

1 vegetative treatments to further habitat and fire management
2 goals in the Mendocino National Forest. The project will also
3 contribute to timber production. The Trinity River Lumber
4 Company ("Trinity") intervened in the case; Trinity purchased the
5 stewardship contract for the Smokey Project and will be
6 harvesting trees ones the Project commences. About a year ago,
7 this Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment on two of its
8 claims against the USFS, remanded the Project to the agency to
9 cure the noted defects, and enjoined tree harvesting of trees
10 exceeding 20 inches dbh. Now the USFS and Intervenor move the
11 Court to dissolve the injunction (ECF No. 162).¹

12 II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

13 On February 16, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion
14 for Summary Judgment on its claims that the USFS failed to take a
15 hard look and failed to develop a reasonable range of
16 alternatives in analyzing the proposed Smokey Project (the First
17 and Fourth Claims).

18 Specifically, the Court found that the USFS:

- 19 • Failed to address reasonable alternatives, specifically
20 the suggested diameter caps, SJ Order (ECF No. 121) at
21 31-37, 39;
- 22 • Stated the Limited Operating Period inconsistently
23 throughout the record, id. at 39-40; and
- 24 • Failed to address how its failure to do the monitoring
25 required for other projects impacts the Smokey Project.
26 Id. at 40-41.

27
28 ¹ A hearing was held on this motion on February 27, 2018.

1 The Court also expressed concern that the Environmental
2 Assessment contained varying statistics regarding the number of
3 acres to be treated that, without much explanation of these
4 differences, made the document confusing. Id. at 41. The Court
5 did not however include this issue as a ground for its decision.

6 In all other respects, the Court found in favor of
7 Defendants and granted their and Intervenor's Cross Motions for
8 Summary Judgment on the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
9 Eighth, and Ninth Claims, and the Supplemental Claim.

10 The Court requested further briefing on the proper remedy
11 and issued a Final Judgment on May 26, 2017 (ECF No. 142). The
12 Court remanded the Project to the USFS with instructions to
13 prepare supplemental NEPA analysis that cures the NEPA violations
14 identified in the Court's Merits Order and complies with the
15 applicable statutes. Final Judgment at 7. If the USFS concluded
16 that no EIS would be required, it was ordered to circulate the
17 analysis and draft revised DN/FONSI to the public. Id. The
18 Court ordered the USFS to accept objections for a 20-day period
19 from eligible parties and complete its supplemental documentation
20 and public involvement process no later than December 1, 2017.
21 Finally, the Court enjoined Defendants and Intervenor from
22 removing any trees with 20 inches dbh or greater. The Court
23 retained jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction upon a showing
24 that the USFS has complied with this Court's Order and satisfied
25 its obligations under NEPA. Id. at 8.

26 The USFS issued a Draft Supplement to the Smokey Project
27 Environmental Assessment on September 27, 2017. Mot. at 2; Obj.
28 Let. at 1. Plaintiff submitted objections on October 16 and 17,

1 2017. Id.; Pl. Obj. The USFS responded to those objections.
2 Obj. Resp., ECF No. 162-3. The USFS then issued its Supplement
3 to Environmental Assessment and an affirmation of its prior
4 DN/FONSI (Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact)
5 on November 27, 2017. SEA; Aff. Dec.

6 **III. OPINION**

7 **A. Legal Standards**

8 A district court may relieve a party from a final judgment
9 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b)(5)
10 allows courts to relieve a party or its legal representative from
11 a final judgment, order, or proceeding if the judgment has been
12 satisfied, released or discharged. "A party seeking modification
13 or dissolution of an injunction bears the burden of establishing
14 that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision or
15 dissolution of the injunction." Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166,
16 1170 (9th Cir. 2000). "A significant change is one that pertains
17 to the underlying reasons for the injunction." Moon v. GMAC
18 Mortg. Corp., No. C08-969Z, 2008 WL 4741492, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
19 Oct. 24, 2008).

