweiss.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION*

By: /s/ Daniel B. Levin

Daniel B. Levin
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
350 South Grand Avenue
Fiftieth Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071-3426
Telephone: (213) 683-9100
Facsimile: (213) 687-3702
E-mail: daniel.levin@mto.com

Jerome C. Roth
Elizabeth A. Kim
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
560 Mission Street
Twenty-Seventh Floor
San Francisco, California 94105-2907
Telephone: (415) 512-4000
Facsimile: (415) 512-4077
E-mail: jerome.roth@mto.com
E-mail: elizabeth.kim@mto.com

David C. Frederick
Brendan J. Crimmins
KELLOGG, HANSEN, TODD, FI-
GEL & FREDERICK, P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 326-7900
Facsimile: (202) 326-7999
E-mail: frederick@kellogghansen.com
E-mail: crimmins@kellogghansen.com

*Attorneys for Defendants ROYAL
DUTCH SHELL PLC and SHELL OIL
PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC*

By: /s/ Kevin Orsini

Kevin Orsini
Vanessa A. Lavelly
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
LLP
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
Tel: (212) 474-1000
Fax: (212) 474-3700
E-mail: korsini@cravath.com
E-mail: vlavelly@cravath.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPO-
RATION*

By: /s/ Thomas F. Koegel

Thomas F. Koegel
CROWELL & MORING LLP
Three Embarcadero Center, 26th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 986-2800
Facsimile: (415) 986-2827
E-mail: tkoegel@crowell.com

Kathleen Taylor Sooy
Tracy A. Roman
CROWELL & MORING LLP
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: (202) 624-2500
Facsimile: (202) 628-5116
E-mail: ksooy@crowell.com
E-mail: troman@crowell.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
ARCH COAL, INC.*

By: /s/ Patrick W. Mizell

Mortimer Hartwell
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
555 Mission Street Suite 2000
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 979-6930
E-mail: mhartwell@velaw.com

Patrick W. Mizell
Deborah C. Milner
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
1001 Fannin Suite 2300
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 758-2932
E-mail: pmizell@velaw.com
E-mail: cmilner@velaw.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
APACHE CORPORATION*

By: /s/ Steven M. Bauer

Steven M. Bauer
Margaret A. Tough
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
San Francisco, California 94111-6538
Telephone: (415) 391-0600
Facsimile: (415) 395-8095
E-mail: steven.bauer@lw.com
E-mail: margaret.tough@lw.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
PHILLIPS 66*

By: /s/ David E. Cranston

David E. Cranston
GREENBERG GLUSKER FIELDS
CLAMAN & MACHTINGER LLP
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 21st Floor,
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 785-6897
Facsimile: (310) 201-2361
E-mail: DCranston@green-
bergglusker.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
ENI OIL & GAS INC.*

By: /s/ Andrew A. Kassof

Mark McKane, P.C.
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
555 California Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone: (415) 439-1400
Facsimile: (415) 439-1500
E-mail: mark.mckane@kirkland.com

Andrew A. Kassof, P.C.
Brenton Rogers
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
300 North LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois 60654
Telephone: (312) 862-2000
Facsimile: (312) 862-2200
E-mail: andrew.kassof@kirkland.com
E-mail: brenton.rogers@kirkland.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
RIO TINTO ENERGY AMERICA INC.,
RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC., and
RIO TINTO SERVICES INC.*

By: /s/ Gregory Evans

Gregory Evans
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
Wells Fargo Center
South Tower
355 S. Grand Avenue, Suite 4200
Los Angeles, CA 90071-3103
Telephone: (213) 457-9844
Facsimile: (213) 457-9888
E-mail: gevans@mcguirewoods.com

Steven R. Williams
Joy C. Fuhr
Brian D. Schmalzbach
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
800 East Canal Street
Richmond, VA 23219-3916
Telephone: (804) 775-1141
Facsimile: (804) 698-2208
E-mail: srwilliams@mcguirewoods.com
E-mail: jfuhr@mcguirewoods.com
E-mail:
bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
DEVON ENERGY CORPORATION
and DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION
COMPANY, L.P.*

By: /s/ Andrew McGaan

Christopher W. Keegan
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
555 California Street
San Francisco, California 94104
Telephone: (415) 439-1400
Facsimile: (415) 439-1500
E-mail: chris.keegan@kirkland.com

Andrew R. McGaan, P.C.
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
300 North LaSalle
Chicago, Illinois 60654
Telephone: (312) 862-2000
Facsimile: (312) 862-2200
E-mail: andrew.mcgaan@kirkland.com

Anna G. Rotman, P.C.
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
609 Main Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 836-3600
Facsimile: (713) 836-3601
E-mail: anna.rotman@kirkland.com

Bryan D. Rohm
TOTAL E&P USA, INC.
1201 Louisiana Street, Suite 1800
Houston, TX 77002
Telephone: (713) 647-3420
E-mail: bryan.rohm@total.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
TOTAL E&P USA, INC. and TOTAL
SPECIALTIES USA, INC.*

By: /s/ Michael F. Healy

Michael F. Healy
SHOOK HARDY & BACON LLP
One Montgomery St., Suite 2700
San Francisco, CA 94104
Telephone: (415) 544-1942
E-mail: mfhealy@shb.com

Michael L. Fox
DUANE MORRIS LLP
Spear Tower
One Market Plaza, Suite 2200
San Francisco, CA 94105-1127
Telephone: (415) 957-3902
E-mail: MLFox@duanemorris.com

Attorneys for Defendant
OVINTIV CANADA ULC
(fka "Encana Corporation")

By: /s/ Peter Duchesneau

Craig A. Moyer
Peter Duchesneau
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS,
LLP
11355 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064-1614
Telephone: (310) 312-4000
Facsimile: (310) 312-4224
E-mail: cmoyer@manatt.com
E-mail: pduchesneau@manatt.com

Stephanie A. Roeser
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS,
LLP
One Embarcadero Center, 30th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 291-7400
Facsimile: (415) 291-7474
E-mail: sroeser@manatt.com

