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10  
11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
12 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION  
13

14 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  
15 INFORMATION CENTER, KLAMATH-  
SISKIYOU WILDLANDS CENTER, and  
16 SIERRA FOREST LEGACY,

17 Plaintiffs,

18 vs.

19 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, *et al.*,

20 Defendants,

21 and

22 AM. FOREST RESOURCE COUNCIL, *et al.*,

23 Defendant-Intervenors.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

Case No.: 3:16-cv-06040-WHA

**PLAINTIFFS' COMBINED  
OPPOSITION TO CROSS-MOTIONS  
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and  
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Date: May 3, 2018

Time: 8 a.m.

Judge: Hon. William Alsup

Place: Courtroom 8

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## INTRODUCTION

1  
2 After conducting a decades'-long scientific review and proposing to list the Pacific fisher as  
3 threatened under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), at the last hour the Fish and Wildlife Service  
4 ("Service") abruptly reversed course and withdrew its proposal. To defend the Service's "Listing  
5 Withdrawal," the Service and industry intervenors now seek to mischaracterize this case as one in  
6 which the Service received persuasive new scientific data showing that the species is no longer at  
7 risk. The record, however, demonstrates otherwise.

8 The record shows—and the Service's own staff acknowledged—that the best available  
9 science did not meaningfully change after the Service published its proposed listing rule. There is  
10 still no question that the Pacific fisher was nearly extirpated by trapping and rampant logging around  
11 the turn of the 20th century, and that only two small native populations survive today. There is still  
12 no question that these two native populations face an inherent risk of extinction due to their small  
13 population size. And there is still no question that they face increasing threats from multiple factors,  
14 including exposure to toxicants and high-severity wildfire driven by climate change.

15 Ultimately, it was not new scientific information that caused the Service to reverse course  
16 and abandon its proposed listing rule only a few months before the court-ordered deadline for it to be  
17 finalized. Rather, the record shows that the Service withdrew the proposal because its Regional  
18 Director misconstrued three population studies as evidence that the two native populations are  
19 "basically stable." But in fact, the studies upon which the Regional Director relied do not show the  
20 populations are stable. At best, the demographic studies are—and have always been—inconclusive  
21 with regard to the Pacific fisher's current population trend. As such, they cannot provide a rational  
22 basis for the Service's Listing Withdrawal. Nor does the Service's desire for hypothetical better data  
23 establishing conclusively the extent to which well-documented threats are currently impacting  
24 fishers provide a legal basis for dismissing the "*best scientific and commercial data available*"  
25 demonstrating that Pacific fishers are at serious risk of extinction within the foreseeable future  
26 throughout all or a significant portion of their range. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). Plaintiffs ask this  
27 Court to set aside the Service's illegal Listing Withdrawal and order the Service to publish a new  
28 final determination within 90 days that comports with the ESA.

**ARGUMENT****I. The Listing Withdrawal Was Not Based on New Information, but on the Service’s Arbitrary Conclusion That Pacific Fisher Populations Are Stable.**

Defendants claim incorrectly that the Service’s Listing Withdrawal was prompted by a significant change in the best available scientific information that occurred after the Service published its proposed listing rule. *See* Fed. Defendants’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF 57) (“Service Br.”) at 1; Def.-Intervenors’ Notice of Mot., Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF 58) (“Intervenor Br.”) at 2, 7–11. In fact, the record is clear that the best available scientific information available did not meaningfully change after the Service proposed listing the Pacific fisher in 2014. Instead, the Service’s own Regional Listing Coordinator confirmed that “[w]e re-evaluated the existing information [and] came to a different conclusion about it.” AR 129266. *See also* AR 133155 (“[W]e previously drew conclusions based on information. We’re now drawing different conclusions on that same information.”); AR 132600 (draft memo explaining that the Service “re-evaluated the best available information used for the proposed listing rule and came to a different conclusion”). Indeed, the Service’s Listing Coordinator cautioned that “saying the new information supports our conclusion is misleading.” AR 129266.

Rather than new information, Service staff explained that the reversal “hinged” on the Regional Director’s new interpretation of the available population trend data. AR 126177. Whereas the Service had previously viewed the available population trend data as unclear, *see, e.g.*, AR 000693, the Regional Director decided to interpret the trend data as showing fisher populations are no longer declining and—to quote the Listing Withdrawal—“basically stable.” AR 000718. In the words of the Service’s Chief of Listing and Recovery, the Regional Director’s “rationale for withdrawal” was “basically based on an acknowledgment that there are threats out there, but they are not being manifested on the ground (e.g., not seeing declining populations).” AR 134274. The Regional Director’s determination in this regard is reflected throughout the Listing Withdrawal, which repeatedly cites the lack of population declines, or lack of “operative” or “manifested” threats, as the reason for dismissing well-documented threats to the fisher’s continued existence. *See, e.g.*, AR 000735 (summarizing the Listing Withdrawal’s reasoning that the Pacific fisher “does not meet

1 the definition of an endangered or threatened species under the Act” as based on (1) the lack of  
2 “significant impacts at either the population or rangewide scales”; and the fact that (2) “the fisher is  
3 not exhibiting population declines in any portion of its range”); AR 000730 (Listing Withdrawal  
4 dismissing cumulative threats to small populations on the basis that the fisher populations are not  
5 “experiencing population declines or further reductions in distribution, which would be indicative of  
6 [cumulative] impacts”); AR 000727 (Listing Withdrawal dismissing threat of toxicants on the basis  
7 that the Pacific fisher “is not experiencing significant impacts at either the population or rangewide  
8 scales, currently or in the foreseeable future”); AR 000721 (Listing Withdrawal dismissing threat  
9 from high-severity wildfire on basis that there are “no surveys or other information [showing] this  
10 stressor to be functioning as an operative threat on the fisher’s habitat to the degree we considered to  
11 be the case at the time of the proposed listing”).

12 In short, the Service’s Listing Withdrawal was not based on any new science discounting the  
13 threats that had initially led the Service to propose to list the Pacific fisher. Rather, the crux of the  
14 agency’s decision was the Regional Director’s assertion that the “threats out there” are not currently  
15 causing population declines. AR 134274.