20 In deciding whether to dissolve an injunction, the Court's
21 review of the agency's action is limited to the scope of the
22 prior litigation and the injunction order at issue. See Today's
23 IV, Inc. v. Federal Transit Administration, No. LA CV13-00378 JAK
24 (PLAx), 2016 WL 741685, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (citing
25 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 162 (2010)).
26 It is not an opportunity for a plaintiff to raise issues that
27 were not addressed in the summary judgment order. Id. New
28 claims must be presented through a new action and cannot serve as

1 a basis to deny a request to dissolve the injunction. Id.; see
2 also Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F. Supp. 2d 825, 844
3 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding a new due process claim exceeds the
4 permissible scope of the court's inquiry in deciding the
5 government's motion to dissolve the 1988 injunction). These
6 limitations build upon a principle common to all federal
7 litigation, a plaintiff cannot raise claims it failed to put the
8 defendant on notice of by its complaint. See Pickern v. Pier 1
9 Imports, Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006).

10 In addition to these principles, Intervenor argues, citing
11 Heartland Regional Medical Center, that the Court need not
12 evaluate the merits of the remand decision before dissolving the
13 injunction. Joinder, ECF No. 165, at 4. In Heartland Regional
14 Medical Center v. Leavitt, the D.C. Circuit found that where a
15 court remanded a case to an agency due to the agency's failure to
16 consider or respond to reasonable alternatives, the agency
17 complied with the judgment by filling the analytical gap and
18 incorporating its rationale for rejecting those alternatives into
19 the decision documents. 415 F.3d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). But,
20 the Circuit explained, "whether or not the agency's [post-remand]
21 rejection of the alternatives was arbitrary is a determination
22 that must be made in [a] separate APA action challenging [the
23 agency's] post-remand decisions." Id. at 30. While this
24 discussion favors a narrow construction of the action required on
25 remand, its instructive value in the present case is very limited
26 because the Heartland decision involved a plaintiff's motion to
27 enforce a judgment, not a decision whether to dissolve an
28 injunction. The more appropriate standards on this motion are

1 cited above.

2 "NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to ensure that
3 the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and
4 will carefully consider, detailed information concerning
5 significant environmental impacts." Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7,
6 23 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). "NEPA . . . simply
7 guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result."
8 Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998).

9 **B. Argument Summary**

10 The USFS seeks dissolution of the injunction. ECF No. 162.
11 It argues, and provides supporting documentation to show, that it
12 has addressed the Court's three main concerns in its supplemental
13 analysis. Additionally, the Supplemental Environmental
14 Assessment ("SEA") clarifies the Project's acreage figures and
15 explains the confusion from earlier iterations of this data.
16 Intervenor joined in this motion, adding some additional
17 arguments and explaining that it has not commenced cutting
18 because the Project was not economically feasible with the
19 Court's diameter cap. Joinder at 2.

20 Plaintiff opposes the motion. ECF No. 166. First, it
21 argues that the failure to conduct a detailed analysis of a
22 single "action alternative" to the Smokey Project is a violation
23 of NEPA's alternative analysis requirement. Opp'n at 2. It
24 contests the USFS's alternatives analysis as (1) skewed toward
25 selecting an alternative with intensive cutting, (2) based upon
26 fire conditions likely to occur during 97th percentile weather
27 conditions (which it claims is arbitrary and capricious),
28 (3) flawed by its failure to explain why the only analyzed action

1 alternative calls for tree cutting far more extensive than
2 necessary, and (4) contrary to underlying management objective of
3 assuring that tree mortality not exceed 25 percent. Id. at 4-12.
4 Next, Plaintiff argues that USFS has failed to meet its
5 monitoring obligations from sources like the Mendocino National
6 Forest Land and Resource Management Plan and the USFWS's "2011
7 Northern Spotted Owl Survey Protocol." Id. at 13. Finally,
8 Plaintiff argues that the supplemental analysis failed to clarify
9 the LOPs.