Nathan P. Eimer
Lisa S. Meyer
Pamela R. Hanebutt
Raphael Janove
EIMER STAHL LLP
224 South Michigan Avenue, Suite
1100
Chicago, IL 60604
Telephone: (312) 660-7605
Facsimile: (312) 961-3204
Email: neimer@EimerStahl.com
Email: lmeyer@EimerStahl.com
Email: phanebutt@EimerStahl.com
Email: rjanove@EimerStahl.com

Attorneys for Defendant
CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION

By: /s/ J. Scott Janoe

Christopher J. Carr
Jonathan A. Shapiro
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
101 California Street
36th Floor, Suite 3600
San Francisco, California 94111
Telephone: (415) 291-6200
Facsimile: (415) 291-6300
Email: chris.carr@bakerbotts.com
Email: jonathan.shapiro@bakerbotts.com

Scott Janoe
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
910 Louisiana Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 229-1553
Facsimile: (713) 229 7953
Email: scott.janoe@bakerbotts.com

Evan Young
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Boulevard
Austin, Texas 78701
Telephone: (512) 322-2506
Facsimile: (512) 322-8306
Email: evan.young@bakerbotts.com

Megan Berge
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
1299 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20004
Telephone: (202) 639-7700
Facsimile: (202) 639-1171
Email: megan.berge@bakerbotts.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
HESS CORPORATION, MARATHON
OIL COMPANY, MARATHON OIL
CORPORATION, REPSOL ENERGY
NORTH AMERICA CORP., and
REPSOL TRADING USA CORP*

By: /s/ Kevin Orsini

Kevin Orsini
Vanessa A. Lavelly
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
LLP
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
Tel: (212) 474-1000
Fax: (212) 474-3700
E-mail: korsini@cravath.com
E-mail: vlavelly@cravath.com

Stephen C. Lewis
R. Morgan Gilhuly
BARG COFFIN LEWIS & TRAPP,
LLP
350 California Street, 22nd Floor
San Francisco, California 94104-1435
Telephone: (415) 228-5400
Facsimile: (415) 228-5450
E-mail: slewis@bargcoffin.com
E-mail: mgilhuly@bargcoffin.com

*Attorneys for Defendants
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP.
and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORP.*

By: /s/ Shannon S. Broome

Shannon S. Broome
Ann Marie Mortimer
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
50 California Street, Suite 1700
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 975-3700
Facsimile: (415) 975-3701
E-mail: SBroome@HuntonAK.com
E-mail: AMortimer@HuntonAK.com

Shawn Patrick Regan
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166-0136
Telephone: (212) 309-1000
Facsimile: (212) 309-1100
E-mail: SRegan@HuntonAK.com

*Attorneys for Defendant
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORPO-
RATION*

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This petition complies with the type-volume limitation of Court Rule 35-4 and 40-1(a) because it contains 4,054 words, excluding the parts of the petition exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). This petition complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft Word 2016 in 14-point New Century Schoolbook type.

Dated: July 9, 2020

 /s/ Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.

EXHIBIT A

FOR PUBLICATION

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO,
individually and on behalf of the
People of the State of California,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION;
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.;
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; BP
PLC; BP AMERICA, INC.; ROYAL
DUTCH SHELL PLC; SHELL OIL
PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC;
CITGO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; CONOCOPHILLIPS;
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY;
PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY; PEABODY
ENERGY CORPORATION; TOTAL
E&P USA, INC.; TOTAL
SPECIALTIES USA, INC.; ARCH
COAL INC.; ENI OIL & GAS, INC.;
RIO TINTO ENERGY AMERICA,
INC.; RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC.;
RIO TINTO SERVICES, INC.;
ANADARKO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION;
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION; REPSOL ENERGY

No. 18-15499

D.C. No.
3:17-cv-04929-VC

NORTH AMERICA CORP.; REPSOL
TRADING USA CORP.;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY;
MARATHON OIL CORPORATION;
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP.;
HESS CORP.; DEVON ENERGY
CORP.; DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION COMPANY, LP;
ENCANA CORPORATION; APACHE
CORP.,

Defendants-Appellants.

CITY OF IMPERIAL BEACH,
individually and on behalf of the
People of the State of California,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION;
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.;
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; BP
PLC; BP AMERICA, INC.; ROYAL
DUTCH SHELL PLC; SHELL OIL
PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC;
CITGO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; CONOCOPHILLIPS;
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY;
PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY; PEABODY
ENERGY CORPORATION; TOTAL
E&P USA, INC.; TOTAL
SPECIALTIES USA, INC.; ARCH

No. 18-15502

D.C. No.
3:17-cv-04934-VC

COAL INC.; ENI OIL & GAS, INC.;
RIO TINTO ENERGY AMERICA,
INC.; RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC.;
RIO TINTO SERVICES, INC.;
ANADARKO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION;
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION; REPSOL ENERGY
NORTH AMERICA CORP.; REPSOL
TRADING USA CORP.;
MARATHON OIL COMPANY;
MARATHON OIL CORPORATION;
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP.;
HESS CORP.; DEVON ENERGY
CORP.; DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION COMPANY, LP;
ENCANA CORPORATION; APACHE
CORP.,

Defendants-Appellants.

COUNTY OF MARIN, individually
and on behalf of the People of the
State of California,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION;
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC.;
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION; BP

No. 18-15503

D.C. No.
3:17-cv-04935-VC

PLC; BP AMERICA, INC.; ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC; SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY LLC; CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION; CONOCOPHILLIPS; CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY; PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY; PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION; TOTAL E&P USA, INC.; TOTAL SPECIALTIES USA, INC.; ARCH COAL INC.; ENI OIL & GAS, INC.; RIO TINTO ENERGY AMERICA, INC.; RIO TINTO MINERALS, INC.; RIO TINTO SERVICES, INC.; ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION; OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION; REPSOL ENERGY NORTH AMERICA CORP.; REPSOL TRADING USA CORP.; MARATHON OIL COMPANY; MARATHON OIL CORPORATION; MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP.; HESS CORP.; DEVON ENERGY CORP.; DEVON ENERGY PRODUCTION COMPANY, LP; ENCANA CORPORATION; APACHE CORP.,

Defendants-Appellants.

COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ,
individually and on behalf of The
People of the State of California;
CITY OF SANTA CRUZ, a
municipal corporation,
individually and on behalf of The
People of the State of California;
CITY OF RICHMOND, individually
and on behalf of The People of
the State of California,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CHEVRON CORPORATION;
CHEVRON USA INC.; ROYAL
DUTCH SHELL PLC; BP PLC;
SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY
LLC; BP AMERICA, INC.; EXXON
MOBIL CORPORATION;
CONOCOPHILLIPS;
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY;
ANADARKO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; APACHE
CORPORATION; DEVON ENERGY
CORPORATION; DEVON ENERGY
PRODUCTION COMPANY, LP;
TOTAL E&P USA, INC.; TOTAL
SPECIALTIES USA, INC.; ENCANA
CORPORATION; CITGO
PETROLEUM CORPORATION; HESS
CORPORATION; MARATHON OIL
COMPANY; MARATHON OIL

No. 18-16376

D.C. Nos.

3:18-cv-00450-VC

3:18-cv-00458-VC

3:18-cv-00732-VC

OPINION

CORPORATION; REPSOL ENERGY
NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION;
REPSOL TRADING USA
CORPORATION; PHILLIPS 66
COMPANY; OCCIDENTAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION;
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL
CORPORATION; ENI OIL & GAS,
INC.; MARATHON PETROLEUM
CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 5, 2020
Pasadena, California

Filed May 26, 2020

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen, and
Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY*

**Removal/Subject-Matter Jurisdiction/Appellate
Jurisdiction**

On appeal from the district court’s order remanding complaints to the state court from which they had been removed, the panel dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed in part, holding that defendants did not carry their burden of establishing the criteria for federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

The County of San Mateo and other cities and counties filed six complaints in California state court against more than thirty energy companies, alleging nuisance and other causes of action arising from the role of fossil fuel products in global warming. The energy companies removed the cases to federal court. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motions to remand, rejecting all eight of the grounds on which the energy companies relied for subject-matter jurisdiction.

Dismissing in part, the panel held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), it had jurisdiction to review the removal order only to the extent the order addressed whether removal was proper under § 1442(a)(1). The panel concluded that the non-reviewability clause of § 1447(d) applied because the district court remanded based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Declining to follow the Seventh Circuit, the panel held that under the “exception clause” of § 1447(d), authorizing review of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1443, it had

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

jurisdiction to review whether removal was proper under § 1442(a)(1), but the exception clause did not subject the district court's entire remand order to plenary review. The panel followed *Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 446 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006), concluding that *Patel* was not abrogated either by intervening judicial authority or by Congress's 2011 amendment of § 1447(d) to insert § 1442.

Affirming in part, the panel held that the district court did not err in holding that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute. The panel concluded that the energy companies failed to establish that they were "acting under" a federal officer's directions based on three agreements with the government: CITGO's fuel supply agreements with the Navy Exchange Service Command, a unit agreement for the petroleum reserves at Elk Hills between Standard Oil Company of California and the U.S. Navy, and the energy companies' Oil and Gas Leases of Submerged Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

COUNSEL

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. (argued), Andrea E. Neuman, William E. Thomson, and Joshua S. Lipshutz, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los Angeles, California; Herbert J. Stern and Joel M. Silverstein, Stern & Kilcullen LLC, Florham Park, New Jersey; Neal S. Manne, Johnny W. Carter, Erica Harris, and Steven Shepard, Susman Godfrey LLP, Houston, Texas; for Defendants-Appellants Chevron Corporation and Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Jonathan W. Hughes, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, San Francisco, California; Matthew T. Heartney and John D. Lombardo, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Los Angeles, California; Philip H. Curtis and Nancy Milburn, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, New York, New York; for Defendants-Appellants BP PLC and BP America, Inc.

Sean C. Grimsley and Jameson R. Jones, Bartlit Beck LLP, Denver, Colorado; Megan R. Nishikawa and Nicholas A. Miller-Stratton, King & Spalding LLP, San Francisco, California; Tracie J. Renfroe and Carol M. Wood, King & Spalding LLP, Houston, Texas; for Defendants-Appellants ConocoPhillips and ConocoPhillips Company.

M. Randall Oppenheimer and Dawn Sestito, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; Theodore V. Wells, Jr., Daniel J. Toal, and Jaren E. Janghorbani, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, New York; for Defendant-Appellant Exxon Mobil Corporation.

Daniel B. Levin, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; Jerome C. Roth and Elizabeth A. Kim, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, California; David C. Frederick and Brendan J. Crimmins, Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel & Frederick P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants Royal Dutch Shell PLC and Shell Oil Products Company LLC.

Bryan M. Killian, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.; James J. Dragna and Yardena R. Zwang-Weissman, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant Anadarko Petroleum Corporation.

Thomas F. Koegel, Crowell & Moring LLP, San Francisco, California; Kathleen Taylor Sooy and Tracy A. Roman, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellant Arch Coal Inc.

Mortimer Hartwell, Vinson & Elkins LLP, San Francisco, California; Patrick W. Mizell and Deborah C. Milner, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Houston, Texas; for Defendant-Appellant Apache Corp.

William M. Sloan and Jessica L. Grant, Venable LLP, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellant Peabody Energy Corporation.

Mark McKane P.C., Kirkland & Ellis LLP, San Francisco, California; Andrew A. Kassof, P.C., and Brenton Rogers, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, Illinois; for Defendants-Appellants Rio Tinto Energy America, Inc.; Rio Tinto Minerals, Inc.; and Rio Tinto Services, Inc.

Gregory Evans, McGuireWoods LLP, Los Angeles, California; Steven R. Williams, Joy C. Fuhr, and Brian D. Schmalzbach, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, Virginia; for Defendants-Appellants Devon Energy Corp. and Devon Energy Production Company, LP.

Christopher W. Keegan, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, San Francisco, California; Andrew R. McGaan, P.C., Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Anna G. Rotman, P.C., Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Houston, Texas; Bryan D. Rohm, Total E&P USA, Inc., Houston, Texas; for Defendants-Appellants Total E&P USA, Inc.; and Total Specialties USA, Inc.