16 **II. The Available Population Trend Data Is at Best Inconclusive and Therefore Does Not**  
17 **Provide a Rational Basis for the Service’s Conclusion That Pacific Fisher Populations**  
18 **Are “Basically Stable” and Well-Documented Threats Are Not “Operative.”**

19 As explained above, the key driver of the decision to withdraw the proposal to protect the  
20 Pacific fisher under the Endangered Species Act was the Regional Director’s view that the native  
21 Pacific fisher populations are “basically stable,” AR 000718, and that therefore “no portion” of the  
22 Pacific fisher population is at risk, AR 000735. Because the population studies in front of the Service  
23 did not show that the Pacific fisher populations are stable, however, this conclusion was arbitrary  
24 and capricious, and the Listing Withdrawal should be set aside.

25 As detailed in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, the Listing Withdrawal cites four demographic  
26 studies for its conclusion that the native Pacific fisher populations are “stable.” Pls.’ Opening Br. at  
27 19-22. Discounting any reliance on the “inconclusive” 2013 study by Zielinski of the North Coast  
28 population, the Service now claims it relied on only three key population studies to support the  
Listing Withdrawal: the Sweitzer study of the Southern Sierra native population, and the Hoopa and

1 Eastern Klamath studies of the North Coast native population. Service Br. at 12–13.<sup>1</sup> The Service  
2 fails to show, however, how these limited and inconclusive studies rationally support the Listing  
3 Withdrawal.

4 The Sweitzer study of the Southern Sierra population does not support the Service’s  
5 conclusion that the Southern Sierra population is no longer at risk. The study found an estimated  
6 population growth rate of .97, and concluded that “[w]e believe that the combination of a population  
7 growth rate slightly below 1.0, small population size and low density, multiple challenges to survival  
8 and reproduction, and damage to habitat from wildfires warrants concern for the viability of the  
9 fisher population in our study area.” AR 024639. Defendants argue that because the confidence  
10 interval of the study straddled 1 (with 1 indicating a stable population), the Service could interpret  
11 the confidence interval as meaning that “the population studies in this case are clear” and “there is  
12 no evidence that the population is in decline.” Service Br. at 18; *see also* Intervenor Br. at 18–19  
13 (“confidence intervals bounding 1.0 for the growth rate” indicates “that the growth rate is not  
14 statistically different from 1.0”); Listing Withdrawal at AR 000728 (“because the confidence  
15 intervals include 1, this indicates a statistically stable trend”). Defendants misunderstand the basics  
16 of confidence intervals.

17 In this case, the confidence interval of the population studies represents a range of numbers  
18 within which the true population growth rate likely falls. But within the confidence interval, any of  
19 the values could represent the true population trend. “[F]or example, if the upper and lower limits of  
20 a confidence interval are .90 and 2.50, there is just as great a chance that the true result is 2.50 as  
21 .90.” Wayne LaMorte, *Confidence Intervals and p-Values*, Boston University School of Public  
22 Health (last updated Jun. 16, 2016), [http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-](http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/EP/EP713_RandomError/EP713_RandomError6.html)  
23 [Modules/EP/EP713\\_RandomError/EP713\\_RandomError6.html](http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/EP/EP713_RandomError/EP713_RandomError6.html). Another way to understand  
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25 <sup>1</sup> Intervenor claim that the “Service considered numerous other studies and reported data.”  
26 Intervenor Br. at 21. Among the studies Intervenor cite to is a population modeling study that  
27 gauged the risk of extinction of the Southern Sierra population and “found that the population has a  
28 very high likelihood of extinction given reasonable assumptions with respect to demographic  
parameters.” AR 022647. Intervenor do not explain how any of these other studies support the  
Listing Withdrawal.

1 confidence intervals is as a test of whether a “null hypothesis” about a population trend can be  
2 rejected. If the null hypothesis—for instance, that the population is stable—is contained within the  
3 confidence interval, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. *See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.*  
4 *Rauch*, 244 F. Supp. 3d 66, 89–90 (D.D.C. 2017). This means that when a confidence interval for  
5 population growth spans 1, it is equally likely that the population is increasing, decreasing, or  
6 stable—and none of these possibilities can be rejected. This correct understanding of confidence  
7 intervals is contained in the Service’s Final Species Report. AR 022641 (explaining it is difficult to  
8 determine if a population is increasing or decreasing when a population growth rate confidence  
9 interval spans 1); *see also* AR 067328–29 (Service scientist explaining that a confidence interval  
10 spanning 1 is “an indication of uncertainty about the population trend”); Service Br. at 13 (admitting  
11 that “trend variation around 1.0 does not necessarily indicate either a steady decline or increase”).

12 A confidence interval spanning 1 therefore does not mean that the population is “statistically  
13 stable.” AR 000728. And it certainly doesn’t mean that “there is no evidence that the population is in  
14 decline.” Service Br. at 18. Rather, it means that the population may be increasing, or it may be  
15 decreasing, or it may stable, and the Service does not have the ability to reject any of these  
16 possibilities. Basic rules of statistics dictate that the Service may not view uncertainty about whether  
17 a population is increasing, decreasing, or stable as a panoply of options from which it may pick its  
18 favored conclusion. This is not a “policy disagreement,” Service Br. at 15; it is just not how  
19 confidence intervals work. The Sweitzer study does not demonstrate that the Southern Sierra  
20 population is stable, and the Service’s reliance on it to support the Listing Withdrawal was arbitrary  
21 and capricious.

22 The D.C. District Court rejected this exact misuse of confidence intervals in *Natural*  
23 *Resources Defense Council, Inc.* There, the National Marine Fisheries Service decided not to list the  
24 blueback herring as threatened under the Endangered Species Act because it concluded that most of  
25 the herring’s populations were stable. The studies at issue there were of population abundance,  
26 where “zero” indicated no change in abundance. Just like here, the Fisheries Service based its  
27 conclusion that the populations were stable on the fact that the studies’ confidence intervals  
28 contained zero. *Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 89. The court rejected this