10 In Reply, the USFS argues that Plaintiff's Opposition seeks
11 to expand the scope of this litigation and raises issues that do
12 not go to the NEPA deficiencies the Court identified in its
13 earlier orders. Fed. Reply at 1. It argues that Plaintiff's
14 criticisms are procedurally improper and that it fully complied
15 with the Court's Order. Id. Similarly, Intervenor contends that
16 Plaintiff has not shown any deficiencies in the analysis on
17 remand. Intervenor Reply at 1. Intervenor also argues,
18 persuasively, that "the deficient alternatives analysis was the
19 foundation of the Court's decision to issue an injunction."
20 Reply at 2; J. Order at 3. Therefore, the central question in
21 deciding whether or not to dissolve the injunction should be the
22 supplemental alternatives analysis.

23 C. Alternatives Analysis

24 1. MSJ Ruling

25 The purpose and need of a project defines the scope of the
26 alternatives analysis and an agency need only evaluate
27 alternatives that are reasonably related to the project's
28 purposes. League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains

1 Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Service, 689 F.3d 1060, 1069
2 (9th Cir. 2012). Courts afford agencies considerable discretion
3 to define the purpose and need of a project. Westlands Water
4 Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 866 (9th Cir.
5 2004). This Court has already deferred to USFS's defined
6 "purpose and need" of the Project. SJ Order at 30.

7 Under NEPA, "[a]gencies are required to consider
8 alternatives in both EISs and EAs and must give full and
9 meaningful consideration to all reasonable alternatives." Te-
10 Moak Tribe of West. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior,
11 608 F.3d 592, 601-02 (9th Cir. 2010). "The existence of a viable
12 but unexamined alternative renders an environmental impact
13 statement inadequate." Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.
14 F.A.A., 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
15 marks and citation omitted) (applying this rule in the EA
16 context). Projects authorized under the Healthy Forest
17 Restoration Act ("HFRA")—like this one—need only consider three
18 alternatives: the proposed agency action; the alternative of no
19 action; and an additional action alternative, if the additional
20 alternative—(i) is proposed during scoping or the collaborative
21 process under subsection (f); and (ii) meets the purpose and need
22 of the project, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
23 Council on Environmental Quality. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(c).

24 The Court previously found that the USFS's failure to
25 consider or acknowledge an alternative with a larger diameter cap
26 was arbitrary and capricious, in light of the numerous diameter
27 cap suggestions made during the collaborative process leading up
28 to the Project.

1 2. USFS Supplemental Analysis

2 The USFS cured this deficiency in its Supplement to
3 Environmental Assessment ("SEA"), Section 5, Issue 1 - Range of
4 Reasonable Alternatives. The agency considered 6 alternatives,
5 two versions each of an 18 inches, 20 inches, and 24 inches dbh
6 limit. It concluded that "all six alternatives would be
7 inconsistent with key elements of the Smokey Project's purpose
8 and need, and would fail to achieve the agency's policy
9 objectives for the project." SEA at 5. It explains that the
10 alternatives were considered with two primary purposes in mind:
11 (1) the need to retain NSO foraging habitat, and (2) the need to
12 thin overstory trees. The analysis also notes that the
13 commercial thin units are the only treatments to contribute to
14 timber production, a secondary purpose and need of the Smokey
15 Project. Id. at 5.

16 The agency concluded that the diameter limit alternatives
17 would fail to sufficiently protect NSO foraging habitat and would
18 significantly reduce the amount of timber offered for sale. Id.
19 at 7. The primary purpose—protecting NSO foraging habitat—was
20 determined by a two part test: "First, the alternative must not
21 cause a direct loss of NSO foraging habitat due to excessive
22 canopy reduction. Second, the alternative must reduce fuel
23 hazard enough to prevent loss of NSO foraging habitat to
24 wildfire. Both tests must be passed for an alternative to be
25 consistent with the project's purpose and need." Id. For the
26 first criteria, the USFS required that an alternative not reduce
27 canopy cover below 40%; anything below that point would not
28 function as foraging habitat and would be downgraded to dispersal

1 habitat. App. 1 at 2. For the second, the USFS limited post-
2 fire basal area mortality to 25 percent or less, as determined
3 using the Forest Vegetation Simulator ("FVS") model with 97th
4 percentile weather conditions. Id. at 3-4.