Michael F. Healy, Shook Hardy & Bacon LLP, San Francisco, California; Michael L. Fox, Duane Morris LLP, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellant Encana Corporation.

Craig A. Moyer and Peter Duchesneau, Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Los Angeles, California; Stephanie A. Roeser, Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, San Francisco, California; Nathan P. Eimer, Lisa S. Meyer, Pamela R. Hanebutt, and Raphael Janove, Eimer Stahl LLP, Chicago, Illinois; for Defendant-Appellant CITGO Petroleum Corporation.

Christopher J. Carr and Jonathan A. Shapiro, Baker Botts L.L.P., San Francisco, California; Scott Janoe, Baker Botts L.L.P., Houston, Texas; Evan Young, Baker Botts L.L.P., Austin, Texas; Megan Berge, Baker Botts L.L.P., Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellants Hess Corp., Marathon Oil Company, Marathon Oil Corporation, Repsol Energy North America Corp., and Repsol Trading USA Corp.

Steven M. Bauer and Margaret A. Tough, Latham & Watkins LLP, San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellant Phillips 66 Company.

David E. Cranston, Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant Eni Oil & Gas, Inc.

Marc A. Fuller and Matthew R. Stammel, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., Dallas, Texas; Stephen C. Lewis and R. Morgan Gilhuly, Barg Coffin Lewis & Trapp LLP, San Francisco, California; for Defendants-Appellants Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation.

Shannon S. Broome and Ann Marie Mortimer, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, San Francisco, California; Shawn Patrick Regan, Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, New York, New York; for Defendant-Appellant Marathon Petroleum Corp.

Victor M. Sher (argued), Matthew K. Edling, Katie H. Jones, and Martin D. Quiñones, Sher Edling LLP, San Francisco, California; Kevin K. Russell, Sarah E. Harrington, and Charles H. Davis, Goldstein & Russell P.C., Bethesda, Maryland; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

John C. Beiers, Paul A. Okada, David A. Silberman, Margaret V. Tides, and Matthew J. Sanders, Office of the County Counsel, Redwood City, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee County of San Mateo.

Brian E. Washington, Brian C. Case, and Brandon Halter, Office of the County Counsel, San Rafael, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee County of Marin.

Jennifer Lyon and Steven E. Boehmer, McDougal Love Boehmer Foley Lyon & Canlas, Office of the City Attorney, La Mesa, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee City of Imperial Beach.

Dana McRae and Jordan Sheinbaum, Office of the County Counsel, Santa Cruz, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee County of Santa Cruz.

Anthony P. Condotti, City Attorney, Santa Cruz, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee City of Santa Cruz.

Bruce Reed Goodmiller and Rachel H. Sommovilla, City Attorney's Office, Richmond, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee City of Richmond.

Steven P. Lehotsky, Michael B. Schon, and Jonathan D. Urick, U.S. Chamber Litigation Center, Washington, D.C.; Peter D. Keisler, C. Frederick Beckner III, Ryan C. Morris, and Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.

Gerson H. Smoger, Smoger & Associates P.C., Dallas, Texas; Robert S. Peck, Center for Constitutional Litigation P.C., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Senator Sheldon Whitehouse.

Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc.

James R. Williams, County Counsel; Greta S. Hansen, Chief Assistant County Counsel; Laura S. Trice, Lead Deputy County Counsel; Tony LoPresti, Deputy County Counsel; Office of the County Counsel, County of Santa Clara, San José, California; for Amicus Curiae California State Association of Counties.

Ian Fein, Natural Resources Defense Council, San Francisco, California; Peter Huffman, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider a district court’s order remanding complaints to state court after the defendants had removed the complaints to federal court on eight separate grounds. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we have jurisdiction to review the remand order only to the extent it addresses whether removal was proper under § 1442(a)(1), *see Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 446 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2006), which authorizes removal by “any person acting under” a federal officer, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). We conclude that the defendants did not carry their burden of establishing this criteria for removal. Because we lack jurisdiction to review other aspects of the remand order, we dismiss the remainder of the appeal.

I

The County of San Mateo, the County of Marin, and the City of Imperial Beach filed three materially similar complaints in California state court against more than 30 energy companies in July 2017.¹ The complaints allege that the Energy Companies’ “extraction, refining, and/or formulation of fossil fuel products; their introduction of fossil fuel products into the stream of commerce; their wrongful promotion of their fossil fuel products and concealment of known hazards associated with use of those products; and their failure to pursue less hazardous alternatives available to them; is a substantial factor in causing the increase in global

¹ We refer to the plaintiffs collectively as the “Counties” and to the defendants collectively as the “Energy Companies.”

mean temperature and consequent increase in global mean sea surface height.” Based on these allegations, the complaints assert causes of action for public and private nuisance, strict liability for failure to warn, strict liability for design defect, negligence, negligent failure to warn, and trespass.

The Energy Companies removed the three complaints to federal court, asserting seven bases for subject-matter jurisdiction, including jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The three cases were assigned to Judge Vince G. Chhabria.

Shortly thereafter, the County of Santa Cruz, the City of Santa Cruz, and the City of Richmond filed materially similar complaints in California state court. The Energy Companies removed these cases to federal court as well, asserting the same seven bases for subject-matter jurisdiction,² and they were also assigned to Judge Chhabria.³

The Counties, in all six cases, moved to remand to state court based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In a reasoned opinion, the district court rejected all eight of the

² Marathon Petroleum Corporation raised an eighth ground for removal: that the complaints raised issues concerning maritime activities, giving rise to admiralty jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

³ The city attorneys of Oakland and San Francisco filed similar actions in California state court. Those cases were removed and assigned to Judge William H. Alsup, who subsequently dismissed the action for failure to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. *See City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018); *City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2018). In a concurrently filed opinion, we resolve the appeal from those cases. *See City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, — F.3d — (9th Cir. 2020).

grounds on which the Energy Companies relied for subject-matter jurisdiction, but the district court stayed its remand orders to give the Energy Companies an opportunity to appeal. “[W]e have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear [a] case.” *Atl. Nat’l Tr. LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.*, 621 F.3d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

II

Our authority to review an order remanding a case to state court is limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “[1] [a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, [2] except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” We consider the Energy Companies’ arguments that we may conduct a plenary review of the district court’s remand order under both of these clauses.