1 conclusion as an “error of logic.” *Id.* at 93. The court explained that the fact that the confidence  
2 interval included zero meant that, statistically, the Fisheries Service could not reject the null  
3 hypothesis that the population was stable. But, the court explained, the fact that the Service could not  
4 reject the possibility of a stable population did not rationally support the Service’s conclusion that  
5 the population “was, in fact, stable.” *Id.* at 94; *see also id.* at 91 (“reasoned decisionmaking does not  
6 permit an agency to conclude, based on a failure to reject the null hypothesis and without further  
7 analysis, that the null hypothesis is true”). The court held that the Fisheries Service had failed to  
8 offer a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions drawn, and set aside the  
9 agency’s conclusion that the blueback herring should not be listed as threatened under the ESA. *Id.*  
10 at 94. The same conclusion should be reached here: just because the confidence interval of the  
11 Sweitzer study included the possibility that the Southern Sierra population was stable does not give  
12 the Service a rational basis to conclude that the population “was, in fact, stable.” *Id.* at 94; *see also*  
13 *Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Associations v. Gutierrez*, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1164, 1168 (E.D.  
14 Cal. 2008) (holding that the Fisheries Service’s conclusion that the winter-run Chinook salmon  
15 population was recovering was arbitrary and capricious when the Service had acknowledged, based  
16 on a study with a population growth rate of .97 and a confidence interval of .87–1.09, that the  
17 population may be declining).

18 For the North Coast population, the two available studies were also inconclusive. As an  
19 initial matter, the Service’s Final Species Report acknowledged that both studies sampled very small  
20 areas (only .62% of fisher habitat), and determined that “given the small portion of the North Coast  
21 population sampled by the two study areas . . . *it is difficult to determine whether the North Coast*  
22 *population as a whole is increasing, decreasing, or stable.*” AR 022641 (emphasis added).

23 Defendants do not attempt to square what the Final Species Report rightly determined (it is not clear  
24 whether the population is increasing or decreasing) with what the Listing Withdrawal wrongly  
25 concluded (the population is “essentially stable”), AR 000729. Rather, they repeat their erroneous  
26 assertion, rejected in *Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, that because the confidence intervals  
27 in the studies spanned 1, the Service was entitled transform statistical uncertainty about population  
28

1 growth into certainty that the population is stable. Service Br. at 12–13; Intervenor Br. at 20–21.  
2 Again, this was not a rational conclusion. *Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. at 88–96.

3 Defendants’ argument that these studies are “the best scientific and commercial data  
4 available” is misplaced. Service Br. at 13, 15; Intervenor Br. at 18. Plaintiffs take no issue with the  
5 quality of the studies themselves, or argue that they should be ignored. The issue is with the  
6 Service’s misinterpretation of these limited and inconclusive studies as showing “essentially stable”  
7 populations, and the shoehorning of this erroneous conclusion to erase seventeen years of  
8 administrative analysis supporting the listing of this critically depleted and fragile species. *Nat. Res.*  
9 *Def. Council, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 94 (noting that National Marine Fisheries’ Service  
10 misinterpretation of confidence intervals “was hardly a complex judgment about sampling  
11 methodology and data analysis; it was a simple error of logic” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
12 Whether or not they are the “best” studies available, ambiguous studies of population trends cannot  
13 provide “evidence of a conclusion that the studies do not support.” *Pollinator Stewardship Council*  
14 *v. Env’tl. Prot. Agency*, 806 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “[n]either logic nor  
15 precedent” could sustain the position that a study that was inconclusive as to the risk of a pesticide  
16 on bees affirmatively proved that there was no risk to bees).

17 Defendants point to no case where a court allowed the Service to rely on inconclusive  
18 population studies to support a determination that a species did not merit listing. And their attempts  
19 to distinguish cases where courts rejected this approach fail.

20 This case is similar to *Tucson Herpetological Society*, where the Ninth Circuit rejected  
21 reliance on a single population study, which did not clearly show a declining population of horned  
22 lizards in two discrete sections of the lizard’s range, for the “sweeping conclusion that viable lizard  
23 populations persist throughout most of the species’ current range.” See Pls.’ Opening Br. at 22,  
24 quoting *Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar*, 566 F.3d 870, 879 (9th Cir. 2009). The Service  
25 argues that the present case is different, because although it agrees the Service was wrong to rely on  
26 only one ambiguous study in *Tucson Herpetological Society*, here the Service has relied on three.  
27 Service Br. at 18. But the Ninth Circuit did not hold that the Service’s irrational reliance on an  
28 ambiguous study could be cured by irrational reliance on a second ambiguous study, or a third. The

1 Service misses the takeaway lesson from the case: the Service may not rely on limited, ambiguous  
2 studies to make sweeping conclusions about a species' persistence. *Tucson Herpetological Soc'y*,  
3 566 F.3d 870; *see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 88-91 (rejecting the Fisheries  
4 Service's misinterpretation of four population abundance studies). Intervenor Br. at 22. The  
5 different because they claim, with no citation to the record, that the Service evaluated evidence that  
6 Pacific fisher populations have been stable over a long period of time. Intervenor Br. at 22. The  
7 record does not support this assertion. Indeed, the longest population study of fishers on the Hoopa  
8 Reservation between 1998–2013, cited by the Service, in fact noted that fisher density declined  
9 dramatically—by 73%—between 1998–2004 and did not recover from the decline between 2004–  
10 2013. AR 012929, AR 012951.

11 Defendants' attempt to distinguish *Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt* is similarly unavailing.  
12 There, the court rejected the Service's conclusion that although the lynx had declined at the turn of  
13 the century, the lynx was not in need of listing because the population trend had reversed in some  
14 areas. The court found this was counter to the studies in the record, which had found the lynx had  
15 dramatically declined with no associated increases and was in "serious trouble." *Defenders of*  
16 *Wildlife v. Babbitt*, 958 F. Supp. 670, 682 (D.D.C. 1997). Just like with the lynx, Pacific fisher  
17 populations declined dramatically at the turn of the century, have not rebounded, and the population  
18 studies the Service relied on confirmed it remains vulnerable to extinction due to the small  
19 population size of its remaining native populations and multiple challenges to survival. *See, e.g.*,  
20 AR 024639 (Southern Sierra population study expressing "concern for the viability of the fisher  
21 population in our study area"); AR 012961 (Hoopa study of North Coast population noting that  
22 stressors "continue to threaten the long-term persistence of fisher populations in the Pacific states").  
23 The Service argues that this case is different, because here the population studies are "clear," and  
24 "there is no evidence that the population is in decline." Service Br. at 18. But as explained above,  
25 none of the studies the Service relied on are "clear," and none rule out the possibility of population  
26 decline. *See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 88-91 (explaining basics of interpreting  
27 confidence intervals). Intervenor Br. at 22. But this is  
28 the Service made unsupported statements containing factual errors. Intervenor Br. at 22. But this is

1 exactly the case here, where the Service has relied on unclear studies of population growth for the  
2 unsupported, blanket conclusion that the Pacific fisher’s populations are stable.