5 The diameter caps failed the first round of modeling (18A,
6 20A, and 24A). SEA at 8. The 20A and 24A caps achieved the fuel
7 reduction goals but resulted in significant reduction in canopy
8 cover because of the clumpy size class distribution in the
9 stands. Id. The 18A cap retained adequate canopy cover but
10 failed to achieve the Project's fuel reduction goals. Id.

11 The USFS then conducted a second round of modeling with the
12 same diameter caps but with a different prescription that
13 constrained canopy cover reduction to the desired minimum level
14 (18B, 20B, and 24B). Id. For each alternative, the constraint
15 precluded the desired fire hazard reduction goals. Id.

16 The USFS explained that because the Proposed Action does not
17 have a diameter limit, trees can be thinned evenly across all
18 size class clumps: "the ability to remove some larger trees
19 allows the Proposed Action to achieve reduction of canopy fuel
20 hazard in the hard-to-replace larger size class clumps, and to
21 retain canopy cover in the smaller size class clumps, both of
22 which comprise the foraging habitat within the commercial thin
23 units." Id. at 9. The agency also noted that only alternatives
24 20A and 24A would produce enough timber to offer economically
25 viable sales.

26 Ultimately, because none of the alternatives were consistent
27 with the primary purposes of fuel hazard reduction and protection
28 of mid- and late-successional habitat, the USFS concluded that it

1 would not consider the alternatives in further detail. Id. at
2 10-11. Additionally, the agency noted that none of these
3 alternatives produced the level of timber achieved in the
4 Proposed Action.

5 3. Plaintiff's Objections

6 a. The Decision Was Biased Because of USFS's
7 Financial Interest In Harvesting Timber

8 Plaintiff argues the "biased adjudicator" problem is in full
9 force here. Opp'n at 5. It latches onto a statement—which seems
10 to be one that describes the USFS generally rather than what
11 specifically occurred in this project—included in the Response to
12 its objections: "The Forest recognizes that their lands can't be
13 protected, as prescribed, if the timber offered is not sold or is
14 at a cost via service contract." Id. (citing Obj. Resp., ECF No.
15 162-3, at 12). It refers the Court to a line in Appendix 1, in
16 which the USFS considers the economic viability of the project
17 with the proposed diameter caps: "Such uneconomic volumes could
18 still be produced, by implementing the commercial thinning
19 through a service contract, but this would require substantial
20 Forest Service funding." Id. (citing App. 1 at 3). Plaintiff
21 notes several other statements in the record indicating that the
22 USFS's interest in funding influenced its judgment.

23 But, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any authority indicating
24 that the agency's financial interest in a particular outcome
25 renders its decision invalid. Judge Noonan's concurring comments
26 in the Earth Island Institute cases do not make new law, nor do
27 they provide any guidance to the Court as to how it should
28 account for the agency's financial interests in the project. See

1 Earth Island Institute v. U.S. Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147 (9th
2 Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J. concurring); Earth Island Institute v.
3 U.S. Forest Service, 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003) (Noonan, J.
4 concurring). In contrast, the USFS cites several authorities—
5 though not directly on point—indicating that the timber
6 production is a permissible consideration in national forest
7 management. Reply at 3; 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (“In developing,
8 maintaining, and revising plans for units of the National Forest
9 System pursuant to this section, the Secretary shall assure that
10 such plans provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the
11 products and services obtained therefrom . . . and, in
12 particular, include coordination of outdoor recreation, range,
13 timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness[.]”).