A

Although the first clause in § 1447(d) (the “non-reviewability clause”) broadly prohibits review of “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed,” the Supreme Court has interpreted this language narrowly as prohibiting review only if a remand order was issued based on a ground enumerated in § 1447(c).⁴ *Atl. Nat’l*

⁴ Section 1447(c) states, in pertinent part:

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be

Tr., 621 F.3d at 934 (citing *Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer*, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976)). When a district court bases its remand order on one of the grounds in § 1447(c)—i.e., the district court “remands based on subject matter jurisdiction [or] nonjurisdictional defects”—as opposed to, for example, based on a merits determination or concerns about a heavy docket, *id.* at 934–35, “review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand,” *Briscoe v. Bell*, 432 U.S. 404, 413 n.13 (1977). “[R]eview of the District Court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, to the extent it is permissible at all, should be limited to confirming that that characterization was colorable.” *Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc.*, 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007).

The Energy Companies argue that the district court’s order remanded the complaints on a ground that cannot be “colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction.” *Id.* Specifically, the Energy Companies contend that the district court remanded the complaints based on a merits determination when it held that “federal common law d[id] not govern the [Counties’] claims” and therefore “d[id] not preclude [the Counties] from asserting . . . state law claims.”

We reject this argument. The district court ordered remand based on its view that the cases were “improperly

made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.

removed to federal court” because the Energy Companies failed to show that “the case[s] . . . fit[] within one of a small handful of small boxes” providing for subject-matter jurisdiction. Put simply, the district court concluded that it “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Even if the district court erred in reaching this conclusion, “review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand.” *Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr.*, 547 U.S. 633, 642 (2006) (citing *Briscoe*, 432 U.S. at 413 n.13). To the extent *Powerex* requires that we determine whether the district court’s conclusion that “federal common law [d]id not govern the [Counties’] claims” was “at least arguable,” *Townsquare Media, Inc. v. Brill*, 652 F.3d 767, 775 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing *Atl. Nat’l Tr.*, 621 F.3d at 937–38, 940), we hold that it was, *see City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.*, — F.3d — (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the district court erred in concluding that there was subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiffs’ state-law nuisance claims were “necessarily governed by federal common law”).

B

We next consider the Energy Companies’ argument that the second clause of § 1447(d) (the “exception clause”) requires us to conduct plenary review of the district court’s remand order. We have interpreted the exception clause as giving us the authority to review the district court’s remand order only to the extent that the order addresses the statutory sections listed in the clause. *See Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.*, 446 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2006). In *Patel*, the defendants removed a state-court complaint to federal court under § 1443(1), which provides for removal of civil-rights cases. *Id.* The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion for remand on the ground that removal was not proper under

either § 1441 or § 1443(1). *Id.* We held that, under § 1447(d), we lacked jurisdiction “to review the remand order based on § 1441” and thus dismissed the defendants’ appeal to the extent it was based on that section. *Id.*⁵ At the same time, we held that we had jurisdiction “to review the remand order based on . . . § 1443(1).” *Id.* The reasoning in *Patel* applies directly to our case. Under § 1447(d), as interpreted in *Patel*, we have jurisdiction to review the Energy Companies’ appeal to the extent the remand order addresses § 1442(a)(1), but we lack jurisdiction to review their appeal from the portions of the remand order considering the seven other bases for subject-matter jurisdiction.

Arguing against this conclusion, the Energy Companies contend that when a suit is “removed pursuant to section 1442,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), the district court’s entire remand order is subject to plenary review. The Energy Companies base this argument on a Seventh Circuit case, *Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co.*, which concluded that because § 1447(d) authorizes appellate review of “an order,” it authorizes review of “the order itself,” not just “particular reasons for an order.” 792 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2015). In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit relied on *Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun*, which construed a statute (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)) giving appellate courts jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that a district court certifies for

⁵ *Patel* considered an earlier version of § 1447(d), which did not include § 1442 in the exception clause. See Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2, 125 Stat. 545, 546 (2011).

immediate appeal. 516 U.S. 199 (1996).⁶ *Yamaha* concluded that § 1292(b) gives an appellate court jurisdiction over “any issue fairly included within the certified order because ‘it is the *order* that is appealable, and not the controlling question identified by the district court.’” *Id.* at 205 (citation omitted).

The Energy Companies urge us to follow *Lu Junhong* notwithstanding our decision in *Patel* for two reasons. First, they argue that *Patel* has been abrogated by an act of Congress. After *Patel* was decided, Congress enacted the Removal Clarification Act of 2011, which amended § 1447(d) to allow for review of remand orders in cases removed pursuant to § 1442. *See* Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2, 125 Stat. 545, 546 (2011). According to the Energy Companies, Congress’s failure to amend the reference in § 1447(d) to orders “reviewable by appeal,” means that Congress intended to adopt *Yamaha*’s interpretive approach and therefore authorized plenary review of remand orders for cases removed pursuant to § 1442.⁷ Second, the Energy Companies argue that we are not bound by *Patel* because it was not well reasoned: it did not provide

⁶ Section 1292(b) provides that “[w]hen a district judge, in making . . . an order not otherwise appealable” determines that the order meets certain criteria and that “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order,” and “[t]he Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

⁷ The Energy Companies do not argue that *Yamaha* abrogated *Patel*, nor could they, given that *Yamaha* was decided in 1996—a decade before *Patel*—and thus is not “intervening higher authority.” *Miller v. Gammie*, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

any grounds for its conclusion that we lacked jurisdiction to conduct a plenary review of the remand order.

Both of these arguments implicate our doctrine of stare decisis. We have long held that “one three-judge panel . . . cannot reconsider or overrule the decision of a prior panel,” *United States v. Gay*, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 1992), unless “our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority,” *Miller v. Gammie*, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

There is no intervening judicial authority that would abrogate *Patel*. Neither the Supreme Court nor an en banc panel of this court has issued a decision after *Patel* was decided in 2006 that is clearly irreconcilable with *Patel*'s conclusion that § 1447(d) limits our review to the grounds for removal covered by the exception clause. Therefore, we consider only the effect of Congress's amendment of § 1447(d) in 2011.