3 Nor is *U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service* helpful to Defendants. Intervenor Br. at 22–23, citing  
4 *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service*, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1279–82 (N.D.  
5 Cal. 2017). There the Service concluded that coastal marten populations in California were not  
6 declining because it lacked current data confirming continued declines. The court, quoting *Tucson*  
7 *Herpetological Society*, rejected this conclusion as unreasonable, explaining that “[i]f the science on  
8 population size and trends is underdeveloped and unclear, the Secretary cannot reasonably infer that  
9 the absence of evidence of population decline equates to evidence of persistence.” *U.S. Fish &*  
10 *Wildlife Service*, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 1280. This is precisely the case here, where there is no clear  
11 population trend data and the Service cannot therefore reasonably conclude the populations are  
12 stable. The court upheld the Service’s conclusion that the marten population in Oregon was  
13 relatively large and stable, in contrast, because the Service pointed to a recent study showing that the  
14 Oregon population was relatively large and stable. No such similar study exists here.

15 In a final attempt to distance the Listing Withdrawal from the ambiguous studies it  
16 erroneously relied on, the Service claims that its decision should be upheld because it “did not rely  
17 exclusively on persistence.” Service Br. at 14. But as explained above, the record is clear that the  
18 reversal “hinged” on these population studies. AR 126177. The Service’s mistaken conclusion that  
19 these studies showed stable populations—and therefore threats had not yet “manifested”—was  
20 repeatedly touted as the key rationale for the Service’s decision. *See* AR 000715; AR 000721;  
21 AR 000730; AR 000734; AR 000756; AR 000774; AR 000795; AR 000804 (Service repeatedly  
22 citing lack of “operative” or “manifested” threats—i.e., lack of evidence of population decline—as  
23 reason for withdrawal). The erroneous finding that the population studies showed stable populations  
24 was the heart of the Service’s ultimate decision to disregard the threats to the Pacific fisher, and to  
25 withdraw the proposed listing. Thus, even if the Service gave other reasons for the Listing  
26 Withdrawal, because it cannot be “readily [said] that the erroneous finding clearly had no bearing on  
27 the Secretary’s ultimate decision to withdraw the proposed listing,” the court must vacate and  
28 remand the Listing Withdrawal. *See Tucson Herpetological Soc’y*, 566 F.3d at 880 (remanding

1 listing withdrawal even when the Service gave multiple rationales unrelated to the Service's  
2 erroneous reliance on limited population data).

3 **III. The Service's Desire for More Definitive Data Regarding the Impact That Existing**  
4 **Threats are Having on the Pacific Fisher Does Not Provide a Legal Basis for Dismissing**  
5 **the Best Available Data.**

6 As explained above, the Service's conclusion that Pacific fisher populations are stable was  
7 not supported by the limited and inconclusive studies it relied on. The Service's decision to  
8 withdraw the proposed rule based on lack of evidence of "operative" or "manifested" threats was  
9 arbitrary and capricious, moreover, because it did not provide a rational basis for the Service to  
10 ignore the inherent threats to small populations, as well as the ESA's mandate that the Service  
11 evaluate not only "operative" threats, but also those threats looming in the "foreseeable future." 16  
12 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20).

13 **A. The Service Lacked a Rational Basis to Dismiss the Risk from the Cumulative**  
14 **and Synergistic Effects of Stressors Acting on Small Populations.**

15 In the proposed rule, the Service determined that "the greatest long-term risk to fishers" is the  
16 "isolation of small populations and the higher risk of extinction due to stochastic events."  
17 AR 000691. The Service determined that the Pacific fisher was likely to become endangered in the  
18 foreseeable future "based on multiple threats impacting the remaining two extant native original  
19 populations and the cumulative and synergistic effects of the threats on small populations."  
20 AR 000693. After publication of the proposed rule, there have been no new studies showing that the  
21 size of these populations has increased, that the small size of these populations no longer poses an  
22 inherent risk, or that the "multiple threats" have abated. The Service's reversal boiled down to its  
23 erroneous conclusion that it could dismiss these threats on the basis that the populations were not yet  
24 "experiencing population declines." AR 000730; *see also* AR 000729 ("there is no indication that  
25 any of the monitored populations are exhibiting a population growth trend that is other than  
26 essentially stable").

27 In the same way the absence of evidence that someone clinging to a cliff has already fallen  
28 does not provide a rational basis to conclude that she is safe, the absence of definitive evidence of  
declining populations does not provide a rational basis to conclude that the species is not at risk. This

1 case is therefore on all fours with *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*, where the court explained that it  
2 was arbitrary and capricious for the Service to “catalogue[] a number of seemingly perilous  
3 circumstances,” including small population size, and then to conclude that none of the circumstances  
4 actually posed a threat, simply because there was no data confirming the threat. *Defenders of  
5 Wildlife v. Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d 975, 1005–06 (D. Mont. 2016).

6 Defendants do not dispute the core holding of *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell* that the Service  
7 may not rely on the lack of data confirming a threat as a reason to dismiss the inherent risk of  
8 extinction in small populations. Intervenor Br. at 23–24; Service Br. at 19–20. This is precisely the  
9 same error that the Service has made here. Just like with the wolverine, the Service noted that Pacific  
10 fisher populations and range have been greatly reduced, which the Service acknowledged could  
11 “potentially increase[] the vulnerability of the fisher to cumulative low- or medium impacts.”  
12 AR 000730. Yet in the same breath, the Service dismissed this threat because it lacked information  
13 suggesting “that current fisher populations in the west coast States are experiencing population  
14 declines or further reductions in distribution.” *Id.* Just like in *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*, the  
15 Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing the inherent threat to small populations based  
16 on the lack of evidence of further declines.