14 The USFS’s supplemental analysis is candid in its
15 consideration of economic factors in implementing the project.
16 But, this concern was not the Project’s primary purpose and it
17 does not appear that financial incentives drove the entire
18 project. Plaintiff has not shown that the economic viability or
19 advantages of a project is an improper consideration.

20 The USFS also argues that Plaintiff waived this argument by
21 failing to address it in its Complaint or the Summary Judgment
22 briefing. Further, Plaintiff did not raise this specific
23 objection in its objections to the SEA, as required for
24 exhaustion purposes. See Pl. Obj. It is true that this specific
25 argument appears to be new, though Plaintiff did express concerns
26 related to the economic viability of the project in its
27 Objections. And, as the USFS notes in footnote 3, this argument
28 appears geared toward challenging the “purpose and need” of the

1 project, which the Court already upheld at the summary judgment
2 stage.

3 The Court finds that this biased adjudicator argument fails
4 substantively and appears to be procedurally untimely as well.

5 b. It Was Arbitrary And Capricious For The USFS To
6 Base Its Alternatives Analysis Upon Fire
7 Conditions Likely To Occur During 97th
Percentile Weather Conditions

8 Plaintiff contends that the USFS used inflated fire weather
9 conditions—97th percentile—in the alternatives analysis to
10 justify its decision to incorporate large old tree component into
11 the timber sales specifications. Opp'n at 8. It points out that
12 this number is inconsistent with the modeling used to prepare the
13 Mendocino National Forest Late Successional Reserve Assessment
14 ("LSRA"), which was at 90th percentile weather conditions. Id.
15 at 7.

16 The USFS responds to this objection, Obj. Resp. at 8-10, by
17 noting that the choice of 97th percentile weather as the
18 threshold for modeling was relied upon in the Environmental
19 Assessment, Fuels Report, and throughout the project. It
20 explains that the 97th percentile weather was selected to meet
21 the purpose and need for reductions in potential fire behavior
22 across as broad a spectrum of possible weather scenarios. Id.

23 The 97th percentile weather conditions measurement was in
24 fact used throughout the Smokey Project, see Environmental
25 Assessment at 5 (citing the Fuels Report) (AR000025), and
26 Plaintiff did not raise this issue in the merits briefing last
27 year. Reply at 7. Plaintiff's objection is a new issue and
28 exceeds the scope of the Court's Order.

1 The USFS also provided an adequate explanation for its
2 decision to use the 97th percentile. Not only did it address the
3 issue in its Objection Responses, it explains the selection of
4 the 97th percentile in Appendix 1 - Evaluation of Diameter Limit
5 Alternatives under the subheading "Methods of Analysis." See
6 App. 1 at 4. The agency explains that "the vast majority of area
7 burned by wildfires is burned by a relatively small number of
8 large wildfires burning under extreme conditions." Id. at 4.
9 It addressed the shift from the 90th percentile to the 97th
10 percentile: the higher percentile accounts for climate change and
11 the 97th percentile conditions were judged to approximate 90th
12 percentile conditions over the life of the Project (20 years).
13 Id. at 5. Plaintiff has failed to cite any authority requiring
14 the USFS to use a different percentile. Nor has Plaintiff
15 pointed to a rule requiring projects to utilize the 90th
16 percentile weather conditions that was used in the LSRA. The
17 court finds that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the USFS
18 to use the 97th percentile in the alternatives analysis.

19 c. The Analysis Is Flawed Because It Does Not
20 Explain Why The Only Analyzed Action
21 Alternative Calls For Tree Cutting Far More
22 Extensive Than Necessary

22 In its objections to the Supplemental Analysis, Plaintiff
23 contends that the project is generating more timber than
24 necessary for minimum economic viability. It argues that the
25 USFS's decision to only analyze an alternative that yielded "7
26 million board feet—almost 50% more than the high end of the
27 'viable range'—is therefore arbitrary and capricious." Opp'n at
28 11. Plaintiff argues that the USFS's explanation for choosing a

1 project with such a high yield is lacking. Id.