Before Congress's amendment of § 1447(d), every circuit court that had addressed this issue agreed with our reading of § 1447(d).⁸ Although *Yamaha* was decided in 1996 (ten years before we decided *Patel*), no circuit court had applied *Yamaha* to § 1447(d) or discussed its applicability in that context. Therefore, when Congress amended § 1447(d) to

⁸ See *Alabama v. Conley*, 245 F.3d 1292, 1293 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001); *Davis v. Glanton*, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997); *Thornton v. Holloway*, 70 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 1995); *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baasch*, 644 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981); *Detroit Police Lieutenants & Sergeants Ass'n v. City of Detroit*, 597 F.2d 566, 567 (6th Cir. 1979); *Robertson v. Ball*, 534 F.2d 63, 66 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1976); *Noel v. McCain*, 538 F.2d 633, 635 (4th Cir. 1976).

insert “1442 or” before “1443,” Removal Clarification Act of 2011 § 2, it was against a backdrop of unanimous judicial interpretation of § 1447(d) as permitting review of only the grounds for removal identified in the exception clause. Congress did not give any indication that it intended to overrule the then-unanimous interpretation of § 1447(d) as limiting judicial review of a remand order to the grounds listed in the exception clause. We “presume that Congress acts ‘with awareness of relevant judicial decisions.’” *United States v. Alvarez-Hernandez*, 478 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *United States v. Male Juvenile*, 280 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002)). And “when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate [the statute’s] . . . judicial interpretations as well.” *Id.* (quoting *Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit*, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006)). Accordingly, we conclude that Congress did not abrogate *Patel* sub silentio but rather “inten[ded] to incorporate” *Patel*’s (and six other circuits’) interpretation of § 1447(d). *Id.* (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. *See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.*, 952 F.3d 452, 461 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he fact that Congress later added § 1442 as an exception to § 1447(d)’s no-appeal rule for remand orders does not undermine our holding . . . that appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review those grounds for removal that are specifically enumerated in § 1447(d).”). We therefore conclude that Congress’s amendment of § 1447(d) did not abrogate our interpretation in *Patel*.

The Energy Companies also argue that we are not bound by *Patel* because it was not well reasoned and failed to analyze *Yamaha* or the statutory interpretation arguments

discussed in *Lu Junhong*. Were we writing on a clean slate, we might conclude that *Lu Junhong* provides a more persuasive interpretation of § 1447(d) than *Patel*. *But see Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 459–60. Precedents, however, do not cease to be authoritative merely because counsel in a later case advances new arguments. *See United States v. Ramos-Medina*, 706 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (“This panel is not free to disregard the decision of another panel of our court simply because we think the arguments have been characterized differently or more persuasively.”). Therefore, we remain bound by *Patel* until abrogated by an intervening higher authority.

Applying *Patel*’s reading of § 1447(d), we may review the district court’s remand order only to the extent it addresses § 1442(a)(1). 446 F.3d at 998; *accord Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 461. Accordingly, we dismiss the Energy Companies’ appeals for lack of jurisdiction to the extent the Energy Companies seek review of the district court’s ruling as to other bases for subject-matter jurisdiction. *See Patel*, 446 F.3d at 1000.

III

We now turn to the single ground of removal that we have jurisdiction to review: the question whether the district court erred in holding that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). We review questions of statutory construction and subject-matter jurisdiction *de novo*. *Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.*, 139 F.3d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1998). The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for removal jurisdiction

have been met. *Leite v. Crane Co.*, 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014).

As currently drafted, § 1442(a)(1) provides for removal of:

A civil action . . . that is against or directed to . . . [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (*or any person acting under that officer*) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added).

In order to invoke § 1442(a)(1), a private person must establish: “(a) it is a person within the meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, and [the] plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a colorable federal defense.” *Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc.*, 939 F.3d 981, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Fidelitad, Inc. v. Insitu, Inc.*, 904 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2018)). To demonstrate a causal nexus, the private person must show: (1) that the person was “acting under” a federal officer in performing some “act under color of federal office,” and (2) that such action is causally connected with the plaintiffs’ claims. See *Goncalves ex rel. Goncalves v. Rady Children’s Hosp. San Diego*, 865 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017).

The parties focus on the first prong: whether the Energy Companies were “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. We begin by providing some background. The federal officer removal statute has existed in some version since 1815. *Willingham v. Morgan*, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969). Although Congress has amended the statute on a number of occasions, *see Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.*, 551 U.S. 142, 147–49 (2007), most recently in 2011, *see* Removal Clarification Act of 2011 § 2, the purpose of the statute has remained essentially the same: “The statute’s history and th[e] Court’s cases demonstrate that its basic purpose is to protect the Federal Government from the interference with its operations that would ensue were a State able, for example, to arrest and bring to trial in a State court for an alleged offense against the law of the State, officers and agents of the Government acting . . . within the scope of their authority.” *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 150 (cleaned up) (quoting *Willingham*, 395 U.S. at 406). Congress thought that allowing a federal officer to remove a state action was necessary because “[s]tate-court proceedings may reflect ‘local prejudice’ against unpopular federal laws or federal officials” and “deprive federal officials of a federal forum in which to assert federal immunity defenses.” *Id.* (citation omitted). Moreover, state-court proceedings may have the effect of impeding or delaying the enforcement of federal law. *Id.* The federal officer removal statute should be “liberally construed” to fulfill its purpose of allowing federal officials and agents who are being prosecuted in state court for acts taken in their federal authority to remove the case to federal court. *Id.* at 147 (citation omitted).

When Congress first enacted § 1442(a)(1), the phrase “officer of the United States” was generally understood as a term of art that referred to federal officers who “exercis[ed] significant authority.” *Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs*

of *Tulane Educ. Fund*, 500 U.S. 72, 81 (1991) (quoting *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)). In 1948, Congress amended the statute to include the language “person[s] acting under” any officer of the United States. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442, 62 Stat. 869, 938 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1442). At the time, this change was understood as extending the section to apply to employees, as well as officers. *Int’l Primate Prot. League*, 500 U.S. at 84 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A134 (1947)).