17 Instead of arguing that the Service was correct to dismiss the threats to the Pacific fisher  
18 based on the lack of evidence of declines, Defendants try to distract from this error. Defendants  
19 attempt to brush aside the Service’s prior conclusion that small population size itself poses a threat  
20 as “based largely on general theoretical principles of ecology.” Service Br. at 11, 20; Intervenor Br.  
21 at 14. But the Service admits that there is no actual population modeling for the Pacific fisher that is  
22 better than theoretical models. AR 000728 (“we lack *specific* information about genetic processes in  
23 small, isolated forest carnivore populations” (emphasis added)). Thus, as the Service’s cited source  
24 explains, in the absence of more specific studies, the studies the Service relied on in the proposed  
25 listing suggesting small population size is a threat provide the best available science: “[w]ithout  
26 better knowledge of the genetic attributes and processes affecting forest carnivores, questions  
27 regarding persistence of small, isolated populations *can only be answered with untested theoretical*  
28

1 *models.*” (Ruggiero *et al.* 1994, AR 179547 (emphasis added), cited in Listing Withdrawal at AR  
2 000728).

3 The Service may not “ignore[] the *best* available science by demanding *better* science.”  
4 *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. The court rejected a similar argument in  
5 *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*. There, the Service was presented with data showing that the  
6 wolverine makes its dens in deep snow, and therefore climate change poses an increasing threat to  
7 the wolverine by leading to decreased snowpack depth. In withdrawing the proposed rule to list the  
8 wolverine, the Service decided it could not determine how climate change would impact denning  
9 because the scale of the model was too coarse, and because it did not know for certain why the  
10 wolverine dens in deep snow. The court found that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in  
11 disregarding what it had previously found to be the best available science. The court noted that there  
12 was no study that analyzed the issue at a finer scale, and concluded that “[q]uite simply, the Service  
13 cannot demand a greater level of scientific certainty than has been achieved in the field to date—the  
14 ‘best scientific data available’ standard does not require that the Service act only when it can justify  
15 its decision with absolute confidence, and the ESA accepts agency decisions in the face of  
16 uncertainty.” *Id.* at 1003 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); *see also Miccosukee*  
17 *Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States*, 566 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009) (the Service “cannot  
18 hide behind uncertain scientific data to shirk their duties under the [Endangered Species] Act”). In  
19 this case, theoretical models explaining “the greatest long-term risk to fishers [is] the isolation of  
20 small populations and the higher risk of extinction due to stochastic events,” AR 000691, is the best  
21 available science, and the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in disregarding it because no  
22 more “*specific* information about genetic processes in small, isolated forest carnivore populations”  
23 exist. AR 000728 (emphasis added).

24 Defendants also suggest that the presence of the reintroduced populations has now  
25 ameliorated the threat posed by small and isolated populations, but they are mistaken. Service Br. at  
26 11, 20; Intervenor Br. at 18-19. While the proposed rule noted that the reintroduced populations  
27 provide some level of redundancy, representation, and resiliency for the native populations, so that  
28 the Pacific fisher was not in immediate danger of extinction (i.e., “endangered”) nevertheless, the

1 Service concluded that the Pacific fisher was threatened “based on multiple threats impacting the  
2 remaining *two extant native original populations*.” AR 000693 (emphasis added).

3 Since the proposed rule, no new information emerged to suggest that the presence of the  
4 reintroduced populations now compensates for the risk to the native populations. The reintroduced  
5 populations are no larger or more robust than when the Service issued the proposed rule. The Final  
6 Species Report, like the proposed rule, found that the reintroduced population in the Southern  
7 Oregon Cascades has persisted but not expanded much. *Compare* proposed rule at AR 000693 (“[the  
8 Southern Oregon Cascades] population has persisted since its establishment more than 30 years ago,  
9 but it does not appear to have expanded much beyond the area in which it was reintroduced”), *with*  
10 Final Species Report at AR 022650 (“it appears that this population has not expanded its range  
11 much”). Similarly, both the proposed rule and Listing Withdrawal considered that the North Coast  
12 and Southern Oregon populations may be connecting. AR 022637. For the other more recently  
13 introduced populations, the Service repeated its determination from the proposed rule that “it is too  
14 early to conclude the degree to which they will persist and contribute to future fisher conservation.”  
15 Proposed rule at AR 000693; Final Species Report at AR 022651 (“it is too early to determine if the  
16 populations will persist”); Listing Withdrawal at AR 000719 (“our finding that the [Pacific fisher] is  
17 not endangered or threatened does not depend on . . . the new reintroduction in the South  
18 Washington Cascades”).

19 Overall, the Final Species Report still recognized that both the native and reintroduced  
20 populations are “relatively small and isolated” which increases “the vulnerability of these  
21 populations to stochastic changes in survival and reproductive rates.” AR 022758. The Final Species  
22 Report thus continued to recognize that if fisher mortality were to increase due to a random event,  
23 there would be the possibility of “sudden, sharp declines in the populations.” *Id.* And in the Listing  
24 Withdrawal, the Service continued to acknowledge that if either of the native populations “were to  
25 be permanently lost, the fisher’s population redundancy in the west coast States [sic] would be  
26 lowered, thereby decreasing the fishers’ chances of survival in the face of potential environmental,  
27 demographic, and genetic stochastic factors and catastrophic events (extreme drought, wildfire,  
28 etc.)” AR 000729. The Service again dismissed these concerns on the basis that there was no

1 “information available” to suggest that stressors were already “acting upon any of the populations.”  
2 *Id.* But as explained above, the absence of data confirming a threat is not a rational basis to dismiss  
3 the threats the Service previously found inherent to small populations. *Defenders of Wildlife v.*  
4 *Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1005–06 (D. Mont. 2016). The Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously  
5 in dismissing the cumulative and synergistic risks to the small native populations.

