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The Honorable Robert J. Bryan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

LIGHTHOUSE RESOURCES, INC., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

and

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v.

JAY INSLEE, *et al.*,

Defendants,

and

WASHINGTON ENVIRONMENTAL
COUNCIL, *et al.*,

Defendant-Intervenors.

No. 3:18-cv-05005-RJB

DEFENDANTS' JOINT RESPONSE TO
ORDER REGARDING APPLICABLE LAW

1 State Defendants Jay Inslee and Maia Bellon (“Ecology”) and Defendant-Intervenors
 2 Washington Environmental Council *et al.* (“WEC”) jointly respond to the Court’s Order
 3 Regarding Applicable Law, Dkt. 309. It is unquestionable that all challenges to the substance of
 4 a § 401 denial must be brought in state court. Because the Pollution Control Hearings Board
 5 upheld Ecology’s denial of the § 401 certification based on the unchallenged Final
 6 Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”), the Court cannot find that there has been
 7 discrimination. The undisputed findings of the FEIS resolve Lighthouse’s *Pike* balance
 8 Commerce Clause claims as well. There are no relevant facts left for this Court to adjudicate;
 9 the Court should resolve the dormant and foreign commerce clause legal issues through the
 10 pending summary judgment motions. The factors for *Pullman* abstention have also been met.¹

12 ***First***, state tribunals are the exclusive fora for challenging § 401 decisions. *See Ackels v.*
 13 *EPA*, 7 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Petitioners’ only recourse is to challenge the state
 14 certification in state judicial proceedings.”); *Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 102 F.3d 1273, 1300
 15 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing cases “hold[ing] that the state courts are the only fora in which to
 16 challenge whatever requirements the state adds, beyond the minimum required by the [Clean
 17 Water Act]”); *Roosevelt Campobello v. EPA*, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982) (“federal
 18 courts and agencies are without authority to review the validity of requirements imposed under
 19 state law or in a state’s certification”); *Lake Erie All. for Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army*

22 _____
 23 ¹ The Court stated (at 2) that “there are other permits and events at issue within the scope of the
 24 case.” To the contrary, although Lighthouse’s Complaint challenged actions by the Washington
 25 Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), the Court dismissed those challenges and DNR’s
 26 Director as a party. Dkt. 170. The only remaining action challenged in this case is Ecology’s §
 27 401 denial, and the only remaining challenge is under the Commerce Clause. While
 28 Lighthouse’s prayer for relief asks the Court to enjoin Ecology from using SEPA “to block the
 terminal,” Dkt. 290 at 6, this case does not (and could not) involve a challenge to the Washington
 SEPA process, the FEIS, or the Cowlitz County Hearing Examiner shoreline permit denial.

1 *Corps of Engineers*, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“To the extent that this particular
 2 question may raise federal issues, we agree with the finding of the Administrative Review Board
 3 and the Ohio Court of Appeals that the state certification under the Clean Water Act is set up as
 4 the exclusive prerogative of the state and is not to be reviewed by any agency of the federal
 5 government.”); 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (“Review and appeals of limitations and conditions
 6 attributable to State certification shall be made through the applicable procedures of the State and
 7 may not be made through the procedures in this part.”). To be sure, this Court has jurisdiction
 8 over federal constitutional claims, but state courts have exclusive jurisdictional over substantive
 9 challenges to § 401 decisions.
 10

11 ***Second***, Lighthouse’s Commerce Clause claim of “discrimination”—that there was a
 12 pretextual reason for the § 401 denial—is a substantive challenge to the merits of the § 401
 13 denial that Lighthouse cannot prosecute here. It does not matter that Lighthouse frames its
 14 challenge under the Commerce Clause; as many of its hundreds of exhibits and witnesses show,
 15 Lighthouse seeks to undermine and question the § 401 decision-making process and the validity
 16 of the § 401 decision itself. In fact, Lighthouse’s desired trial would lead to hundreds of exhibits
 17 and dozens of witnesses attempting to relitigate substantive environmental issues that the FEIS
 18 grappled with for years. That is not a proper role for this Court. Such challenges must be
 19 brought, if brought at all, in state court.²
 20

21 The Hearings Board held that, under SEPA and the federal Clean Water Act, Ecology
 22 “lawfully employed its SEPA substantive authority to deny Millennium’s § 401 Certification
 23 request based on the significant adverse environmental impacts identified in the FEIS.” Dkt.
 24

25
 26 ² Which Lighthouse has done, *see Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview, LLC v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology*, No. 18-2-00994 (Cowlitz County Superior Court) (complaint filed at Dkt. 304-1).

1 130-6 at 19. As the Court explained (at 2-4), the Board’s order affirming the validity of
2 Ecology’s § 401 denial is entitled to preclusive effect under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28
3 U.S.C. § 1738, the principles of collateral estoppel, and Washington state court precedent. *See*
4 *also* Dkt. 211, WEC Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-11; Dkt. 227, Ecology Motion for
5 Summary Judgment at 15.