2 First, Plaintiff has not identified a previously proposed,
3 reasonable alternative that both meets the purpose and need of
4 the project and decreases the number of board feet produced. The
5 USFS provided a reasoned explanation for ruling out the diameter
6 caps. It does appear that the project produces more board feet
7 than the USFS has acknowledged is necessary for the Project to be
8 economically viable. See Obj. Resp. at 12. The USFS does not
9 specifically explain why the Project goes beyond that amount.
10 But it does explain how the Smokey Project's design and the
11 treatments to be performed meet the purpose and need of the
12 project. It explains why the diameter cap alternatives do not.
13 Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any statute or regulation
14 requiring the USFS to explain itself in the negative (i.e. why it
15 chose not to do something) except as necessary to explain why it
16 did not consider alternatives, which it did. Plaintiff's
17 approach would require an agency to explain why it did not
18 consider any infinite number of possible project designs. This
19 does not accord with the HFRA, which only requires the USFS to
20 consider an additional alternative if it is proposed during
21 scoping or the collaborative process under subsection (f) and
22 meets the purpose and need of the project. 16 U.S.C. § 6514(c).

23 Second, this challenge goes beyond the scope of the Court's
24 order, which required the USFS to consider the diameter caps
25 suggested during the scoping process. As such, this argument
26 fails both procedurally and on the merits.

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1 d. The Only Action Alternative Assessed By The
2 USFS Will Result In A Significant Amount Of
3 Tree Mortality

4 Finally, Plaintiff claims that the alternatives analysis is
5 flawed because the only action considered is inconsistent with
6 the underlying management objective for the Smokey Project, which
7 is to assure that tree mortality not exceed a maximum of 25
8 percent. Opp'n at 12 (citing Environmental Assessment at 4).
9 Again, this challenge goes beyond the scope of the Court's order,
10 which required the USFS to consider the diameter caps suggested
11 during the scoping process. Further, Plaintiff did not raise
12 this issue in its original Motion for Summary Judgment. See MSJ,
13 ECF No. 103. Plaintiff is attempting to use this opportunity to
14 litigate new issues.

15 Even were the Court to countenance this argument, it lacks
16 merit. The USFS explains that the 25 percent mortality rate
17 discussed in the Late Successional Reserve Assessment ("LSRA")
18 refers to potential mortality from future wildfire, not mortality
19 due to fuel treatment removal. See Opp'n at 12; Obj. Resp. at
20 10. Plaintiff describes this explanation as absurd, but it is
21 consistent with the quoted portion of the LSRA. See AR 5298-99
22 (LSRA at 35). The quoted rate is included in a sub-section
23 titled "Risk to LSR Habitat From Future Large-Scale
24 Disturbances," which discusses the potential risk that wildfires
25 pose to LSR habitat. AR 5295-96 (LSRA at 31-32). The entire
26 section discusses predicted mortality rates for different areas
27 of the forest and habitat classes should fires occur. The
28 following portion of this section, which is quoted in the Smokey
 Project Environmental Assessment, does appear to refer to

1 mortality caused by fires and not by fuel reduction treatments:
2 "Fuel management strategies and techniques that reduce the
3 intensity of wildfires, limit flame lengths to less than four
4 feet, and reduce the likelihood of crown fires would reduce tree
5 mortality to less than 25% and maintain late successional
6 habitat." AR 5299 (LSRA at 35). The USFS is entitled to
7 deference in interpreting its own regulations unless that
8 interpretation is plainly inconsistent with the regulation at
9 issue. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 418
10 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2005). Such deference is warranted here.
11 Plaintiff has also not identified any USFS document or rule that
12 restricts overall tree mortality to 25 percent. For all these
13 reasons, Plaintiff's argument fails.