6 **B. The Service Lacked a Rational Basis for Dismissing the Risk from Threats**  
7 **Looming in the Foreseeable Future.**

8 By focusing myopically on the lack of “operative” threats, the Service also unlawfully  
9 ignored the ESA’s mandate to consider the “foreseeable future” and to thus “take preventive  
10 measures before a species is ‘conclusively’ headed for extinction.” *Def. of Wildlife v. Babbitt*, 958  
11 F. Supp. 670, 680 (D.D.C. 1997). The Service is incorrect to the extent that it implies stressors must  
12 be currently “operating on the species” in order for the Service to list it under the ESA. Service Br.  
13 at 16–17. The Service need not “wait until it [has] quantitative data reflecting a species’ decline, its  
14 population tipping point, and the exact year in which that tipping point would occur before it could  
15 adopt conservation policies to prevent that species’ decline.” *Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker*,  
16 840 F.3d 671, 683 (9th Cir. 2016). Rather, the Service has a duty to “take action at the earliest  
17 possible, defensible point in time to protect against the loss of biodiversity within our reach as a  
18 nation.” *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1011. Despite the Service’s claim to the  
19 contrary, Service Br. at 21, the overwhelming scientific evidence in front of the Service suggests that  
20 exposure to toxicants and high-severity wildfire will impact the Pacific fisher in the foreseeable  
21 future. The Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disregarding this evidence on the basis that  
22 there is no evidence these stressors are currently “functioning as an operative threat,” AR 000721, or  
23 already causing “documented . . . decline,” AR 000727.

24 **1. There Was No Rational Basis to Dismiss the Threat of Exposure to**  
25 **Toxicants.**

26 In the proposed rule, the Service concluded that toxicants, and anticoagulant rodenticides in  
27 particular, were “a newly identified threat because of reported mortalities of fishers from toxicants  
28 and a variety of sublethal effects.” AR 000690. The Service’s Final Species Report did not conclude  
that toxicants no longer pose the threat identified in the proposed rule. Instead, the Final Species

1 Report repeated the conclusion of the Draft Species Report that exposure to toxicants “may result in  
2 significant population-level impacts in the near future” for the Southern Sierra Population. *Compare*  
3 AR 022755 (Final Species Report), *with* AR 022520 (Draft Species Report). The Service’s dismissal  
4 of this threat again ultimately hinged on the (erroneous) conclusion that the Pacific fisher “is not  
5 experiencing significant impacts at either the population or rangewide scales, currently or in the  
6 foreseeable future.” AR 000727.

7 The Service’s other excuses for dismissing the threat of toxicants, Service Br. at 10, are again  
8 an attempt to “ignore[] the best available science by demanding better science.” *Defenders of*  
9 *Wildlife v. Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.<sup>2</sup> The Service now claims that toxicants do not pose a  
10 threat because there is “no evidence that rodenticide usage will increase within the range of the  
11 [Pacific fisher] in the future.” Service Br. at 10. But the Service’s desire to wait for further evidence  
12 that rodenticide use will increase is arbitrary and capricious in the face of the most recent study on  
13 Pacific fisher mortality, which concluded there *has already been* “an increase of this emerging  
14 threat.” AR 010949; *see also* Final Species Report at AR 022740 (citing study as “new  
15 information”). The study found the average incidence of toxicosis for 2007–2011 was only 5.6%, but  
16 between 2012–2014, 18.7% of fisher deaths were caused by exposure to toxicants. *Id.* This  
17 represented a 233% increase in mortality due to toxicosis. AR 133753 (email from study author to  
18 Service explaining importance of the finding). In the same time period, the study found that Pacific

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>2</sup> Intervenor do not argue that the Service properly considered the effects of toxicants. *See*  
21 Intervenor Br. at 12–18 (arguing that the Service adequately considered other threats, without  
22 mentioning toxicants). Under “Factual Background,” Intervenor mention wisps of public comments  
23 on the Service’s Draft Species Report’s analysis of toxicants. Intervenor Br. at 10-11. Although one  
24 public commenter—a timber company with a financial interest in the withdrawal of the proposed  
25 listing—provided anecdotal evidence of declines in illegal marijuana grows on its own land (*see*  
26 Roseburg Resources Company comment at AR 164955), none of the comments Intervenor point to  
27 offered any new studies showing that the use of toxicants or toxicant exposure was decreasing across  
28 the Pacific fisher’s range. And several of the commenters Intervenor selectively quote from  
expressed support for the Service’s conclusion that toxicants posed a threat, particularly to the native  
California populations. *See* Sauder peer review at AR 179198-99 (“[O]verall, I find the estimates of  
scope and severity for the various threats assessed to be reasonable.”); Sager peer review at AR  
179252-3 (concluding that “[o]verall, I agree that the Service has compiled substantial data to  
support listing at least some segment of west coast fishers as threatened under the Endangered  
Species Act” and noting that exposure to toxicants “is clearly an emerging threat to fishers in at least  
some parts of the range (particularly California”).

1 fishers were also increasingly exposed to anticoagulant rodenticides due to their profligate use at  
2 illegal marijuana cultivation sites, with exposure increasing from 79% between 2007–2011 to 85%  
3 in 2012–2014. AR 010949. The study explained that “[t]his increase in cases and exposure could  
4 signify either an increase in the number of cultivation sites or area impacted or that cultivators are  
5 increasing the level of toxicants being dispersed within occupied fisher home ranges. In either case,  
6 this anthropogenic threat is of increasing concern.” AR 010949.

7         The mortality study was not the only one to conclude the problem is growing. A 2015 study  
8 by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife found that illegal marijuana grows increased  
9 between 2009 and 2012. AR 002230–33. And the Hoopa Study of the North Coast also concluded  
10 the problem of exposure to toxicants may be “growing in severity.” AR 012957–59. Ignoring that  
11 the problem has been increasing in the recent past, while concluding that the Pacific fisher is not  
12 threatened by exposure to toxicants because the Service lacks the ability to predict precisely how the  
13 problem may progress in the future, was arbitrary and capricious. *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*,  
14 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1001; *see also Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen*, 665 F.3d 1015, 1028–  
15 30 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Service’s conclusion that whitebark pine declines would not  
16 threaten the grizzly because “the specific response of grizzly bears to declines in whitebark cone  
17 production is . . . uncertain” was arbitrary and capricious when “considerable data—demonstrating a  
18 relationship between pine seed shortages, increased bear mortality, and decreased female  
19 reproductive success”—all pointed to potential impacts to the grizzly bear).