The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the term “person acting under that officer” as extending to a “private person” who has certain types of close relationships with the federal government. See *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 152–53. The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors courts should consider in determining whether a private person is “acting under” a federal officer for purposes of § 1442(a)(1). Among other things, the Court considers whether the person is acting on behalf of the officer in a manner akin to an agency relationship. See *id.* at 151 (private person must be authorized to act “with or for federal officers”); see also *Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1246 (holding that a private person qualified as “acting under” a federal officer when it was “serving as the government’s agent”); *Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Assocs., Inc.*, 797 F.3d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a company’s independent-contractor status supported the conclusion that it was not acting under a federal officer). The Court also considers whether the person is subject to the officer’s close direction, such as acting under the “subjection, guidance, or control” of the officer, or in a relationship which “is an unusually close one involving detailed regulation, monitoring, or supervision.” *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 151, 153 (citation omitted); see also *Leite*, 749 F.3d at 1120, 1124 (holding that a defense contractor

properly removed a case under § 1442(a)(1) based, in part, on “the Navy’s detailed specifications regulating the warnings that equipment manufacturers were required to provide”). Third, the Court considers whether the private person is assisting the federal officer in fulfilling “basic governmental tasks” that “the Government itself would have had to perform” if it had not contracted with a private firm. *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 153–54; *see also Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1246–47 (holding that private person fulfilled a basic governmental task by pursuing subrogation claims on behalf of a government agency). Finally, taking into account the purpose of § 1442(a)(1), the Court has considered whether the private person’s activity is so closely related to the government’s implementation of its federal duties that the private person faces “a significant risk of state-court ‘prejudice,’” just as a government employee would in similar circumstances, and may have difficulty in raising an immunity defense in state court. *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted).

As the Supreme Court has indicated, and circuit courts have held, a government contractor may meet the criteria for “acting under” an officer under certain circumstances. *See id.* at 153–54. *Watson* cited with approval a Fifth Circuit case, *Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.*, which held that a government contractor could remove a state action under § 1442(a) because the contractor was acting on behalf of the government to produce Agent Orange, a carcinogenic herbicide used as part of the war strategy in Vietnam, and was acting under the close direction of the federal government which had provided “detailed specifications concerning the make-up, packaging, and delivery of Agent Orange,” as well as “on-going supervision . . . over the formulation, packaging, and delivery of Agent Orange.” 149 F.3d 387, 399–400 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, the contractor provided a product that

was “used to help conduct a war” and at least arguably “performed a job that, in the absence of a contract with a private firm, the Government itself would have had to perform.” *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 153–54; *see also Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1246–47 (holding that a private contractor was “acting under” a federal officer when it was serving as an agent for the government and assisting the government in fulfilling basic duties).

By contrast, a person is not “acting under” a federal officer when the person enters into an arm’s-length business arrangement with the federal government or supplies it with widely available commercial products or services. *See Cabalce*, 797 F.3d at 727–29; *Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 463–64; *cf. Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1244–47; *Winters*, 149 F.3d at 398–400. Nor does a person’s “*compliance* with the law (or *acquiescence* to an order)” amount to “‘acting under,’ a federal officer who is giving an order or enforcing the law.” *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 152. This is true “even if the regulation is highly detailed and even if the private firm’s activities are highly supervised and monitored.” *Id.* at 153. We may not interpret § 1442(a) so as to “expand the scope of the statute considerably, potentially bringing within its scope state-court actions filed against private firms in many highly regulated industries.” *Id.*

The Energy Companies argue that they meet the criteria under § 1442(a) to remove the Counties’ complaints because they were “persons acting under” a federal officer based on three agreements with the government.⁹ They also argue that

⁹ We have held that corporations are “person[s]” under § 1442(a)(1), *Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1244, so there is no dispute that the Energy Companies meet this requirement.

there is a causal nexus between their actions under those agreements and the Counties' claims. We consider each of these agreements in turn.

We first consider CITGO's fuel supply agreements with the Navy Exchange Service Command (NEXCOM). Under these contracts, CITGO agreed to supply gasoline and diesel fuel to NEXCOM for service stations on approximately forty U.S. Navy installations. The government resold the CITGO fuel at NEXCOM facilities to individual service members. The Energy Companies point to three sets of contractual requirements in the fuel supply agreements which they claim establish the "subjection, guidance or control" necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction, namely: (1) "fuel specifications" that required compliance with specified American Society for Testing and Material Standards and required that NEXCOM have a qualified independent source analyze the products for compliance with those specifications; (2) provisions that give the Navy the right to inspect delivery, site, and operations; and (3) branding and advertising requirements.¹⁰

¹⁰ The Energy Companies cite the following sections in the fuel supply agreements. First, the fuel specification provisions require CITGO to "provide high quality gasoline product identical to or the same product as supplied [by] the contractor[']s commercially operated gasoline service station [e.g., regular leaded, regular unleaded, and premium unleaded]." The "[m]otor fuel products supplied" by CITGO were required to comply with the generic standards promulgated by the American Society for Testing and Materials, and the Navy agreed to "have a qualified independent source analyze the products provided [by CITGO]," including any product that was "suspected of being faulty/inferior." Second, the inspection provisions gave the Navy the right to "visually check truck compartment(s) before and after deliveries" of fuel and to conduct "general operational reviews," which "might also include inspections of . . . vehicles." Third, the branding provisions require CITGO to "supply all necessary equipment, including signage, for each facility," to

This argument fails. The provisions on which the Energy Companies rely “seem typical of any commercial contract” and are “incidental to sale and sound in quality assurance.” *Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 464. The contracts evince an arm’s-length business relationship to supply NEXCOM with generally available commercial products. *See id.* Supplying gasoline to the Navy for resale to its employees is not an activity so closely related to the government’s implementation of federal law that the person faces “a significant risk of state-court prejudice.” *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 152. Accordingly, we hold that CITGO was not “acting under” a federal officer by supplying gasoline and diesel fuel to NEXCOM pursuant to fuel supply contracts.