14 **D. Past Monitoring**

15 1. Prior Ruling

16 In its merits order, the Court expressed concern that the
17 USFS admitted it had not completed the monitoring for other
18 projects in the Mendocino National Forest as required in the
19 Enforceable Terms and Conditions found in prior Biological
20 Opinions. SJ Order at 19-20. Though the Court did not find that
21 this issue rendered the decision not to complete an EIS arbitrary
22 and capricious, it found the lack of explanation for this
23 deficiency meant the agency failed to take a "hard look" at the
24 impacts of the Smokey Project. Id. at 40-41.

25 2. Supplemental Analysis

26 The USFS claims that the Mendocino National Forest was and
27 is in full compliance with its ESA monitoring obligation. SEA at
28 16. It clarified that the monitoring for several projects had

1 not been done because the projects had either been cancelled or
2 not yet been implemented. Id. Only one project—of the 15
3 projects that have gone through formal consultation for the NSO—
4 has been implemented and requires annual reporting: the Westshore
5 project. The USFS has done the necessary monitoring for the
6 Westshore project and the information gathered does not affect
7 the Smokey Project's expected impacts or significantly modify the
8 environmental baseline. Id. at 16-19.

9 3. Plaintiff's Objections

10 Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the USFS has
11 complied with the monitoring requirements imposed following
12 formal consultation with the FWS. Instead they argue:

13 Conservation Congress has demonstrated that the USFS
14 has monitoring obligations arising from other sources.
15 For example, Conservation Congress has explained that
16 the USFS has mandatory monitoring obligations imposed
17 by the USFS's Mendocino National Forest Land and
Resource Management Plan and the USFWS's "2011
Northern Spotted Owl Survey Protocol," and that the
USFS has failed to comply with these monitoring
obligations.

18 Opp'n at 13. Plaintiff cites back to declarations it submitted
19 in the remedy briefing indicating that the USFS has failed to
20 comply with such requirements.

21 In the summary judgment briefing, Plaintiff took issue with
22 the general lack of monitoring and the USFS's failure to perform
23 the monitoring required by FWS following formal consultation on
24 previous projects. See generally MSJ, ECF No. 103; Reply, ECF
25 No. 114. The Court only found a violation due to the fact that
26 the USFS failed to account for its admitted failure to do
27 monitoring required in other Biological Opinions. The SEA
28 addresses the Court's concern. Plaintiff has not provided any

1 reason for the Court to question the USFS's representations
2 concerning its monitoring of other projects. It has not argued
3 that there is any project the USFS failed to account for in the
4 SEA or that any of the information is inaccurate. The Court
5 therefore finds that the USFS has cured the identified monitoring
6 deficiencies.

7 The challenges Plaintiff raises also exceed the scope of the
8 Court's order. During the remedy briefing stage, Plaintiff
9 attempted to introduce declarations and evidence showing that the
10 USFS has failed to comply with the Survey Protocols and the
11 monitoring required for the Smokey Project. Plaintiff again
12 refers the Court to this evidence as well as evidence concerning
13 surveys in the year 2017. Opp'n at 16 (citing Sugarman Decl.,
14 Ex. 2). But Plaintiff has not provided a legal basis for the
15 Court to consider such evidence at this stage of the proceedings.
16 It is a new argument; Plaintiff contends that because the USFS
17 has failed to perform protocol-level surveys in the Smokey
18 Project area, the Court should find that the agency failed to
19 take a "hard look" at the Project's impacts. The new argument
20 has little to do with the Court's prior order and seeks to
21 litigate new violations.

22 Plaintiff also argues that the USFS knows about a nesting
23 pair of northern spotted owls in a stand occupying stands
24 adjacent to commercial timber units. Opp'n at 14. Plaintiff
25 raised this issue in its Supplemental Claim against the FWS and
26 the Court deferred to the agencies' interpretation of the
27 available data. SJ Order at 48. This issue may not be revisited
28 here.