20         The Service also attempts to dismiss the threat of toxicants on the basis that it lacked required  
21 evidence “indicating that exposure to toxicants at sub-lethal levels . . . was occurring wide-range or  
22 at the population level.” Service Br. at 10. But the best available science before the Service indicates  
23 that sublethal exposure is widespread and already causing harm to the Pacific fisher. The Final  
24 Species Report repeated the conclusion of the Draft Species Report that “toxicant exposure in the  
25 two populations of California fishers appears to be widespread.” Final Species Report at AR 022759.  
26 The Final Species Report, like the Draft Species Report, also explained how sublethal exposure can  
27 harm the Pacific fisher by “impair[ing] an animal’s ability to recovery from physical injury.”  
28 *Compare* Final Species Report at AR 022754, *with* Draft Species Report at AR 022519; *see also* AR

1 040510–11 (email from leading fisher biologist providing a video,  
2 [www.youtube.com/watch?v=otognB4LdTY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otognB4LdTY), demonstrating how a fisher compromised by sublethal  
3 exposure “may be vulnerable to other mortality factors, i.e., predation”). For example,  
4 “[anticoagulant rodenticide]-exposed fishers may be at risk of prolonged bleeding if wounded when  
5 pursuing or killing prey, escaping or fighting predators, or by conspecifics (for example, during  
6 mating).” *Id.* Exposure can also result in changes to animal’s behavior, “which makes them more  
7 susceptible to environmental stressors, such as adverse weather conditions, food shortages, and  
8 predation.” *Id.* Sublethal exposure to anticoagulant rodenticides may also “reduce the reproductive  
9 potential of fishers,” as exposure “has been documented to cause fetal abnormalities, miscarriages,  
10 and neonatal mortality in mammals.” AR 022755. And although the exact degree to which sublethal  
11 exposure increases mortality from other causes is not known, “individual fishers within [the North  
12 Coast, Southern Sierra, and Olympic National Park populations] have been found dead from other  
13 causes and also were found to be exposed to [anticoagulant rodenticides] at sublethal levels,”  
14 AR 000727. Thus, the best available science still confirms that the Pacific fisher, and particularly the  
15 population in the Southern Sierra, is at risk from the direct and sublethal effects of exposure to  
16 toxicants. The Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing the threat of toxicants in the  
17 Listing Withdrawal on the basis that it lacked information about the exact extent of sublethal  
18 exposure. *Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell*, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1001; *Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc.*,  
19 665 F.3d at 1028-30.

## 20 **2. There Was No Rational Basis For Dismissing the Threat from Wildfire.**

21 In the Service’s proposed rule to list the Pacific fisher, the Service considered wildfire to be a  
22 present and future threat “because the frequency and size of wildfires is increasing; we expect this  
23 trend to continue into the future; and based on fishers outside of the West Coast range and other  
24 related species, we predict that large fires (particularly those of higher severity and larger scale) will  
25 cause shifts in home ranges and movement patterns, lower the fitness of fishers remaining in the  
26 burned area, and create barriers to dispersal.” AR 000686. The Service considered wildfire to be  
27 “particularly problematic” for the Southern Sierra population, “because of the narrow band of habitat  
28 that comprises [the Southern Sierra population] and the small population size.” *Id.* The Service

1 linked increasing high-severity fires and habitat conversion in the Southern Sierra to climate change,  
2 noting that climate models predicted that climate change would cause more-frequent fires and  
3 conversion of fisher habitat to grassland and shrubland. Draft Species Report at AR 022432–33.  
4 No new information has cast doubt on the Service’s original key findings. The Service’s Final  
5 Species Report confirmed the basic facts that climate change will cause increasing high-severity  
6 fires and habitat conversion in the drier portions of California, including the Southern Sierras.  
7 AR 022721, AR 022667, AR 022690, AR 022687, AR 022669 (“[b]ecause both the size and severity  
8 of fire may be increasing within fisher habitat in the Sierra Nevada, this risk is likely to increase in  
9 the future.”). The best available science since the proposed rule has therefore confirmed the concern  
10 that high-severity wildfires and loss of habitat could threaten the Pacific fisher, and the native  
11 Southern Sierra population in particular. AR 022667, AR 022691. Again, the Service’s reversal  
12 came down to its erroneous conclusion that the Service lacked “surveys or other information”  
13 showing that wildfire was already “an operative threat.” AR 000721.

14 Defendants’ additional attempts to dismiss the threat of high-severity wildfire are either  
15 contradicted by the record or fail to grapple with the Service’s initial rationale behind the proposed  
16 rule. *See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009) (explaining that when  
17 an agency changes policy, “a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and  
18 circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy”); *Organized Vill. of Kake v.*  
19 *U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture*, 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n agency may not simply discard  
20 prior factual findings without a reasoned explanation.”).

21 Defendants claim that wildfire is no longer a threat because “future wildfires will continue at  
22 a similar rate and severity across the landscape [sic] has been occurring in the recent past.” Service  
23 Br. at 10; Intervenor Br. at 18. But the Service’s Final Species Report contradicts this assertion,  
24 explaining that “[r]ecent climate change has already caused an increase in wildfire activity in some  
25 areas, and this trend is likely to increase as climate change progresses.” AR 022687 (citations  
26 omitted). The Final Species Report also explains that “it is highly likely that the Sierra Nevada”—  
27 the area containing the most vulnerable native Pacific fisher population—“will experience climate-  
28 related increases in disturbance from fire[.]” AR 022690.

1 Defendants further argue that the Service was correct to dismiss the threat of wildfire to the  
2 Pacific fisher because “wildfires are not expected to be high severity in all cases such that they  
3 destroy habitat for entire populations.” Service Br. at 10; Intervenor Br. at 18. They also now point  
4 to habitat benefits from forest ingrowth and low- or mixed-severity fire. *Id.* But the concern that  
5 drove the proposed listing was never that a wildfire itself would wipe out an entire population’s  
6 habitat. Rather, the Service’s concern was that fires could “cause shifts in home ranges and  
7 movement patterns, lower the fitness of fishers remaining in the burned area, and create barriers to  
8 dispersal.” AR 000686. The Service predicted that these impacts, acting on small populations, could  
9 lead to rapid extinction. *See, e.g.*, AR 000028 (“Random . . . environmental changes can lead to  
10 declines that, in small populations, result in rapid extinction. . . . [S]tand-replacing fire or severe  
11 storms, magnify risk of extinction further.” (citations omitted)). In the Listing Withdrawal, the  
12 Service entirely ignored its prior reasoning as to why high-severity fire poses a threat, and similarly  
13 failed to explain how any benefits from forest ingrowth and low- or mixedseverity fire would  
14 ameliorate the risks from high-severity wildfire identified by the proposed rule. The Service may not  
15 simply “casually ignore[]” its prior concerns and findings when altering course. *State v. Bureau of*  
16 *Land Mgmt.*, No. 17-CV-07186-WHO, 2018 WL 1014644, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2018). The  
17 Service’s new erroneous conclusion that wildfire does not pose a threat to any portion of the Pacific  
18 fisher’s range was arbitrary and capricious. *See Fox Television Stations*, 556 U.S. at 515-16; *see also*  
19 *The Fund for Animals v. Norton*, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that a “180  
20 degree reversal from a decision on the same issue” was arbitrary and capricious when the agency  
21 failed to give a reasoned explanation for dismissing the concerns that drove the original rulemaking).