6
7 Because the appropriate administrative tribunal has upheld the § 401 denial based on
8 application of the unchallenged FEIS, Lighthouse may not relitigate the validity of the § 401
9 denial—which cuts out the heart of its dormant Commerce Clause claim. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 262,
10 Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Summary Judgment on Commerce Clause at 2 (“The record is replete with
11 factual issues concerning Defendants’ discriminatory actions and shows that there is no
12 legitimate basis for the 401 Denial.”); *id.* at 14 (“The 401 Denial did not derive from—or even
13 accurately reflect—the conclusions in the FEIS.”); *id.* at 29 (“[T]he 401 Denial materially
14 diverges from the FEIS on which it purports to rely, creating core fact issues that should be
15 resolved at trial; *id.* at 51 (“The 401 Denial’s reliance on non-water quality potential impacts ...
16 raises serious questions about whether the 401 Denial constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s
17 delegated water quality authority under Section 401.”) (emphasis omitted). Lighthouse’s
18 Commerce Clause theory violates the principle that “a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a
19 defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he
20 subsequently seeks to raise,” including “when the issue has been decided by an administrative
21 agency ... which acts in a judicial capacity. *Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino*, 501
22 U.S. 104, 107–08 (1991).

23
24 ***Third***, the unchallenged findings of the FEIS foreclose Lighthouse’s *Pike* balance
25 Commerce Clause claims. The Court noted (Order at 5) that if this case proceeded to trial, there
26

1 “might not be much left to do except, perhaps, a *Pike* balancing.” With respect, defendants
2 submit that there is nothing left to do at trial at all.

3 With no valid issue of discrimination, a *Pike* balancing only addresses two questions—
4 (1) whether the § 401 denial imposes a significant burden on interstate commerce; and (2)
5 whether the alleged benefits of the § 401 denial are illusory. On the first question, the
6 unchallenged FEIS Coal Market Study (Dkt. 213-2) supplies the answer: there is no impact from
7 the § 401 denial to the coal export market because U.S. exports “would mostly replace
8 internationally produced coal.” Market Study at 6-11. The FEIS, which extensively studied the
9 impacts of operating the terminal to both coal production and consumption, found only modest
10 change in the U.S. production from current levels if the terminal were not built. Market Study at
11 6-10. In fact, even using the calculations of Lighthouse’s expert, Mr. Schwartz, the terminal at
12 full build-out would add less than one quarter of one percent to the international coal import-
13 export market. *See* WEC Motion for Summary Judgment at 14. Because the *Pike* analysis
14 “protects the interstate market, not particular firms,” *Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland*, 437
15 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978), the alleged impact to Lighthouse’s ability to make money is not
16 cognizable under the Commerce Clause.
17

18
19 On the second question, the reasons for the § 401 denial are real and significant, and
20 Lighthouse can present no evidence to make them illusory.³ The FEIS documented in detail the
21 nine significant and unavoidable impacts that would be caused by the construction and operation
22 of the coal terminal. Lighthouse may disagree with the numeric value of the public health,
23 safety, and environmental benefits that flow from the § 401 denial, but even Lighthouse’s experts
24

25 ³ Ecology denied the § 401 certification for two sets of reasons: the significant unavoidable
26 harms found in the FEIS and Millennium’s admitted failure to supply reasonable assurances that
27 water quality standards would be met.

1 acknowledge that there are benefits. *See, e.g.*, Berkman Rebuttal Report at 8-9 (Dkt. 213-14.)
 2 No witnesses or evidence are needed to address the benefits side of the *Pike* balance, particularly
 3 as the § 401 denial relied for part of its decision on the FEIS's unchallenged findings.

4 ***Fourth***, if the Court is disinclined to conclusively resolve this case on summary
 5 judgment, this situation meets the test for *Pullman* abstention. Order at 5-6; Dkt. 62,
 6 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Abstain; Dkt. 105, Reply re Motion to Dismiss and Abstain.
 7 Denial of the § 401 involves state land-use law and is a sensitive area of social policy;
 8 Lighthouse's constitutional claims could be avoided by a state court ruling in its favor; and this
 9 Court cannot predict how the state law issues of first impression will be resolved. *See Sinclair*
 10 *Oil Corp. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara*, 96 F.3d 401, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). There is no point in having
 11 a 12-day trial with hundreds of exhibits and hundreds of hours of witnesses when ongoing state
 12 court litigation will either moot this case by giving Lighthouse the relief it seeks or present this
 13 case in a different posture for the Court's review. Order at 5-6, citing *Rollsman v. City of Los*
 14 *Angeles*, 737 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1984).

15 Respectfully submitted this 8th day of April, 2019

16
 17 ROBERT W. FERGUSON
 18 Attorney General

EARTHJUSTICE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 8, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of this filing to the attorneys of record and all registered participants.

Dated this 8th day of April, 2019.

s/ Kristen L. Boyles

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