1 The USFS argues that Plaintiff should not be allowed to
2 pursue its new claims regarding insufficient monitoring due to
3 the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine is a
4 prudential one under which courts may, under appropriate
5 circumstances, determine that the initial decision making
6 responsibility should be performed by the agency rather than the
7 courts. Syntek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Technology
8 Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). "Primary jurisdiction
9 is properly invoked when a claim is cognizable in federal court
10 but requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a
11 particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to a
12 regulatory agency." Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc.,
13 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). The USFS asks the Court to
14 exercise its discretion to defer the monitoring claim, to the
15 extent it relies on new 2017 survey data, to the agency.

16 The Court finds the USFS cured the monitoring issue the
17 Court identified in the SJ Order. Plaintiff has not contested
18 the agency's account of its activities for other projects, but
19 instead, has improperly raised issues outside the scope of the
20 Court's Order. Because the USFS has satisfied its obligation on
21 this issue, the Court need not decide the USFS' primary
22 jurisdiction contention to resolve this issue.

23 **E. LOPs**

24 1. Prior Ruling

25 In the Merits Order, the Court found that the Limited
26 Operation Period protocol was stated inconsistently throughout
27 the record, making it difficult (if not impossible) for one to
28 know how the LOPs operate and determine agency compliance. SJ

1 Order at 41. The confusion principally stemmed from statements
2 in the Environmental Assessment and Appendix A, stating that "A
3 limited operating period for northern spotted owls would be
4 applied to all units from February 1 to September 15 unless
5 current protocol-level surveys indicate that they are
6 unnecessary." SJ Order at 39 (emphasis added). This statement
7 did not accord with the LOPs stated in the Biological Assessment
8 and the three Biological Opinions.

9 2. Supplemental Analysis

10 The USFS thoroughly discusses and describes the LOPs in the
11 Supplemental Environmental Assessment and in Appendix 3 - Unit-
12 Specific LOP Application and History. It clarifies that "any
13 characterization of the LOPs in the EA that differs from the LOP
14 general requirements in the 2011 BA and 2012 BO . . . should be
15 disregarded." App. 3 at 1 (Section 2.1 Application Error in the
16 EA). The Appendix explains the LOPs and provides a chart showing
17 (and explaining the basis for) the applicable LOP for every unit
18 in the Smokey Project for the year 2017. Id. at 4-12.

19 3. Plaintiff's Objections

20 Plaintiff argues that the supplemental analysis did not cure
21 the deficiencies. It argues that the Environmental Assessment
22 plainly stated that "an LOP for northern spotted owls would be
23 applied to all units from February 1 to September 15 unless
24 current protocol-level surveys indicate that they are
25 unnecessary." Opp'n at 17. Now, it takes issue with the
26 supplemental documents' characterization of that statement as an
27 "application error."

28 Plaintiff's argument fails to account for the fact that the

1 USFS could not comply with this Court's order without providing
2 an explanation for the inconsistent statements in the decision
3 record. The USFS solved the problem by retracting the overbroad
4 and confusing statements and supplementing the record with a
5 thorough explanation that takes precedence over the earlier
6 statements. See SEA at 4 (explaining that where there is
7 conflict with earlier documents "this supplemental document shall
8 take precedence over the 2012 EA.").

9 Plaintiff has not identified any other issues with the
10 supplemental explanation of the LOPs. Plaintiff has also not
11 disputed any of the information in the LOP chart in Appendix 3.
12 For all these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff's argument.

13
14 **IV. CONCLUSION**

15 The USFS adequately addressed each of the Court's concerns.
16 While the result did not change, the agency provided a reasoned,
17 clear, and thorough analysis for its conclusions. The purposes
18 of NEPA, ensuring process but not outcomes, have been met through
19 these supplemental efforts. For all the foregoing reasons, the
20 Court grants the Federal Defendants' and Intervenor's Motion to
21 Dissolve the Injunction.

22 IT IS SO ORDERED.

23 Dated: March 2, 2018.

24
25 
26 **JOHN A. MENDEZ,**
27 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**
28