22 In sum, the lack of definitive evidence of declining populations was not a rational basis to  
23 dismiss the well documented threats that drove the proposed rule. The best available science  
24 demonstrates that small population size, exposure to toxicants, and increasing high-severity wildfire  
25 all threaten the Pacific fisher. The Service’s dismissal of these threats based on its desire for more  
26 conclusive data was arbitrary and capricious. The Court should set aside the Listing Withdrawal and  
27 require the Service to issue a new rule, based on the evidence before the agency.

28

1 **IV. The Court Should Not Resolve Count II in Favor of Defendants.**

2 Plaintiffs brought a separate cause of action challenging the Service’s failure to apply its  
3 Significant Portion of the Range policy, which provides that: “[i]f the species is neither endangered  
4 nor threatened throughout all of its range, we will determine whether the species is endangered or  
5 threatened throughout a significant portion of its range.” 79 Fed. Reg. 37,578, 37,585 (July 1, 2014),  
6 AR 036794. *See* Complaint, ¶¶ 59–64. In the Listing Withdrawal, the Service concluded “it was not  
7 necessary to assess whether any portion of the range may be significant under the [Service’s  
8 Significant Portion of the Range] policy” because it “determined that *no portion* of the [Pacific  
9 fisher’s] range *may be* in danger of extinction in those portions or is likely to become so within the  
10 foreseeable future.” AR 000735 (emphasis added); *see also* AR 126147 (email explaining that the  
11 Regional Director “has concluded that the recommendation [to designate the North Coast and  
12 Southern Sierra as significant portions of the range] at this time is not warranted given the lack of  
13 demonstrated population declines from the significant stressors individually and cumulatively”).

14 Plaintiffs have extensively briefed why the Service’s conclusion that “no portion of the  
15 [Pacific fisher’s] range may be in danger of extinction in those portions or is likely to become so  
16 within the foreseeable future” was in error. AR 000735. The Court should not, therefore, “find in  
17 favor of Federal Defendants on claim 2.” Service Br. at 22–23. Rather, the Court should grant  
18 Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment requesting this Court remand the Listing Withdrawal with  
19 direction that the Service reevaluate its conclusion that the Pacific fisher is not threatened in any  
20 portion of the species’ range, which would effectively resolve both counts I and II of Plaintiffs’  
21 Complaint in Plaintiffs’ favor.

22 **V. The Court Should Remand with Direction that the Service Prepare a New Rule Within**  
23 **90 Days.**

24 Contrary to the Service’s protest, Service Br. at 23, remand with direction that the Service  
25 prepare a new rule within 90 days is appropriate here. Courts may generally set reasonable deadlines  
26 for agency action. *Env’tl. Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt*, 73 F. 3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1995). In particular,  
27 “timeliness in the listing process is essential.” Congress specifically amended the Endangered  
28 Species Act in 1982 “for the very purpose of curtailing the [listing] process.” *Biodiversity Legal*

1 *Found. v. Badgley*, 309 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.*  
2 *Norton*, 254 F.3d. 833, 839 (9th Cir. 2001).

3 The Service has demonstrated that in the absence of a court-ordered deadline, it will  
4 indefinitely delay taking action to protect the Pacific fisher. *See* Pls.’ Opening Br. at 9–11 (detailing  
5 Service’s repeated delays and the repeated need for court-ordered deadlines). Ninety days is a  
6 reasonable amount of time. The Service has already had more than seventeen years to consider the  
7 existing science. And it has demonstrated it can reevaluate its listing conclusions within a matter of  
8 months. *Compare* AR 126177 (Regional Director’s decision to withdraw proposed rule), *with* AR  
9 000711 (Listing Withdrawal published four months later). Given this history, and given that  
10 Congress explicitly set a short deadline for the Service to list species as threatened or endangered,  
11 “in order to encourage and expedite the listing process,” 90 days is a reasonable period of time. *W.*  
12 *Watersheds Proj. v. Foss*, No. CV 04 168 MHW, 2006 WL 2868846, at \*4 (D. Idaho Oct. 5, 2006)  
13 (setting a 90-day deadline for the Service to issue a final listing decision).

14 Despite the Service’s claim to the contrary, the “prevailing case law in this circuit” does not  
15 “recognize” that 90 days is insufficient to prepare a new rule. Service Br. at 24. *Tucson*  
16 *Herpetological Society* did not address the reasonableness of a proposed deadline. 566 F.3d at 874.  
17 In *Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton*, the Service presented the court with specific evidence  
18 of a budget moratorium and backlog of listing petitions that delayed it from issuing a final rule  
19 listing the spotted owl as endangered or threatened within the time period proposed by plaintiffs.  
20 *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton*, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Here, the  
21 Service has claimed that 90 days would “simply not be enough time” but fails to point to any reason  
22 why that is the case. Service Br. at 24. The record provides ample evidence that 90 days is a  
23 reasonable amount of time under the circumstances.

## 24 CONCLUSION

25 The best available science, essentially unchanged since the proposed rule, makes it clear that  
26 the fragile remaining Pacific fisher populations warrant protection under the Endangered Species  
27 Act. Deciding at the eleventh hour to jettison this data while pointing to scant and inconclusive  
28 studies of population growth and the desire for hypothetical “better” data was a textbook example of

1 arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. The Listing Withdrawal should be set aside, the proposed  
2 rule reinstated, and the Service instructed to prepare a new rule based only on the best scientific  
3 information available.

4 Respectfully submitted,

5  
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10 Dated: March 16, 2018

11 /s/ Elizabeth B. Forsyth  
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