Second, the Energy Companies point to the 1944 unit agreement¹¹ for the petroleum reserves at Elk Hills between Standard Oil Company of California (Chevron Corporation’s predecessor in interest) and the U.S. Navy. We have detailed the history of this unit agreement at length in our prior decisions. *See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.*, 545 F.2d 624, 626–28 (9th Cir. 1976). In brief, Standard owned one-fifth and the Navy owned four-fifths of the

“incorporate the Government logo on at least three . . . provided signage fixtures,” and to supply “[a] standard service station rotating-fixed neon or incandescent street corner station identification sign . . . for each Government fueling station.” And CITGO could submit “proposals on [CITGO] branded products,” but the government was not obligated to market “said product under [CITGO’s] brand or trade name.”

¹¹ “A unit agreement was at that time and still is a common arrangement in the petroleum industry where two or more owners have interests in a common pool. Under such an arrangement, the pool is operated as a unit and the parties share production and costs in agreed-upon proportions.” *United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California*, 545 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1976).

approximately 46,000 acres comprising the Elk Hills reserves. As is common in the oil exploration and production industry, the two landowners entered into a unit agreement to coordinate operations in the oil field and production of the oil. Because the Navy sought to limit oil production in order to ensure the availability of oil reserves in the event of a national emergency, the unit agreement required that both Standard and the Navy curtail their production and gave the Navy “exclusive control over the exploration, prospecting, development, and operation of the Reserve.” To compensate Standard for reducing production, the unit agreement gave Standard the right to produce a specified amount of oil per day (an average of 15,000 barrels per day). Both parties could dispose of the oil they extracted as they saw fit, and neither had a “preferential right to purchase any portion of the other’s share of [the] production.”

Standard’s activities under the unit agreement did not give rise to a relationship where Standard was “acting under” a federal officer for purposes of § 1442. Standard was not acting on behalf of the federal government in order to assist the government perform a basic government function. Rather, Standard and the government reached an agreement that allowed them to coordinate their use of the oil reserve in a way that would benefit both parties: the government maintained oil reserves for emergencies, and Standard ensured its ability to produce oil for sale. When Standard extracted oil from the reserve, Standard was acting independently, *see Cabalce*, 797 F.3d at 728–29, not as the Navy’s “agent,” *Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1246; *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, pt. 1, at 3 (2011) (“Removal is allowed only when the acts of Federal defendants are essentially ordered or demanded by Federal authority . . .”). And Standard’s arm’s-length business arrangement with the Navy does not

involve conduct so closely related to the government's implementation of federal law that the Energy Companies would face "a significant risk of state-court 'prejudice.'" *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 152.¹²

Finally, we consider the Energy Companies' lease agreements, entitled "Oil and Gas Leases of Submerged Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act." Under these standard-form leases, the government grants the lessee the right to explore and produce oil and gas resources in the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf, and in exchange the lessee agrees to pay the government rents and royalties. The Energy Companies argue that the lessee Energy Companies were "acting under" a federal officer because the leases require that the lessees drill for oil and gas pursuant to government-approved exploration plans and that the lessees sell some of their production to certain buyers; specifically, lessees must offer twenty percent of their production to "small or independent refiners" and must give

¹² At oral argument, the Energy Companies argued for the first time that Standard was "acting under" a federal officer pursuant to the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-258, § 201, 90 Stat. 303 (1976), which directed the Secretary of the Navy to "produce such reserves [including the Elk Hill reserve] at the maximum efficient rate consistent with sound engineering practices for a period not to exceed six years" and to "sell or otherwise dispose of the United States share of such petroleum produced from such reserves." § 201, 90 Stat. at 308. Nothing in the record indicates that the Secretary of the Navy "ordered or demanded," H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, pt. 1, at 3 (2011), *reprinted in* 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420, 422, that Standard produce oil on behalf of the Navy, *see also Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 471 ("[W]e are left wanting for pertinent details about Standard's role in operating the Elk Hills Reserve and producing oil therefrom on behalf of the Navy."). Therefore, the Energy Companies' reliance on this Act is misplaced.

the United States the right of first refusal in time of war or “when the President of the United States shall so prescribe.”

This argument also fails. The leases do not require that lessees act on behalf of the federal government, under its close direction, or to fulfill basic governmental duties. Nor are lessees engaged in an activity so closely related to the government’s function that the lessee faces “a significant risk of state-court ‘prejudice.’” *Id.* In fact, the lease requirements largely track legal requirements, for instance, that the lessee offer 20 percent of the “crude oil, condensate, and natural gas liquids produced on [the] lease . . . to small or independent refiners,” 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(7), and that “[i]n time of war, or when the President shall so prescribe, the United States shall have the right of first refusal to purchase at the market price all or any portion of any mineral produced from the outer Continental Shelf,” 43 U.S.C. § 1341(b). Mere “compl[iance] with the law, even if the laws are ‘highly detailed, and thus leave [an] entity ‘highly regulated,’” does not show that the entity is “acting under” a federal officer. *Goncalves*, 865 F.3d at 1245 (quoting *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 151–53). We agree with the Fourth Circuit that “the willingness to lease federal property or mineral rights to a private entity for the entity’s own commercial purposes, without more” cannot be “characterized as the type of assistance that is required” to show that the private entity is “acting under” a federal officer. *Baltimore*, 952 F.3d at 465. Accordingly, the leases on which the defendants rely do not give rise to the “unusually close” relationship where the lessee was “acting under” a federal officer. *Watson*, 551 U.S. at 153.

Because we conclude that the Energy Companies have not carried their burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that they were “acting under” a federal officer, we do not reach the question whether actions pursuant to the fuel supply agreement, unit agreement, or lease agreement had a causal nexus with the Counties’ complaints, or whether the Energy Companies can assert a colorable federal defense. *See Fidelitad*, 904 F.3d at 1099.

We affirm the district court to the extent it held there was no subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and we dismiss the remainder of the appeals for lack of jurisdiction under § 1447(d).

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.¹³

¹³ The Counties’ Motion for Partial Dismissal (ECF No. 41) is **GRANTED**. *See Patel*, 446 F.3d at 1000. Costs shall be taxed against the Energy Companies.